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1 Introduction
The etymological connection between capitalism and capital is apparent. The latter
seems to play a crucial role in the former. But what is capital? Samuelson and Nord-
haus (2001) state that “the factors of production” (p. 33) in a capitalist economy are
called capital. According to them, capital is “a durable input” (ibid.) which “has to be
produced before [...] use” (ibid.). What precisely the term capital encompasses has
broadened over time.
The classic notion of capital that can already be found in Marx’ Kapital from 1867
[Marx, (1957)] is that capital are tangible things and the financial assets that reflect
the value of these things in monetary units. Samuelson and Nordhaus (2001) give
a number of tangible things as examples for what constitutes capital: “buildings, ma-
chines, computers” (p. 33). Although this type of capital typically depreciates over time,
it is durable in the sense that it can be used repeatedly before it needs to be written
off. Over time, intangible assets such as “technology licenses, patents and copyrights”
[Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2009), p. 667] have been added to the list. Different from
a machine, their value is directly connected to the legal framework they are valid in.
Nonetheless, in such a framework, they fulfil the definition set up by Samuelson and
Nordhaus (2001): they are durable in the sense that they are valid for a certain time
span and they have to be produced before use. Patents, for example, can be produced
through research and development (and patent attorneys). Intangible assets, just as
tangibles, can in principle be converted into financial assets and the other way around.
The notion of capital has been expanded beyond tangible, intangible and financial
assets. Becker (1964) is credited with the concept of human capital. The idea is that
the skills an individual possesses and that he can engage in a productive process con-
stitute capital as well. Again, the definition by Samuelson and Nordhaus (2001) can be
applied: human capital is durable because an individual can use his skills repeatedly.
It also has to be produced before use. This production process has many forms: ex-
amples include formal education in schools and universities or informal training at the
workplace. Human capital is different from the tangible and intangible assets discussed
above in that it cannot be sold, at least not, as Samuelson and Nordhaus (ibid.) point
out, since slavery has been abolished. It thus cannot immediately be converted into
financial assets. Instead human capital is typically rented out for certain amounts of
time in the labor market.
Human capital is not the only extension of the notion of capital. The concept of natu-
ral capital has also gained some prominence in economics. Costanza and Daly (1992)
explain that the stock of natural capital yields a flow of services. In the case of renew-
able natural capital, these services can be produced without a reduction in the stock.
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In the case of non-renewable natural capital, the stock is liquidated to produce the flow
of services. Checking with the definition of capital by Samuelson and Nordhaus (2001)
yields that natural capital is certainly durable in a way that is at least comparable to
tangibles and intangibles and human capital. It is also the result of a prior productive
process, although the extent to which humans are involved in this process differs. It
is often difficult to convert natural into financial capital since many of the services pro-
duced using natural capital are non-excludable, e.g. the production of oxygen by a
tree.
The extended notion of capital that includes not only tangible, intangible and financial
assets, but also human and natural capital still has a blind spot. It says nothing about
the resources that possibly lie in the relationships between individuals. This negligence
may well be rooted in the individualistic nature of neo-classical economic theory. Here,
individuals do not interact directly. Instead, they act on markets that bring together buy-
ers and sellers. Markets are assumed to be anonymous in the sense that it is irrelevant
to the buyer who the seller is and vice versa. Since the middle of the 20th century, game
theory has served to model the interaction between agents [Neuman and Morgenstern
(1944), Nash (1950)]. Game theory is a very helpful instrument to understand how
agents behave in specific situations where the final number of interactions are finite
and known ex-ante. Game theoretic analysis quickly gains complexity when it comes
to representing repeated interactions that characterize most people’s everyday lives.
Here, in order to keep complexity at bay, textbooks like Osborne (2004), even for sim-
ple games like the prisoner’s dilemma1, revert, much in the spirit of Axelrod (2009), to
proposing different simple strategies and examining their results when played against
other simple strategies. An alternative that helps to avoid the overboarding complexity
of repeated game theory but stays within the framework of economic theory is needed,
because, as Jackson (2014) stresses, if “economists endeavor to build better models of
human behavior, they cannot ignore that humans are fundamentally a social species”
(p. 3). The approach that is pursued in this thesis is to conceptualize the value that lies
in the relationships between individuals as capital.
A number of such concepts have been proposed, often by authors that are either
sociologists, social theoreticians or political scientists rather than economists. All these
concepts share the basic intuition, namely that relationships between individuals and
the resulting networks “have value” [Fernandez and Castilla (2001), p. 85] and the
name, social capital. In a first step, this thesis will look at the concepts of social capital
developed by five different scholars. The aim of this section is twofold:
It will become apparent that social capital does not stand for one concept only; sev-
1The prisoner’s dilemma is a well-known game in game theory. Two criminals, A and B, are impeached
for a crime. They cannot communicate with each other. They can either confess or keep silent. If
individual A confesses and B stays silent, A receives w years in prison and B z years. The reverse
is true when B confesses and A stays silent. When both criminals confess, they both receive y years
in prison, while if both criminals stay silent, they both receive x years in prison. For w < x < y < z, a
situation arises where it is the dominant strategy for both individuals to confess although the pareto
superior solution would be for both criminals to stay silent.
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eral different concepts are found under the notion social capital. This variety of con-
cepts reveals the necessity of at least two steps in order to assess whether introducing
a concept of social capital to economic analysis might be a fruitful endeavour: In a first
step it is necessary to specify each of the concepts of social capital in some detail. In
a second step the different concepts and their similarities and differences should be
highlighted. Otherwise, confusion about what is aimed for when using the term social
capital is bound to arise. This specification needs to be rooted in the literature on social
capital, hence an analysis of this is necessary, yet also easily accessible to economists.
Connected to this, the question arises which elements from the different social capi-
tal concepts are compatible with economic theory. This points, more fundamentally, to
the methodological approach used by economic theory. Within neo-classical, or main-
stream, economics, there is usually little debate on methodology. Rational utility max-
imization by individuals with well-behaved preferences is the usual assumption even
in advanced microeconomic textbooks [e.g. Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995),
Silberberg (1990)]. All kinds of institutions, or social wholes, can, at least in prin-
ciple, be explained by the actions and interactions of the individual agents involved.
This methodological approach is commonly referred to as methodological individual-
ism. Udehn (2001) argues that methodological individualism can be differentiated into
strong and weak versions. He gives the following definition for strong methodological
individualism: “In any social scientific model, the exogenous variables and conditions
must refer only to individuals, etc., but not to social institutions [or structure]” [Udehn
(ibid.), p. 355]. Most economists do not use the strong version of methodological indi-
vidualism consequently, but rather weak versions which give some explanatory power
to exogenous variables.
Things, however, become more difficult when transgressing into neighbouring so-
cial sciences as is inevitable when writing about a concept originating there, like social
capital. In the social sciences outside economics, there is a long tradition of quite the
opposite paradigm, namely methodological collectivism or holism. As Udehn (ibid.)
puts it, the core idea is that social wholes are “irreducible to [...] human individuals and
their actions” (p. 39). This paradigm tends to leave little explanatory power for an indi-
vidual, leaving him, in the most extreme case, as “homo sociologicus” [c.f. Dahrendorf
(2006)], as a mere fulfiller of an exogenously assigned role.
There are good arguments to stick with methodological individualism beyond the fact
that it is the predominant methodological approach in economics. As Udehn (2001)
points out, it is the methodology that “follow[s] from individual humanism” (p. 340) and,
unlike collectivism and holism, is not endangered to reduce the individual “to a means
for the ends of history [or] a cog in the social machine” (ibid.). However, sociology
has, at least since Homans (1961), adopted a vivid pluralism in methodology. There
is by now also a strand of rational choice, or, as it is referred to within sociology, so-
cial exchange theory [Fine (2001)], which also uses a weak form of methodological
individualism. Some of the authors who contribute to the literature on social capital
are rational choice sociologists. With them, different methodologies are not an issue.
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Others are no proponents of rational choice, but still use weak forms of methodological
individualism. Here, a careful investigation of their writings is necessary. Still others are
methodological holists, whose writings are difficult from the perspective of methodolog-
ical individualism. Thus, when specifying a concept of social capital, the accessibility of
the different contributions to the social capital literature from a perspective of method-
ological individualism plays a major role. This is the individual perspective that also
appears in the title of this thesis,
From this foundation, namely the specification of a social capital concept that can be
used for further analysis, two research questions arise:
The first research question this thesis will investigate into asks for the different pre-
dictors of social capital possession. Once a social capital concept that is compatible
with economic theory has been found, it can be used to formulate further research
hypotheses. An interesting endeavour is to look into the distribution of social capital,
i.e. which kinds of persons have much and which kinds of persons have little social
capital. The answer to this question does not only yield insights into the mechanisms
that effect social capital in reality, but also into the relationship between social capital
and other forms of capital and into its distribution.
Moreover, the development of research hypotheses on the different predictors of
individual social capital possession is a purely theoretical exercise unless they can be
tested. To do so, social capital needs to be measured. The second research question
pursued in this thesis asks how this can be done. While there are numerous different
proposals to measure social capital, they either aim at different concepts of social
capital relative to the one proposed in this thesis or exhibit severe design flaws. A part
of the answer to the second research question will thus be the development of a new
tool to measure social capital. This tool has also been included in an internet survey
that has been conducted with a sample of 1000 participants which are representative
for the German adult resident population with respect to age, gender, income and
educational level.
The social capital possession measured with this tool can then be used to test the
hypothesis formulated as part of the first research question. Thus, determinants of
social capital possession can be identified. Moreover, statements on the distribution of
social capital can be made.
The structure of this thesis will be as follows: in the first four sections of chapter
2, the theoretical foundation for the social capital concept used throughout this thesis
will be laid. Section 2.1 will briefly look at three early uses of the term social capital
and investigate into the the five most prominent contributions to the social capital liter-
ature in detail. Here, the similarities and differences of the different concepts will be
exposed. Moreover, the connections between the different concepts will be analysed.
Since all of the concepts in section 2.1 originate outside economics, section 2.2 looks
at the modelling of social capital in economic theory. The aim is to see which additional
insights can be gained by investigating social capital from the perspective of different
economists. Section 2.3 will introduce a system to categorize the different concepts
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of social capital presented in sections 2.1 and 2.2. With this systematization, a so-
cial capital concept that is compatible with the individual perspective can be proposed.
Section 2.4 will investigate into the details of this concept. Finally, section 2.5 will de-
velop hypotheses regarding the different predictors of social capital possession. Here,
the first research question is specified in more detail.
In chapter 3, the question how to measure social capital will be investigated in detail.
Specifically, section 3.2 looks at the types of resources identified as social capital re-
sources in the literature in order to assess what should be captured by a social capital
measure. Section 3.1 briefly investigates into the question how different items can be
combined to form an indicator. In section 3.3, different existing social capital measures
will be analyzed. Building on this analysis, a new tool for social capital measurement
will be proposed in section 3.4.
In chapter 4, the results of the empirical survey will be presented. This includes
a descriptive summary of the survey in section 4.1 and an overview over the results
regarding the social capital measurement tool and the indicators hereby created in
section 4.2. Moreover, the results of testing the different hypotheses developed in
section 2.5 are presented in section 4.3. Chapter 5 concludes.
5
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In order to assess whether social capital might be a viable concept for use in eco-
nomics, it needs to be clear what is meant by the term social capital. While this might
look easy at first glance, it becomes more difficult at second: social capital is a term
that is defined in many ways in the literature. Moreover, many of these definitions do
not seem to converge on the same concept. Thus, a specification of the concept of
social capital used in this thesis is necessary. Since this specification needs to be
rooted in the existing literature, a thorough investigation of the concepts proposed in
this literature is necessary. Moreover, it needs to be analyzed which aspects of these
concepts can be connected to economic theory as capital.
In this chapter, firstly, an investigation into the development of the different social
capital concepts and the analytical constructs that have been proposed to bridge the
gaps between them will take place. After a brief overview over early usage of the term
social capital, the works of five key authors will be looked at, who all developed their
respective concept of social capital. It will be analyzed what these authors understand
by the term social capital and what their specific conceptual contributions are. This
aims at depicting the analytical developments that lead to the different concepts that
today bear the name social capital. The second part will look at the reception of social
capital in formal economic modelling. In a third part, a concept of social capital will be
proposed that is sound from an individual perspective. To do so, the concepts devel-
oped in the first part will be systemized and their compatibility with said perspective will
be analyzed. Here, a definition of social capital will be given that will be used for the
rest of this thesis. The fourth part of this chapter will further investigate into this pro-
posed concept of social capital. To do so, a look will be taken at a number of debates
that have been led in the literature regarding certain properties of social capital. The
respective arguments will be analyzed and assessed.
The first research question of this thesis asks for the different predictors of social
capital possession. This research question will be dealt with in two steps: Firstly, in
the fifth part of this chapter, theoretical considerations on different predictors for social
capital possession will be presented. Here, research hypotheses are developed that
will be tested in the empirical investigation in chapter four of this thesis. The second
step, i.e. an empirical testing of these hypotheses, will take place in the fourth chapter.
2.1 Constitutive Literature
The recent literature on social capital can be traced back to Bourdieu and Coleman,
who developed their respective concepts in the 1980s. However, social capital is a
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term that had been given to different concepts several times before. In this section,
these early uses of the term will be looked at briefly before the more recent literature
is introduced. For the latter, the concepts of Bourdieu (1983), Burt (1992, 2000, 2005),
Coleman (1988, 1990), Putnam (1993, 2000) and Fukuyama (1995a, 1995b) will be
discussed in turn. The selection of these authors is based on their role as often-cited
proponents of certain streams within the social capital literature, a role which is based
on their major analytical contributions. For each author, his concept of social capital
will be explained in detail and contrasted to the concepts of the other authors. It will be
assessed what his main conceptual contribution is. The arrangement of the different
authors is not strictly chronological. Instead, it is such that certain developments in the
social capital literature can be shown in a coherent way.
2.1.1 Early Use of the Term Social Capital
There are three notable early inventors of the term social capital, i.e. scholars who used
it before approximately 1980: Hanifan already employed the term in 1916. Homans
(1961) and Loury (1977) are more recent users, writing in the 1960s and 1970s, re-
spectively. Looking at these early contributions is interesting because they all use the
term social capital in different contexts and with different meanings. This variety al-
ready foreshadows the discrepancy of meanings of the term social capital in the more
recent literature discussed later in this thesis. In the following part, a brief introduc-
tion will take place to the perspective of the three authors mentioned above and their
understanding of the term.
Hanifan’s School Community Center
Putnam (2000) and Woolcock (2010) cite Hanifan (1916) as the first to use the term
social capital. He defines social capital as “goodwill, fellowship, mutual sympathy and
social intercourse among a group of individuals and families who make up a social unit”
[Hanifan (ibid.), p. 130] and sees it in close analogy to accumulated physical capital.
While accumulated physical capital can be used to produce consumption goods and
infrastructure to ameliorate the material living conditions of the people, social capital
can be “directed towards a general improvement of the community well-being” [ibid.,
p. 131]. Accordingly, social capital can be created by events such as “public entertain-
ments, “sociables”, picnics and a variety of other community gatherings” (ibid.). In his
analysis, this social capital is lacking in many rural communities at the time, and in-
creasing the level of social capital could help to improve the local living conditions. He
afterwards recounts how a new teacher created social capital in a rural West Virginia
community by initiating regular community meetings. As an effect of these, and the
social capital created therein, school attendance rates increased. Moreover, the need
of evening classes for illiterate adults was discovered and these were subsequently
introduced. Additionally, money for school libraries could be raised.
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Hanifan’s (1916) concept thus sees social capital as an asset which is owned by an
entire community. Different from physical capital, individual possession of social capital
is not possible. Nevertheless, the direct benefits of the community’s social capital
possession accrue to the community’s individual members, e.g. pupils that now attend
school more often or adults that can now learn how to read and write. Notwithstanding,
Hanifan (ibid.) aims at showing that the well-being of the entire community is increased
since it now consists of better educated citizens.
Social Capital in Homans’ Theory on Social Behaviour
Astone et al. (1999) and Adler and Kwon (2002) point to Homans (1961) as the orig-
inator of the term and the concept. According to them, he “describes in detail how
activities, interactions, sentiments, and their interrelationships create new resources”
[Astone et al. (1999), p. 11]. Homans (1961) brings up the term social capital when
explaining how investments may also take place without the direct involvement of phys-
ical or financial capital. Like Hanifan (1916), Homans (1961) argues that the concept
of capital can easily be extended beyond these “classical” types of capital1. For him,
capital is “anything that allows it to postpone actions leading to some immediate re-
ward in order to undertake others whose rewards [...] are both uncertain and deferred”
[Homans (ibid.), p. 386]. Instead of a definition of the term social capital, he describes
it: firstly, he gives the example of an individual A2 who has earned himself some respect
from other individuals by giving good advice. Individual A thus possesses the social
capital to tell these other individuals what to do “on a new occasion” [Homans (ibid.), p.
373]. By doing so, individual A is putting his “social capital at hazard” (ibid.) as he is in
danger of losing his esteem if the other individuals do not find the outcome rewarding.
However, he also has the chance of increasing his social capital if the other individuals
find the outcome satisfactory. Secondly, Homans gives the example of a medieval king
who creates institutions like judges or treasurers. His argument is that institutions are
the result of the investment of capital, including social capital, by, ultimately, individuals.
Consequently, institutions persist “if they turn out to pay off ” (p. 389).
Summing up, social capital for Homans (ibid.) is esteem and the power derived from
it. It is thus an asset that an individual A can use to influence other individuals to behave
in his interest. This asset, however, is not exogenous: it can build up or deteriorate
depending on the use individual A makes of it. There is, thus, a marked difference to
the concept of social capital as developed by Hanifan (1916). The benefit for society
1In what follows, these classical types of capital, i.e. physical and financial capital, will also be called
economic capital.
2There are two alternative ways to clearly denote interacting individuals. In economic game theory, it is
standard to denote them with numbers or letters, i.e. individual one, two, three, etc. or A, B, C, etc.
In sociology, an often-used nomenclature is to denote the individual under investigation as ego and
other interacting individuals as alter in singular, or alters in plural. The nomenclature from economic
game theory has the advantage of being able to further differentiate between individual alters. It will
thus be sticked to. The individual that would be denoted ego in the sociological tradition will typically
be denoted as individual A throughout this thesis.
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Homans (1961) sees is that individuals who invest social capital to try out a variety of
institutions in a process of trial and error can help a society to develop.
Loury’s Idea of Social Capital as a Factor in Human Capital Creation
Coleman (1990) cites Loury (1977) as the originator of the term. The latter deals
with racial income differences and the question whether they will diminish over time.
He develops an economic model where the parental socioeconomic status as well as
the community environment influence the cost of human capital accumulation, and
thus job opportunities, for an individual. In this model, diminishing returns to scale for
parental income in the production of their offspring’s human capital are assumed: if
the offspring’s human capital creation would only be dependent on the parental so-
cioeconomic status, income between races would converge over time. Accordingly,
Loury (ibid.) proposes that there are communities exhibiting “more favorable environ-
mental influences” (p. 161) on the cost of human capital accumulation and that these
are the communities where the average level of income is higher. He thus argues
that it is necessary to include the community environment as an explanatory variable.
Moreover, the assumption is introduced that there is some social stratification between
races and that individuals in some racial groups exhibit a lower average socioeconomic
status. With these assumptions, it can be shown that income levels may, but need not
converge over time. Loury (ibid.) proposes to call these influences of the community
environment on an individual’s cost of human capital accumulation “social capital” (p.
176).
Different from Homans (1961) and Hanifan (1916), Loury (1977) does not see social
capital as a resource in analogy to economic capital which allows groups [in the case
of Hanifan] or individuals [in the case of Homans] to use it for possibly profit-bringing
endeavours in the widest sense of the word. For him, social capital is a variable ex-
ogenous to the individual or the social group, describing the influence of the social
environment on an individual’s capacity to build human capital.
These three authors already represent almost the entire disparity of the latter con-
cepts of social capital: the very same term is used for exogenous environmental vari-
ables, capital stocks owned and controlled by a community and capital stocks owned
and controlled by individuals. However, while all three authors offer very insightful
analysis and use the term social capital in a way that could almost seamlessly be
connected to the work of later authors, it was not until the work by Bourdieu (1983),
Coleman (1988, 1990), Burt (1992) and Putnam (1993) that the concept of social cap-
ital found widespread attention. In addition, later work by Fukuyama (1995a, 1995b),
Burt (2000) and Putnam (2000) has also attracted intense scholarly interest. In the
next section, an in-depth discussion of the social capital concepts of these five authors
will take place.
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2.1.2 Bourdieu’s Concept of Social Capital
As shown above, Bourdieu has not been the first author to use the term social capital.
However, it was one of his articles that initiated a widespread academic discussion on
the subject.
Although Bourdieu’s article from 19833 is widely referred to in the social capital liter-
ature, he had already dealt with the topic earlier: Coleman (1990) points to a two-page
long research note from 1980 as his first publication on social capital. While this short
research note captures his main ideas on social capital, it remains largely uncited in
the literature. The same is true for the short references to social capital in Bourdieu’s
magnum opus “La distinction” that was published a year earlier, in 1979 [Bourdieu
(2008)]. Woolcock (2010) even points to the book “Esquisse d’une the´orie de la Pra-
tique, pre´cede´ de trois e´tudes d’ethnologie kabyle” [Bourdieu (1972, 1976)] as his first
elaboration on social capital. Indeed, some parts of his concept are already included
in the fifth chapter of the second part of the book. Portes (1998) presumes that these
earliest works of Bourdieu on social capital receive little attention because they are
written in French. Moreover, the treatment in the article from 1983 is theoretically more
refined. The focus will thus be put on this latter publication when examining Bourdieu’s
concept of social capital.
In the context of Bourdieu’s sociology, the different forms of capital constitute a major
building block [see e.g. Lenger, Schneickert, and Schumacher (2013), Rehbein (2011)
or Schwingel (1995)]. Together with an individual’s habitus and the rules of a certain
field, they create practice, i.e. observed reality. A field is to be understood as a rel-
atively autonomous area of society. An individual’s aim is to gain an advantage in a
certain field [Rehbein (2011)]. In order to do so, an individual acts. His actions are con-
strained by two factors: firstly, the set of possible actions is limited by his habitus. The
habitus are an individual’s tastes, behavioral patterns and patterns of action that have
been acquired during his socialization [Browne-Yung, Ziersch, and Baum (2013)]. The
habitus allows an individual to act quickly even in unknown situations and, at the same
time, to keep his identity. While it does not predetermine his actions, it limits, as de-
scribed, the number of possible actions. However, the individuals’ aggregated habitus
also shapes the field, creating a pattern of co-determination [Schwingel (1995)]. Within
this framework, the different forms of capital constitute the action resources available
to an individual, i.e. the resources that determine which actions in the set of possible
actions are also realizable.
Bourdieu (1983) begins by explaining why examining capital is important: capital is
the main driver of inequality that can explain why “everything is not equally possible or
impossible” [Bourdieu (1986), p. 241 f]. The argument is that “capital is accumulated
labor” [ibid., p. 241], which enables those who possess it to “appropriate social energy
in the form of reified or living labor” (ibid.), an idea that can be traced to Marx (1957)
3This article was originally published in German. An often-cited translation to English was published in
1986.
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[c.f. Fuchs-Heinritz (2011)]. The difference is as follows: while Marx’ (1957) analy-
sis is limited to economic capital4, Bourdieu thus extends Marx’ notion of capital and
identifies three types of capital: economic capital, cultural capital and social capital5.
These three forms of capital can be transformed into one another, time being the main
resource necessary to do so. Bourdieu (1983) does not examine economic capital any
closer and presumes it is a concept familiar to the reader. He does, however, offer
a closer examination of cultural and social capital. The concept of cultural capital is
related to, but of a broader scope than Becker’s (1964) concept of human capital, an
interpretation also shared by Portes (1998).
Social capital is defined as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which
are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized rela-
tionships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or, in other words, to membership
in a group – which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectivity-
owned capital, a “credential” which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the
word” [Bourdieu (1986), p. 248 f]. Thus, membership in a “network [...] of mutual ac-
quaintance and recognition” [ibid., p. 248], has a twofold advantage to its members.
Firstly, it allows access to the resources of other network members. This entails their
economic, but also their cultural and social capital. Secondly, with Bourdieu’s prime
example being the aristocracy, membership in such a network may serve as a signal
to outsiders about the resources an individual A has access to by virtue of his mem-
bership. These resources may serve as a collateral vis a vis individuals from outside
individual A’s group and thus give individual A access to further resources, again en-
tailing economic, cultural and social capital. The social capital individual A possesses
thus “depends on the size of the network of connections he can effectively mobilize”
[Bourdieu (ibid.), p. 249] and on the resources individual A and those he is connected
to control. Thus, there is a “multiplier effect” (ibid.) on an individual’s own resources,
including his economic and cultural capital, that is caused by social capital.
Creation of Social Capital in Bourdieu (1983)
With the definition of social capital as the access to other individuals’ resources, the
question that subsequently arises is how social capital is created. For Bourdieu, so-
cial capital results from “more or less institutionalized relationships” [Bourdieu (ibid.),
p. 248]. These, in turn, are based on, maintained and generated by “indissolubly ma-
terial and symbolic exchanges” (p. 249), i.e. social interaction in a broad sense. This
includes, but is by no means limited to, economic exchanges6. This social interac-
tion turns “contingent relations [...] into relationships that are at once necessary and
4Marx acknowledges the role of nature in the production process (p. 23), but would not identify natural
inputs into the production process as natural capital as they are not the product of human labor.
5Bourdieu identifies further forms of capital later in his research which he does not analyze in the same
depth [Fuchs-Heinritz (2011)]. However, as this dissertation is about social capital and not about
capital theory in general, this will not be further elaborated on.
6Bourdieu claims to utilize this interpretation throughout his entire article
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elective, implying durable obligations” (ibid.). These durable obligations between two
individuals A and B are at the core of Bourdieu’s social capital concept, as they, for
example, allow an individual A to access individual B’s resources and vice versa.
Moreover, social capital is the result of “investment strategies” (ibid.) followed “con-
sciously or unconsciously” (ibid.). The reasoning is as follows: as pointed out, forming
durable obligations requires material or symbolic exchanges between individuals. Ma-
terial exchanges are costly in terms of economic capital. Symbolic exchanges, as the
non-material part of social interaction, require time. This time has an opportunity cost
as it cannot be used for paid labor. Investment in and maintenance of social capital
thus “directly or indirectly” (ibid., p. 250) requires economic capital. Hence, the in-
vestment analogy is that, ultimately, economic capital needs to be spent in order to
generate social capital. This constitutes an investment because social capital can be
used at a later point in time to generate payoffs.
Bourdieu (1983) makes a further point: the cost of forming lasting connections are
heterogenous between individuals. An individual A richly endowed with resources may
generate a larger benefit (i.e. larger increase in access to resources) for other individ-
uals he acquaints himself with than an individual B who only has a small endowment.
Thus, individual A needs to invest less in social interactions, compared to individual
B, to obtain lasting connections. The reason is that individual A is a more attractive
person to know.
A final aspect is that social capital is a risky investment. As already mentioned, so-
cial interaction may create obligations. Examples include “exchanges of gifts, services,
visits” [Bourdieu (1986), p. 253], that are costly now and that may be honored in some
different form in the future. However, they might as well not be honored. Social obliga-
tions are usually not guaranteed in any explicit form and thus particularly vulnerable to
a “refusal of [...] recognition” (ibid., p. 254). Consequently, social capital in the form of
obligations arising from social interaction comes at a higher risk of loss than economic
capital. This is a point widely accepted in the literature [e.g. Coleman (1990), Burt
(1992), Putnam (2000)]. As the upside of this increased risk of loss Bourdieu (1983)
identifies a high degree of concealment of economic power if the economic power is
exercised by the possession of social capital instead of economic capital.
The Role of Group Membership in Bourdieu (1983)
Bourdieu’s ibid. focus lies, just as in “La distinction” [Bourdieu (1979)], on the repro-
duction of social groups and classes. The membership of individuals in networks and
groups thus influences their opportunities to create and access social capital. It is
hence important to further examine this aspect. The mere existence of groups is as-
sumed to be exogenous. Group membership can be gained through “the alchemy of
consecration” [Bourdieu (1986), p. 250] in “institution rites” [Bourdieu (ibid.), p. 249].
Once membership has been achieved, groups generate plenty opportunities for their
members to socialize, thus creating and reproducing social capital as described above.
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The members of a group thus profit from their group membership as it helps them to
access the resources of other group members. Moreover, as can be seen from the def-
inition of social capital given above, members of a group can also use the resources
of other group members as a credential when interacting with individuals from outside
the group, thus enhancing their credit (in the widest sense of the word). Unfortunately,
Bourdieu (1983) does not elaborate on how this process works in detail, i.e. which
members of a group have access to which amount of credential and how this is made
visible for outsiders.
There is a second argument why group membership may help an individual to create
and access social capital: social capital implies a “mutual acknowledgment” [Bourdieu
(1986), p. 249] between participating individuals, which in turn requires “the reacknowl-
edgment of a minimum of objective homogeneity” (ibid.). This can be interpreted to be
a homogeneity in habitus. Groups thus serve to bring together individuals with said
homogeneity. Moreover, there is a sharp divide between those in a group and those
outside it, i.e. that each group has a clear limit in order to preserve its inner homo-
geneity. The opportunities groups generate for their members to socialize thus do not
only serve to build their social capital, but also to favor “legitimate exchanges” (ibid., p.
250) and to exclude “illegitimate ones” (ibid.), i.e those between very heterogeneous
individuals that may well come from very different social classes. The result is that
social capital may be concentrated within relatively homogeneous groups, an effect
widely recognized in the literature [e.g. Portes (1998), Putnam (2000), Adler and Kwon
(2002), Dasgutpa (2005) and Jackson (2014)].
In this context, it is also relevant that social capital is delegable within groups. This
delegation can take place by the members of a group towards a single leader or a
smaller group. It creates the opportunity of aggregating the individual social capital
stocks to “exercise a power incommensurate with the individual’s personal contribution”
[Bourdieu (1986), p. 251]. However, in order to avoid that the competition for becoming
the group representative tears the group apart, the members of the group will have
to establish rules to determine this representative. Consequentially, the delegation
of power within can be institutionalized. There are a number of examples from the
“pater familias” (ibid.) as “the most elementary form of institutionalization” (ibid.) to
the “title of the noble [...] [as] the form par excellence of the institutionalized social
capital ” (ibid.) and who actually used to bear the name of the group he represented.
This property of social capital, i.e. that it is delegable and that it can be institutionalized,
does lead to problems of misappropriation. This may even include the use of the power
delegated to an individual A against the group by that individual A. However, it is not
clear how this delegation takes place. If social capital is understood as an individual
B’s access to individual C’s resources, which is possible because of the longstanding
social interaction between them, would individual C also grant access to individual A
if individual B mandated it? And, if individual C would do so, would individual C allow
that his resources are used against individual B?
The described connection between membership in groups and social capital is prob-
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lematic for three reasons. Firstly, it implies an additional assumption implicitly made
by Bourdieu (1983): all members have the same access to the capital of the mem-
bers of a group to at least use it as “credential” [Bourdieu (1986), p. 249]. As Astone
et al. (1999), albeit in reference to Coleman (1990) point out, this is not necessar-
ily so as there may be “social stratification” (p. 9) within groups. Secondly, it is not
really clear how intra-group processes work, e.g. how the delegation of social capi-
tal is supposed to be organized. Thirdly, Bourdieu (1983) emphasizes, as mentioned
above, that groups have clearly defined limits. This may be true for exclusive clubs
and (some) families - two of Bourdieu’s (ibid.) examples. However, some relationships
may take place in groups where the limits are much less clearly defined. Friendship
ties may be a good example, which may or may not take place in groups (e.g. cliques),
and the limits to these groups may by no means be clear. A straightforward solution
to solve this would be to limit the size of the group to those, to stay with the exam-
ple, friends which mutually acknowledge themselves as members of the group. The
implication would be that each individual would be the member of a multiplicity of tiny
groups which have, in the most extreme example, only two members. As member-
ship in multiple, even overlapping groups is clearly implied by Bourdieu (ibid.), nothing
stands against such a solution [Browne-Yung, Ziersch, and Baum (2013)]. However,
such a broadening of the definition of the group reduces the explanatory power of the
concept. It is thus questionable whether the attention Bourdieu (1983) gives to group
membership is really a convincing part of his concept of social capital.
Focus of Analysis in Bourdieu (1983)
With respect to the question whether the concept is viable from an individual perspec-
tive, it is important to also examine the focus of analysis: Bourdieu’s (ibid.) focus of
analysis is at first sight twofold: A large part of his analysis of social capital examines
the individual and his actions, leading Fine (2001) to describe his concept of capital
as “individualistic” (p. 57). However, to do him justice, it has to be mentioned that
Bourdieu emphasizes the role of the existing structure of society on the (perceived)
possibilities and even the individual’s preferences as expressed by the habitus [c.f.
Bernhard (2008)] and is reported to dismiss the idea of rational choice [c.f. Fuchs-
Heinritz (2011)]. While he also claims that individuals follow strategies, he does not
believe that they rationally calculate their actions all the time [Lenger (2013)]. Rather,
they are guided by their habitus in many situations. Nonetheless, large parts of Bour-
dieu’s (1986) analysis of social capital are compatible with weak forms of methodolog-
ical individualism, which accept that individuals are by no means unaffected by the
social structure around them.
Other parts of his concept, however, are more difficult to reconcile with even weak
forms of methodological individualism. On several occasions, groups are described
as acting entities, e.g. that they follow their own investment strategies and arrange
opportunities to socialize [Bourdieu (1983), p. 192 f.]. Giving to a group the status
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of an acting entity is obviously at odds with methodological individualism, as many
individuals form the group. There is at least a lack of examination of the processes
within a group, which is a weakness of Bourdieu’s (1983) writing on social capital.
However, even if Bourdieu sees the group as an acting entity of its own right, little is
lost if this aspect will be left aside. The reason is that his examination of social capital
is in its core – how and why social capital is created – based on the individual and his
deliberate actions, embedded in the social structure.
Summary of Bourdieu (1983)
The treatment of social capital by Bourdieu offers a solid foundation for further work
with the concept. He clearly carves out the purpose of social capital to the individual
and thus his motivation to create and own social capital: the access to other individuals’
resources. Bourdieu (ibid.) moreover explains how social capital is created and main-
tained, by social interaction between individuals, turning acquaintances into durable
relationships. This creation of connections between individuals necessarily leads to a
network structure of social ties. In this concept, social interaction is costly to the indi-
viduals and these costs decrease with the attractiveness, i.e. control over resources,
of an individual for other individuals. Lastly, as individuals prefer to interact with rather
homogeneous other individuals, homogeneous groups will arise. These homogeneous
groups then facilitate the creation and strengthening of social capital within the group,
thus leading to a certain segregation between different groups. The treatment of so-
cial capital by Bourdieu already entails a good share of the topics discussed in the
social capital literature in later years. Portes (1998) highlights that “Bourdieu’s analy-
sis is arguably the most theoretically refined among those that introduced the term in
contemporary sociological discourse” (p. 3).
2.1.3 Burt’s Concept of Social Capital
Burt is the author of numerous publications in which he explains his conception of so-
cial capital. His book “Structural Holes” (1992) is perhaps the most prominent one. A
later article (2000) and the book “Brokerage and Closure” (2005) further elaborate on
his ideas. Although Burt’s writings on social capital were published later than those
by Coleman, they are introduced here before Coleman’s as they have a stronger focus
on the individual and can easily be connected to the concept by Bourdieu, 1983. An
important difference is that Burt puts a stronger focus on the position of an individual
A within the network that comprises all individuals. His definition of social capital is
that “holding a certain position in the structure of these exchanges [meaning connec-
tions between individuals, obligations to support between individuals, dependence of
exchange between individuals,remark by the author ] can be an asset in its own right”
[Burt (2000), p. 347] and that this “asset is social capital” (ibid.). That is, although he
recognizes that access to resources, or, as he puts it “whom you reach” [Burt (1992), p.
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12] is an essential part of social capital, he argues that the position of these individuals
in the network, i.e. “how you reach” (ibid.) may be even more important.
Burt also draws on the theory of social and economic networks. Thus, when analyz-
ing his concept of social capital, introducing some terminology used in the economic
theory of networks up front may be helpful [cf. Jackson (2008)]: the entire set of in-
dividuals that is under consideration forms a network. Individuals within the network
may or may not be connected. Individuals that are directly connected to each other are
linked. There exists a path between two individuals in a network if they are connected
by at least one link (i.e. there is a direct connection) or a sequence of links (i.e. there is
an indirect connection). The length of a path is given by the number of links it consists
of. The distance between two individuals is the length of the shortest path between
them. A network is called connected if there exist paths between all individuals in the
network. Otherwise, the network consists of at least two components, between which
no link exists. In a connected network, there may be individuals that are interconnected
by direct links. These are called a clique.
The baseline assumption by Burt is a typical one in network theory: there is a value
for an individual in being connected to other individuals. This value is access to in-
formation, understood as “access, timing and referrals” [Burt (1992), p. 13] and, con-
nected to that “opportunities to use [one’s] financial and human capital” (ibid., p. 9).
As different individuals hold different pieces of information, there is an incentive for any
individual to make such connections that maximize the amount and quality of informa-
tion he has access to. Burt (2000) systemizes the individuals in the network according
to the information they hold relative to each other. Firstly, there are “cohesive con-
tacts” (p. 353), i.e. “contacts strongly connected to each other” (ibid.). Secondly, there
are “structurally equivalent contacts” (ibid.) that do not have a direct link, but share a
common third individual as contact. Due to their common acquaintance, structurally
equivalent contacts are likely to possess the same information, i.e. they have “redun-
dant information” (ibid.) and forming a link between them is of little worth when it comes
to improving the amount and quality of information an individual has access to.
Thirdly, there are contacts on the other side of a so-called “structural hole” (ibid.).
Technically speaking, these are individuals in a different component that was hitherto
unconnected with the component individual A is a part of. Thus, no information flow
took place between the components. There are three benefits for an individual to form
a link that “bridge[s]” (p. 356) a structural hole. Firstly, structural holes are “like an in-
sulator in an electric circuit” (p. 353) and different, “nonredundant” (ibid.) informations
circulate in the two components on either side of the hole. An individual A spanning
the structural hole thus profits from the new information available in the other compo-
nent. Here, the individual A has an advantage over the other individuals in his initial
component. Secondly, as long as individual A is the only one who spans the struc-
tural hole, he can “broker” (ibid.) information between the two previously unconnected
components. If the new nonredundant information individual A now has access to is
helpful to another individual B in his initial component, individual A can “sell” this in-
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formation to this other individual B. A possible example would be a job offer hitherto
only circulated on the other side of the structural hole. Thirdly, an individual A who has
such ties across structural holes does not only possess better information. Relative to
other members of their initial component, individual A is also more likely to be part of
interesting information. A possible example would be a recommendation for a job by
its bridging partner on the other side of the structural hole.
Creation of Social Capital in Burt (1992, 2000, 2005)
The creation of social capital in Burt’s concept is specifically the creation of links be-
tween individuals. In network economics, links are typically assumed to be costly, an
assumption shared by Burt. This creates a trade-off between the benefits occurring
from direct links and the costs they cause. Direct links generate a higher payoff vis-a`-
vis longer paths because there are no intermediate individual’s involved that may act
as brokers and claim a share in the profit created through the connection. In this set-
ting, if individuals are allowed to decide endogenously on which links to form, anything
from a fully connected network, i.e. one where all possible links exist, and an empty
network, i.e. one where no links exist at all, is possible. The result depends on the
benefits from direct links and the relative discounts the payoffs from connections made
via longer paths face. Needless to state, the costs of links also play a role7.
Nonetheless, a little more can be said about the links an individual A is specifically
interested in to create in any given network and the incentives connected to this de-
cision. Consider the following case, in which individual A has two options. Firstly, he
can create an additional link to another individual in a possibly already highly inter-
connected component he is already connected to. Secondly, he can form a link to an
individual B in a different component, i.e. bridge a structural hole. Assume that in both
cases, the cost of forming the new link will be identical. In the first case, individual A
will not gain access to individuals hitherto not connected to him, but in the best case
he will only shorten the distance to some of them. The information individual A will
access will most probably be redundant. In the second case, he will gain access to
all the individuals in the newly connected component. He is thus likely to gain access
to non-redundant information. Even if the bridging link is more expensive to form, it
may still generate the greater overall benefit for individual A. Burt (1992) argues that
it is optimal for an individual to bridge as many structural holes as possible in order to
maximize the “nonredundancy of contacts” (p. 20). As a consequence, he proposes
to maintain only one contact to each clique and to use them as “ports of access to
clusters of people beyond” (p. 21).
It is apparent that, in this setting, a very conscious investment in social capital takes
7Network theory can be complex. Of course, the result also depends on the specific mechanism of
network formation, e.g. whether individuals propose links simultaneously or serially, whether pro-
posed links have to be accepted or can also be declined and whether the costs of links are shared
equally between the two individuals involved, only by the proposing individual or, possibly, also other
individuals in the network. A discussion of these details is, however, not the focus of this thesis.
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place: individuals form links endogenously to maximize their payoff from the network.
Burt (2000) goes as far as calling individuals that systematically bridge structural holes
“entrepreneurs” (p. 355). With time, other individuals will imitate these entrepreneurs,
thereby making their ties redundant and thus reducing their profit. Thus, the return to
social capital is the higher, the more imperfect a market is, i.e. the fewer links across
structural holes there already are.
Burt (1992) touches upon an interesting point on the optimal strength of ties that will
be useful in later analysis. He stresses that social capital is a risky investment as it is
not necessarily symmetric: doing another individual B a favor, e.g. passing on infor-
mation, may or may not yield a reward for individual A in the future. It is thus important
for individual A to select carefully to whom he forms strong connections. These will be
other individuals that individual A trusts. Burt points out that these strong connections
which imply trust are more likely to form between homogeneous individuals as they
are most likely to accept each other as equal and not to mistake a favor for “proper
obeisance” (p. 16).
Summary and Discussion of Burt (1992, 2000, 2005)
Burt makes a strong case that strong ties are necessary to ensure that relevant in-
formation is actually passed on. However, there is a prominent earlier finding from
Granovetter (1973) who observed that individuals get job information via weak ties, not
via strong ties. This result is clearly at odds with Burt’s recommendations. The solution
to this dilemma presented by Burt (1992) is as follows: Granovetter’s (1973) observa-
tion is correct, but the reason for his findings is that the individuals he observed have
strong ties that access redundant information whereas non-redundant information is
mainly provided to them via their weak ties. Granovetter’s individuals bridge structural
holes using weak ties, which is not optimal. There is thus a difference between the nor-
mative recommendations of Burt, i.e. the recommendation to bridge structural holes
using strong ties, and the positivist observations by Granovetter. Additionally, Adler
and Kwon (2014) elaborate on two interesting contributions in this context that confirm
the stance of Burt: Firstly, Marin (2012) finds that agents who have information on job
availability may be reluctant to share it with others because they do not want to appear
intrusive. This may hold especially true with agents they only have weak ties to and
where the personal relationship may not be as deep. Secondly, Smith (2005) argues
that those agents with job information may be reluctant to pass it on because a large
investment of time and energy might be necessary to motivate the agents they pass it
on to. Again, it should be expected that the agents who have the job information may
be more willing to shoulder these costs for agents they have thick ties to.
Burt’s concept of social capital picks up numerous aspects of Bourdieu’s concept,
i.e. the inherent riskiness investments in social capital and, connected to that, the role
of trust. This latter point is not explicit in Bourdieu’s writings, but rather concealed in the
requirement of intra-group homogeneity: a certain degree of homogeneity with others
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is required for an individual to deeply trust them.
Moreover, Burt adds an important aspect to Bourdieu’s concept: in order to gain
access to information and the opportunities connected to them, it is not only important
to be well connected within a group. Instead, it is valuable to know people that can
provide non-redundant and thus diverse information. Since forming connections is
costly and resources are limited, an individual A should concentrate his links on these
individuals that provide non-redundant information and that he can trust, e.g. because
they are homogenous to him.
The focus of analysis by Burt is more clearly individualistic than Bourdieu’s. Social
capital is the result of individual decisions and individual optimizing behaviour. Individ-
uals can rent out their social capital just as they could with their human capital, e.g. to
use their contacts to help advance their company, but it will ultimately stay with them.
Burt’s focus on non-redundant ties is in stark contrast to the focus in Coleman’s
(1988, 1990) social capital concept, which will be discussed next.
2.1.4 Coleman’s Concept of Social Capital
Looking at Coleman’s concept of social capital is worthwhile for two reasons: Firstly,
it adds some interesting aspects to the concepts of Bourdieu and Burt. Coleman e.g.
elaborates on the benefits of redundant ties and the externalities inherent in social
capital. Secondly, Coleman lays the seed for treating social capital as a phenomenon
on the macro level. Since this is a highly popular strand of the social capital literature
up to this day, it is worth investigating Coleman’s concept of social capital to find the
beginnings of the divide between individual level social capital and social capital at the
macro level of the society.
Coleman has made two noteworthy publications on social capital. The first is an
article from 1988. The second can be found in chapter 12 of his book “Foundations
of Social Theory” (1990). The two publications are similar to a large extent, which
leads Astone et al. (1999) to argue that the latter is a revised version of the former.
However, close examination yields that they exhibit a slightly different focus. The article
from 1988 concentrates on the role of “social capital in the creation of human capital”,
as promised by the title, and includes an empirical part. The later publication lacks
this focus on the role of social capital in the creation of human capital. It elaborates
in more detail on the role of mutual obligations for social capital and adds a section
on the “creation, maintenance and destruction of social capital” [Coleman (1990), p.
318]. Moreover, the chapter from ibid. exhibits references to the work of Loury (1977)
and Bourdieu (1980), something which is, as Portes (1998) points out, missing in the
article from 1988 in spite of the similarities of the concept of social capital by Coleman
and Bourdieu. In the following section, when describing Coleman’s contribution to the
literature on social capital, both publications will be drawn upon.
Coleman, in comparison to Bourdieu (1983) and Burt (1992, 2000, 2005), goes to
greater lengths to motivate the necessity of a concept of social capital. He does so
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slightly differently in his two aforementioned publications, but in both cases he argues
from a perspective which can be called philosophy of science.
On the one hand, Coleman refers to the individual-centered philosophy developed
by Hobbes in the seventeenth century, which, since Adam Smith’s work, supposedly
dominates the thinking in especially neoclassical economics. Although not explicitly
mentioning it, Coleman identifies as its core homo oeconomicus, the agent that acts
independently of others and wholly self-interested, maximizing his utility. Coleman
(1988) argues that this “principle of action” (p. S95) is the “main virtue” (ibid.) of
the individual-centered philosophy in general and neoclassical economics in particular.
However, he also points out that this school of thought has an important flaw in that it
underestimates, or even neglects, that “individuals do not act independently” [Coleman
(1990), p. 301].
On the other hand, Coleman points to the concept of man used in sociology, where
the individual is “governed by social norms, rules, and obligations” [Coleman (1988), p.
S95]. Although he does not mention the work of Dahrendorf (2006) in this context, the
concept of homo sociologicus is what he obviously aims at. While Coleman stresses
that for the homo sociologicus the social context plays an important role, describing
this as the concept’s main virtue, he also hints at the problem that it lacks an “engine
of action” [Coleman (1988), p. S96]. He claims that bringing together homo oeco-
nomicus and homo sociologicus is the aim of his concept of social capital8. Here, at
first glance, a parallel between Coleman and Bourdieu seems to exist. There is a fun-
damental difference, though: Coleman is a proponent of rational choice [Fine (2001),
Ha¨uberer (2011)], treating preferences as exogeneous, whereas Bourdieu argues that
preferences arise from the social context the individual is situated and habituated in
[c.f. Bernhard (2008)].
Definition of Social Capital in Coleman (1988, 1990)
To fully grasp Coleman’s argument, some explanation of his terminology is necessary.
Coleman (1990) uses the term “social-structural resources” (p. 302). By social struc-
ture, Coleman means the structure that arises if “social relationships [...] [have] some
persistence over time” (p. 300). For this, he provides “authority relations” (ibid.) and
“relations of trust” (ibid.) as examples. Additionally, he goes back one step further and
analyzes why people have social relationships in the first place. He argues that they
are the result of social exchanges and “unilateral transfers of control” (ibid.) that come
into being if an individual is interested in resources that are “fully or partially under the
control of other actors” (ibid.). Social-structural resources are thus resources that an
individual has control over or access to through his social relationships which persist
over time.
Coleman (ibid.) proposes to “conceive of these social-structural resources as a cap-
ital asset for the individual” (p. 302). As Lin (1999) stresses, Coleman chooses a
8Although he acknowledges that he is not the first to have this idea.
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functionalist definition9, namely: “Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a
single entity, but a variety of different entities, with two elements in common: They all
consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors
[...] within the structure.” [Coleman (1988), p. S98]. Thus Coleman sees the core
aspect of social capital in facilitating the access of an individual A to the resources
of other individuals. He defines resources as encompassing economic capital, or, as
he puts it, “private goods” [Coleman (1990), p. 33], and certain aspects of human or
cultural capital, or “certain attributes [of individuals], such as skills” (ibid.). Moreover,
Coleman’s resources include “rights to control” (ibid.) on actions that are directly or
indirectly alienable, as well as resources that “are effective in determining [...] the out-
comes of events” (ibid.) in which an individual is interested because he is affected by
them.
Forms of Social Capital in Coleman (1990)
This broad definition of social capital allows Coleman to identify a vast array of phe-
nomena as what he calls forms of social capital. Coleman (ibid.) gives six examples
of forms of social capital. It rather appears that two of these forms, the first and the
third form of social capital, are really different forms, an analysis also shared by Portes
(1998). The remaining four forms are more or less specific examples of the two differ-
ent main forms or “consequences of [the] possession [of social capital]” [Portes (ibid.),
p. 5]. Thus the two different main forms will be introduced, which Coleman (1990) calls
“Obligations and Expectations” (p. 306) and “Norms and Effective Sanctions” (ibid.),
respectively. The distinction between these two forms of social capital has been picked
up in the literature, e.g. by Esser (2008). Esser (ibid.) differentiates between “relational
capital” and “system capital”, meaning the form of obligations and expectations and the
form of macro level norms, respectively. This differentiation will be investigated in more
detail in section 2.3.
Obligations and Expectations
The first main form Coleman (1990) introduces requires a “level of trustworthiness
of the social environment” (p. 306) high enough that “obligations will be repaid” (ibid.).
This requirement is identical to a norm of reciprocity. If this holds, an individual A doing
a favor for another individual B creates an obligation to return this favor, or, as Coleman
(ibid.) puts it, a “credit slip” (p. 306). This credit slip gives individual A the right to have
the favor returned by individual B some time in the future. This credit slip is seen by
Coleman as a direct “analogy to financial capital” (ibid.). It is apparent that reciprocity
and the idea of obligations created by favors is easy to align with the definition of social
capital as access to the resources of other individuals. The more credit slips individual
9This is curious as Coleman (1990) picks up Granovetter’s (1985) criticism of the functionalist approach
of new institutional economics.
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A possesses, the more returns for favors done by him in the past can he claim and the
more access to resources of other individuals he accordingly has.
The favor which “created” the credit slip does not need to be returned in kind. Social
capital has no currency, i.e. the exact value of favors is unknown. Moreover, the
credit slips are, to a certain extent, not fungible, and thus appear not to cancel out.
Accordingly, even after two individuals have done and returned a favor, to a certain
extent, they both still possess access to each other’s resources.
Favors that create credit slips, and thus social capital, can of course be done as
a by-product to everyday social interaction. According to Coleman’s analysis, this is
what mostly happens since there is “often little or no direct investment in social capital”
(p. 312). However, some individuals create more social capital than others, depend-
ing on their preferences for pro- or anti-social behaviour, something Coleman (1990)
describes as their “ideology” (p. 320).
Moreover, the possibility that obligations are wilfully created by doing favors unasked
for and unwanted is also explored by Coleman. This factually amounts to an invest-
ment in social capital. Coleman argues that there is a lack of direct investment in social
capital as a result of an externality inherent in the mechanism of obligations and expec-
tations. This comes about because social capital resides in the relationship between
individuals, i.e. it is contingent on the stability of the social structure, which is made of
the relationships between different individuals. These individuals have created obliga-
tions on one another, i.e. they own credit slips. It must be kept in mind that Coleman
defines the right to access another individual’s resources or to control his actions as a
relationship. From this, it follows directly that if an individual A severs his relationship to
another individual B, he loses his rights to access and control on individual B’s actions
and resources and vice versa. Thus the entire social capital that is contingent on this
relationship between the individuals A and B is lost. Coleman gives individual mobility
as an intuitive example where relationships are completely severed. If an individual
moves away, usually not all ties to individuals in his former place of residence are cut,
but still some are cut completely. As these obligations, as described above, typically
exist on both sides of a relationship between two individuals, the unilateral ending of
that relationship by an individual A will also deplete the social capital of the other indi-
vidual B involved in that relationship, without this being taken into consideration by the
individual A. In the process of creation of social capital, this implies that when deciding
on the establishment or ending of a relationship to another individual B, individual A
only weighs his benefits of this relationships against his (opportunity) cost. He does
not take into account the effects of his decision in the form of creation or loss of social
capital for the other individual B.
Coleman also comes to the result that creating social capital is a risky investment as
the obligation thus created might not be honored. Still, it might be rational: an individual
A might wish to create obligations in times of affluence to call on them in times of need,
i.e. for insurance motives. How risky an investment in the creation of a credit slip is
depends on how likely the other involved individual B is to honor the norm of reciprocity,
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i.e. to return the trust placed in him. This level of trust is endogenous. Coleman points
out that an individual is likely to trust individuals he knows well, i.e. that have honored
their obligations in the past. Since these obligations do not cancel out completely due
to their infungibility, this means that an individual B which is trusted in is usually one
which has a large amount of credit slips outstanding with the individual A who puts trust
into him. On the other side, it also means that this individual A also has a large amount
of credit slips outstanding with individual B. Consequently, individuals that are trusted
in may possess high social capital, but this high social capital is no one-way street but
typically includes the possibility that other individuals ask for access to the individiual’s
resources.
As already pointed out above, Coleman claims to bring up several further forms of
social capital. These are, as mentioned, rather examples for one of the two main forms.
Three of them that can be aligned with the form called obligations and expectations, i.e.
the “information potential” (ibid., p. 310) of a connection and the ones that Coleman
calls “appropriable social organization” (ibid., p. 311) and “intentional organization”
(ibid., p. 312). Since their detailled discussion does not add to the understanding of
Coleman’s concept of social capital, it will be omitted here.
Norms and Effective Sanctions
The second main form of social capital introduced by Coleman (1990) is what he
calls “norms and effective sanctions” (p. 310). In chapter 10 of the “Foundations of
Social Theory”, he defines norms as follows: “They specify what actions are regarded
by a set of persons as proper or correct, or improper or incorrect.” (p. 242). Norms
are “ordinarily enforced by sanctions” (ibid.), but may as well be internalized and thus
be effective without external sanctions. Moreover, those who “hold [...] a norm” (p.
243) possibly enact sanctions on those that are “subjects” (ibid.) of a norm to make
them act as specified by the norm. Thus, the holders of a norm effectively claim the
rights to control on a certain action by another individual. Coleman (ibid.) differentiates
between norms which discourage certain actions, which he calls “proscriptive norms”
(p.247) and those that encourage certain actions, which he calls “prescriptive norms”
(ibid.).Prescriptive and proscriptive norms are usually two sides of the same coin and
in a situation where there are two options for action, one option might be subject to a
prescriptive norm while the other is subject to a proscriptive norm. If the norm actually
affects how those subject to it act, i.e. if it is “effective” (ibid., p. 310), then those that
hold a norm have a right of control on other individuals’ actions. So defined norms con-
stitute social capital according to Coleman’s definition as they facilitate certain actions
by certain individuals within the social structure (although they certainly also serve to
impede others).
At first thought, it may seem that norms and their enforcement may in part be ex-
plained with the assumption of reciprocity described above and the mechanism of obli-
gations and credit slips connected to it. Coleman himself writes that “credit slips” (ibid.,
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p. 281) may serve as positive sanctions for adhering to a prescriptive norm, e.g. to
“forgo self-interest to act in the interests of collectivity” (ibid.). On the other side, those
that act against a proscriptive norm are negatively sanctioned. In effect, someone vio-
lating a proscriptive norm refuses to give up his right to control on a certain action. If,
however, the holders of the norm claimed this right of action in the first place, they now
have an incentive to negatively sanction the violator in order to make the norm effective
and thus defend their right of control. In the case of adhering to a proscriptive norm, it
is harder to see how the mechanism of obligations and credit slips might be involved.
But even here, a transaction takes place as the individual subject to the norm is spared
from further sanctions in return for adhering to it.
If norms are not internalized, as discussed below, the realization of norms employing
sanctions is the standard case for Coleman. It is part of a more complex mechanism
which is, for larger groups, different from the mechanism of reciprocity, obligations and
credit slips described above. This mechanism involved in the realization of norms is
based on mutual exchanges between two individuals, which brings up a public goods
problem as a typical free rider problem: an individual A that puts a sanction on another
individual B to make a norm effective bears all the cost of the sanction, but only receives
a part of the benefit. The reason for this is that the rights of control of the sanctioned
individual on the action subject to the norm, i.e. the benefits of the norm being effective,
are not only transferred to individual A, but to the entire group of individuals holding the
norm. Coleman identifies this as a problem of the coordination of social exchange and
proposes various solutions from an “action-rights bank” (ibid., p. 267) to examples to
show how this first individual A, who enacted the costly sanction, might be reimbursed
by other individuals holding the norm. Nevertheless, Coleman’s proposals all share
that they are only working if transaction costs are low, and if the individuals that are
holding the norm are highly interconnected, an aspect also recognized by him and
described as “closure of social networks” (p. 318).
Coleman describes a social structure in which the individuals that uphold a norm
are interlinked to exhibit closure. Homans (1961) has already used the term “closed
network” (p. 7) to describe a network where all individuals have links to all other indi-
viduals in the network. Coleman’s conception of closure is less strict in that there are
varying degrees of closure possible depending on which share of possible connections
is actually established. Closure may help to overcome the free rider problem connected
to the sanctioning of norms described above. Coleman presents two mechanisms how
this may come about:
Firstly, the individuals upholding a norm may, if interlinked, coordinate to jointly and
simultaneously sanction an individual that violated a norm10, thus avoiding a situation
characterized by the prisoner’s dilemma game. Secondly, if only one individual A exe-
cutes the sanction, a situation labeled as a “heroic sanction” [Coleman (1990), p.278],
the other interlinked individuals may compensate him for his cost of doing so. This
may come as a joint positive sanction in the form of outstanding obligations, i.e. as
10For the sake of readability, the term norm will from now on be used to describe a proscriptive norm.
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credit slips. As Coleman (1990) points out, the cost of sanctioning an individual B who
violates a norm rise the more powerful individual B is. Thus, the possibility of sharing
the cost of a sanction amongst those that uphold the norm is the more important for
the emergence of effective norms the larger the differences in power are between the
individuals which are present in the social structure. Coleman (ibid.) gives honoring of
obligations and reciprocity as a specific example for a norm that benefits from closure.
This is important as it supports the first mechanism how social capital works (described
on page 22 of this thesis). Here, the problem arises what came first: obligations and
credit slips, which make the emergence of norms possible, or the norm of reciprocity,
which makes the mechanism of obligations and credit slips possible11
Closure may thus be a useful tool to explain how norms can be sustained amongst
small groups of individuals. As closure is typically decreasing when the size of a group
is growing, and converges towards zero for whole societies, it cannot serve as an
explanation how norms can be transferred to or be upheld at the macro level, i.e. the
scale of society. Moreover, Coleman (ibid.) does not propose an alternative micro level
explanation for this. Consequently, norms, at least those also effective in relatively large
groups, cannot be satisfactorily explained by the mechanism of reciprocity, obligations
and credit slips. They have to be seen as a form of social capital of its own right in
Coleman’s concept of social capital. 12
Of the six original forms of social capital Coleman (ibid.) identifies, the one that is
rather an example for norms and effective sanctions than a form of its own are “authority
relations” (p. 311). As with the forms that are rather examples for the mechanism of
obligations and expectations, it will not be discussed in more detail in this thesis.
Summary and Discussion of Coleman (1988, 1990)
Coleman picks up quite a number of ideas also included in the concepts of Bourdieu
and Burt. The similarities can be found on a basic level, e.g. that social capital is cre-
ated in social interaction, but are not limited to this. Coleman’s analysis that purposeful
investment in social capital (in the form of credit slips and obligations) takes place, al-
beit to a limited extent, is also shared by both Bourdieu and Burt. Bourdieu argues that
the individual stock of social capital is the result of a, maybe unconscious, investment
strategy. Burt goes even farther and recommends a strategic planning of one’s position
in the social network and thus a very conscious investment in social capital. Conse-
11Other authors have tried to solve this puzzle, i.e. Putnam (1993, 2000), as will be elaborated on in
section 2.1.5 of this thesis.
12A further special case are internalized norms, which are effective without the prospect of a sanction.
Individual A who internalized a norm voluntarily gives away his right of control without receiving a
credit slip in return or being afraid of negative sanctions. This may be because his utility function
is such that he believes that the action a norm prescribes is the right thing to do, or that the action
a norm proscribes is wrong to do. If his utility is such, there is no need for (external) sanctions,
as individual A, the subject of the norm, has developed an “internal sanctioning system” [Coleman
(1990) ,p. 293]. How norms can become internalized in such a way is not the focus of this thesis,
however, and will thus be discussed no further.
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quently, all three authors also share the analysis that an investment in social capital
is a risky investment, as it might not be honored. Finally, the externality connected to
the mechanism of obligations and expectations that is described on page 23 is also
identified by Burt.
However, there are also differences between the social capital concepts: When look-
ing at the definition of social capital, it becomes clear that Coleman (ibid.) has a broader
definition of resources than Bourdieu. The latter confines himself to economic, cultural
and social capital as resources, while for Coleman, anything that is useful for the indi-
vidual and that can be accessed via the social structure may well be a resource. This
includes the right for certain actions to be performed.
Still other aspects of Coleman’s concept require a more detailed discussion. Espe-
cially when looking at the mechanism of norms and effective sanctions as social capital,
Coleman puts a strong focus on closure as a possibility to keep the free rider problem
associated with sanctioning in check. Closure can be seen as the conceptual opposite
to Burt’s emphasis on non-redundant bridging ties, as it implies links with individuals
an individual A is already connected to, i.e. redundant links. Coleman’s concept of clo-
sure can moreover be seen as connected to Bourdieu’s (1983) statement that there is
a divide between those within a group and those outside. As a consequence, both au-
thors stress that an interconnected group is a prerequisite for social capital to function.
But while Bourdieu argues that the aim of groups is to exclude “illegitimate exchanges”
[Bourdieu (1986), p. 250] and that, accordingly, acquiring membership in a group may
be difficult and costly, there is no comparable statement by Coleman. For Coleman,
the interconnectedness of individuals, or closure, is a phenomenon that is necessary
to bring together the form of obligations and expectations and norms and effective
sanctions, which, as pointed out above, only works out up to limited group size. For
Coleman, closure arises endogenously “where one type of individual is weaker in a
relationship” [Coleman (1990), p. 319] who “will subsequently develop social networks
that have closure” (ibid.) to outbalance this weakness. Moreover, external factors may
“facilitate” the emergence of networks exhibiting closure, such as “social proximity”,
which may be seen as connected to Bourdieu’s analysis that a certain homogeneity
between individuals is necessary for social capital to develop within a group. How-
ever, while this is a requirement for Bourdieu, it is only one aspect among others for
Coleman.
Inalienability of Social Capital
Coleman’s (ibid.) elaborations on the question whose property social capital is have
created much confusion in the literature. Thus, a more detailed discussion on them
is necessary. To understand this, it is important to know that, for Coleman, social
capital is inalienable, i.e. “it cannot easily be exchanged” (ibid., p. 315). The reason
is that social capital is bound to the relationship between specific individuals. It thus
is an “attribute of the social structure in which a person is embedded” (ibid.) and that
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it is “not the private property” of any individual. However, Coleman does not offer an
alternative specification whose property, or what kind of property, it is instead. The
problem is aggravated by his inconsistent use of terminology. He describes property
as a “physical thing[...]” (ibid., p. 45). He adds, however, that “intangibles” (ibid.),
i.e. rights to control or access, have comparable characteristics to physical things
in economic and social exchanges . Supporting this interpretation, Coleman defines
property rights to include “rights of use [...], rights of consumption [if applicable] [...],
and rights of disposal” (ibid.). Consequently, a right to control may be transferred from
one individual to another “as [...] a material resource” (p. 58): to do so, the individual
needs to “hold[...] the right [to control] and also the right to transfer it” (ibid.). This is
what Coleman most plausibly aims at when using the word “property” in chapter 12 of
the Foundations of Social Theory. It is the right of transfer which is usually lacking for an
individual’s social capital, which is a consequence of its inalienability. This differentiates
social capital from an individual’s private property as Coleman defines it, which the
individual can freely sell at will. A this is impossible for social capital, it is not private
property for Coleman13.
Social capital is thus not the private property of an individual because of a definition
of private property which states that private property is necessarily alienable. This
is in line with Lin and Erickson (2008), who point out that social capital means that
resources are accessed, but not “possessed by the individual” (p. 4). This point has
caused some confusion in the literature. Some scholars, e.g. Putnam (2000), as will be
shown in chapter 2.1.5, and Ha¨uberer (2011), draw the conclusion that if social capital
is not a private good, then it must be a public good. Although the outcome of some
norms may exhibit the properties of a public good, the interpretation that social capital
always is a public good is by no means consistent with Coleman’s concept of social
capital.
Astone et al. (1999) point out that Coleman’s assertion of social capital not being
an individual’s private property but an attribute of the social structure leads to a prob-
lematic measurement of social capital in empirical studies: it is often assessed as a
property of certain groups rather than as a property of individuals. Coleman (1988)
additionally invites to making this mistake, e.g. by assuming that children who visit
catholic schools have access to a larger amount of social capital. Astone et al. (1999)
explain that especially political scientists who work with the concept of social capital
subsequently measure it as the property of a specific group in society or of a specific
political entity. Measuring the social capital of a group as a product of its members’
social capital is, according to Astone et al., problematic as individuals may have ac-
cess to resources outside the social group they are assumed to belong to. Moreover,
they may even belong to multiple groups. The social capital of the members of a group
may well have developed outside the group and need not necessarily be available to
the other members of the group. Measuring the social capital of the group in this way
13Even if social capital cannot be sold, it may well be possible to rent it out. Coleman does not elaborate
on this possibility.
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may thus carry little explanatory information about the social capital available within
the group. Moreover, even if individuals were to have only relationships within a group,
using social capital on the group level as a proxy for the group members’ social cap-
ital “rests on two shaky assumptions” [ibid., p. 9 f.] already discussed in the context
of Bourdieu’s concept of social capital: firstly, that the group level resources are club
goods to which all members have equal access. Secondly, that access to rights of
control acquired through relationships of individuals within a group are available to the
group as a whole, i.e. to every group member. Astone et al. argue that access to re-
sources within a group may depend on the power relations between the individuals in
that group, something also recognized by Coleman. Hence, Astone et al. stress that
a close examination of social groups is necessary to check whether their group level
social capital is really a good proxy for the group members’ social capital.
Focus of Analysis in Coleman (1988, 1990)
The focus of Coleman’s analysis is, different than Bourdieu’s analysis, at first glance,
solely the individual [e.g. Fine (2001)]. Nonetheless, Coleman’s failure to give a satis-
factory explanation for the micro-to-macro-transition between obligations and expecta-
tions and norms and effective sanctions for large groups and the confusion he causes
on the question whether social capital can be some individual’s private property or not
has greatly contributed to many scholars conceptualizing and measuring social capital
solely as a group level attribute. Thus, although Coleman’s concept can be restricted
to its individual parts, it can also easily be interpreted as including holistic aspects.
Coleman’s identification of the incentives an individual faces when acting within the
social structure makes his work easily accessible for economists who build their the-
ories in line with methodological individualism. Coleman’s concept of social capital is
wider than that of Bourdieu or Burt. For Coleman, social capital is the name for two
separate phenomena:
Firstly, social capital describes the access an individual A gains to other individuals’
resources in return for promising them access to his resources in return in the future.
Coleman’s main contribution to this aspect of social capital relative to Bourdieu (1983)
is the identification of the externalities inherent in social capital as it lies in the rela-
tionship between individuals, not within individuals. The main difference to Burt is the
emphasis on closure as an important factor in maintaining norms as a form of social
capital on a local level.
Secondly, in Coleman’s concept, social capital can also be found in the form of ef-
fective norms, which, if they exist on a macro level and exist irrespective of the public
goods problem connected to them, are a form not envisaged as social capital by Bour-
dieu or Burt. Nonetheless, this second form of social capital is the one that arguably
inspired the larger part of the literature on social capital.
Other than Bourdieu’s (ibid., 1986) article on the forms of capital, Coleman’s (1988)
article was published in the widely circulated “American Journal of Sociology”. Con-
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sequently, its reception has been large and Coleman’s influence on the social capital
literature, especially on the early social capital literature, is larger than Bourdieu’s. As-
tone et al. (1999) even state that Coleman is “the scholar who inspired most recent
research on social capital” (p. 6).
2.1.5 Putnam’s Concept of Social Capital
Putnam’s approach follows Coleman’s in the two forms of social capital identified, i.e.
obligations and expectations, or, to use Esser’s (2008) terminology, relational capital,
and norms, or, in Esser’s terminology, system capital14. However, while Coleman puts
more or less equal emphasis on both forms, Putnam’s focus is clearly on the second
form, i.e. norms or system capital. It is interesting to look at Putnam’s work for two
reasons: Firstly, he brings in two new approaches to connect the micro and the macro
level of social capital introduced by Coleman. Secondly, he introduces macro level
social capital as a vehicle to explain the performance of macro level institutions, which
has found widespread scholarly attention.
Putnam’s main question is how social interaction between individuals, i.e. on the
micro level, and outcomes on the macro level of society are connected. He argues that
social capital as he understands it is an important element of this connection. Putnam’s
concept has been picked up by a very large number of scholars who argue that social
capital is a macro level phenomenon and use it to explain macro level outcomes. At the
end of this section, it will be shown that, just as in the concept by Coleman, the connec-
tion between individual social interaction and macro level outcomes as postulated by
Putnam is unconvincing from an individual perspective. Hence, it is doubtful whether
micro level social capital in the sense of Bourdieu and Burt, understood as individual
access to resources, and macro level social capital as used by Putnam, really share a
common base. Instead, it will be shown that they are two basically distinct concepts.
Putnam’s concept of social capital will be introduced in more detail in the the next sec-
tion as a starting point for this discussion. Due to its close relationship with Coleman’s
social capital concept, it will be contrasted with the latter throughout.
Unlike Bourdieu, Burt and Coleman, Putnam has not written a mostly theoretical
work on social capital. He has included some elaborations on the topic in his book
“Making Democracy Work” (1993) on civic institutions, their performance and their roots
in Italy. He dealt with the concept of social capital in more detail in his book “Bowling
Alone” (2000), where he developed the hypothesis that the stock of social capital in
the U.S. is declining. However, while “Making Democracy Work” is clearly geared to-
wards an academic audience, “Bowling Alone” is a popular science book, advertised
as “the national bestseller” on its front page. As Putnam elaborates on social capital
extensively in it, it will still be used in this thesis, with the aim to strip it to its scientific
core.
14Putnam (1993, 2000) does not use this wording.
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Definition of Social Capital in Putnam (1993, 2000)
Putnam (1993) defines social capital with explicit reference to Coleman (1990) as “fea-
tures of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the
efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (p. 167). This definition can eas-
ily be aligned with Coleman’s (1988, 1990) form of macro level norms as social capital.
Interestingly, Putnam (1993) only very briefly touches upon the subject of social capital
creation: he hardly says more about it than that it is created in social interaction.
At first sight, it seems more difficult to align Putnam’s definition with Coleman’s other
main form of social capital, obligations and expectations. It is not a priori clear what
individuals and their respective access to other individuals’ rights of control have to do
with coordinated actions and the efficiency of society, at least in the case that does not
directly encompasses norms. Further investigation reveals that Putnam also recog-
nizes “that social networks have value” [Putnam (2000), p. 19] for individuals because
they “affect the productivity of individuals and groups” (ibid.). Moreover, Putnam ex-
plicitly stresses the benefits of social capital possession for the individual, summing
them up as “individual clout and companionship” (ibid., p. 20). This part of his concept
is thus connected to Coleman’s form of obligations and expectations as social capi-
tal. Consequentially, Putnam acknowledges both forms of social capital as he aims to
connect micro level social interaction and macro level outcomes.
The Norm of Reciprocity in Putnam (1993, 2000)
Up to this point, Putnam is in line with the general definition and the two forms of
social capital that can be found in Coleman’s work, as shown in chapter 2.1.4: for
Coleman (1990), a norm of general reciprocity is a necessary condition for a system of
social obligations and credit slips to function. It is, as the name suggests, part of the
mechanism how social capital works which is based on “norms and effective sanctions”
(p. 310). As pointed out on page 26, Coleman (ibid.) has an ambiguous relationship to
the norm of reciprocity: he needs it for the mechanism of obligations and credit slips to
work, but at the same time points to the difficulty of sustaining it as a macro level norm
due to the free rider problem. Summing up, it is fair to say that Coleman (ibid.) cannot
offer a satisfactory solution to the question how a micro level norm of reciprocity can
be generalized into a macro level norm.
Putnam also, be it implicitly, acknowledges that norms may develop endogenously
within social networks. He tries to solve Coleman’s dilemma with the norm of reci-
procity, arguing that “norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness” (p. 19) arise from social
networks. This step in principle allows for integrating the two forms of social capital
that can be identified in Coleman’s work. Frequent social interaction, be it through
favor-doing or through joint adhering to norms, builds trust. This, in turn, facilitates
further social interaction since trust reduces the perceived risk of not receiving a return
for outstanding obligations and simplifies the sanctioning of those who violate a norm.
Unfortunately, Putnam does not devote more effort into developing the microfounda-
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tions of his micro-to-macro-transition. The precise mechanism thus remains unclear
[c.f. Jordana (1999)]. This is also a consequence of his level of analysis, which is only
to a small extent concerned with the individual.
Although Putnam does not state in detail how he imagines the norm of reciprocity
to arise from social interaction, he further investigates into its details. As the norm of
reciprocity is central to his concept of social capital, this is worth looking at: Putnam
differentiates between “specific” [Putnam (2000), p.20] and “generalized” (ibid.) reci-
procity, but his definition of the two is different in “Making Democracy Work” and in
“Bowling Alone”. Specific reciprocity as described in “Making Democracy Work” is a
norm of immediate exchange of favors of equivalent value between the same individ-
uals. The way specific reciprocity is used in “Bowling Alone” is akin to the description
of the norm of reciprocity used by Coleman when defining his form of social capital
of credit slips and obligations (c.f. p. 22 of this thesis): here, reciprocity is limited to
the persons directly involved in an interaction, e.g. if one individual is doing a favor to
another individual now, the other individual is expected to return the favor some time
due to the norm of specific reciprocity. Interestingly, this is the same as described as
generalized reciprocity in “Making Democracy Work”. In “Bowling Alone”, a norm of
generalized reciprocity postulates that the return of a favor is not specific to the individ-
ual who has done or who has received the favor. It rather states that a favor done will
be returned, but maybe by some other individual not involved in the initial interaction.
In what follows, the terms specific and generalized reciprocity will be used as used in
“Bowling Alone” and the term matching reciprocity [Kolm (2006)] will be introduced for
what is described as specific reciprocity in “Making Democracy Work”15.
It is apparent that generalized reciprocity is subject to an additional problem relative
to specific reciprocity: why should some other individual return, i.e. do, a favor he has
not initially received? A possible answer would be that sanctions are attached to this
norm and that the individual is in danger of being negatively sanctioned if he violates
the norm. However, in a group of many individuals, which individual is to be singled out
to do the favor and hence be negatively sanctioned if he does not do it? The solution
Putnam implicitly offers is, in reference to Tom Wolfe’s novel The Bonfire of Vanities,
“the favor bank” [Putnam (2000), p. 20]16. This idea is related to Coleman’s (1990)
action-rights bank (c.f. p. 25 of this thesis). Unfortunately, like Coleman, Putnam
does not elaborate how this favor bank works in practice. Thus, it remains unclear
how individuals know whose turn it is to do or to receive a favor. This is especially
true in large groups or even societies, to whom Putnam attributes the possibility to be
“characterized by general reciprocity” [Putnam (2000), p. 21]. The consequence is that
Putnam is also unable to offer a satisfactory explanation how macro level norms, as
generalized reciprocity on the scale of an entire society would be, emerge on a micro
level.
15In the literature, further forms of reciprocity are discussed. An investigation into this discussion will
take place in the section on reciprocity as a determinant of social capital possession on page 61
16Putnam (2000) notes that Robert Frank called his attention onto this example “in private conversation”
(p. 446).
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Trust as a Key Concept in Putnam (1993, 2000)
Like Coleman, who identifies the role of trust in the mechanism of obligations and
expectations, Putnam argues that trust plays an important role in connection with social
capital. He goes further than Coleman in that he also sees a role for trust in connecting
between micro and macro level social capital. He differentiates between “thick trust”
[Putnam (2000), p. 136] and “thin trust” (ibid.).
For the term thick trust, Putnam (ibid.) refers to Williams (1988) and Burt and Knez
(1996)17. Thick trust is the type of trust already identified as a byproduct of repeated
interaction by Coleman and as a prerequisite for the passing on of information between
contacts by Burt.
As an addition to the concept of thick trust, Putnam (2000) introduces the term thin
trust. This idea goes well beyond what Coleman means when writing about trust being
created as the result of repeated interaction. Thin trust is the idea of trust “in the
generalized other” [ibid., p. 136]. Generally, trust in other individuals alone does not
help to reduce transaction cost. The other individuals must also be trustworthy, i.e.
de facto honor their obligations. In the concept of thick trust, trust and trustworthiness
typically fall together: an individual A trusts other individuals because they have proven
to be trustworthy in repeated interaction. With thin trust, this is more difficult as there
is no repeated interaction with “the generalized other” (ibid.). Putnam’s solution is
“honesty based on a general community norm” (p. 136). It is easy to see how such a
norm would help to reduce transaction cost in a community, but it is difficult to imagine
how it could be enforced. Take the extreme case of two complete strangers who, in
addition, have no joint acquaintances. If individual A cheats on the other individual
B, how is individual A to be sanctioned? There are two possibilities: one is that the
individuals the cheating individual A is connected to impose sanctions on him because
cheating means the violation of a norm - but how can they find out that individual
A cheated? The individuals A and B have no joint acquaintances, so individual B,
who was cheated upon, cannot tell them and individual A, who cheated, certainly will
not tell them. The other possibility is that some third individual C who observes the
cheating imposes a sanction. However, in many cases, there is no third individual
C to observe the cheating. Even if there is, as pointed out by Coleman (1990) (c.f.
p. 24 of this theses), the sanction will be the more costly to individual C, the less
individuals are involved (although this point is somewhat mitigated by the possibility
that the sanctioning individual receives positive sanctions from his acquaintances). A
further problem is that the sanctioning would need to take place on the spot because
the individuals involved might never meet again. The problem resulting from this is:
how bad can a sanction from a stranger be, whom the cheating individual A might
never meet again? It is intuitive that the disutility connected to a sanction is worse,
the more value the connection to the sanctioning individual has, which is put at stake
17Although Burt and Knez (1996) do not use the term thick trust, they recognise that trust increases in
the density of a relationship.
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through the sanction. In effect, it is very difficult to imagine how a norm of general
honesty could be made effective. This result is very similar to that already pointed out
on page 24 of this thesis in connection with Coleman’s social capital concept, i.e. that
the emergence of macro level norms is not satisfactorily explained on a micro level
using the mechanism of obligations and credit slips.
Implicitly, Putnam (2000) recognizes this, and his solution is very similar to the idea
of closure prominent in Coleman’s work: the norm of thin trust is easier to sustain in a
community which exhibits a dense social network, as a dense network is more effective
in “transmitting and sustaining reputations” (p. 136). But then, reputation is basically
what thick trust is about. In the end, it remains unclear how thin trust can be sustained
without making it thick trust. This is especially important as Putnam (ibid.) and many
other researchers use a variant of the question: “Generally speaking, would you say
that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”
(p. 137) 18, which clearly aims at thin trust, to measure social capital in a community,
which may or may not [Newton (2001)] lead to empirically valid results. Interestingly,
even Williams, to whom Putnam refers with the term thick trust, dismisses the idea
of thin trust. He points out that he finds it difficult to imagine how such a community
norm of cooperation could work “without an arrant degree of traditionalist or charismatic
mystification“ [Williams (1988), p. 12]. In any case, the idea of integrating the two forms
of social capital using trust stands on theoretically weak foundations, as has hopefully
been shown.
Summary and Discussion of Putnam (1993, 2000)
An interesting side feature of his strong focus on macro level norms as social capital
is that Putnam identifies further externalities connected to social capital creation: for
Putnam, social interaction on a micro level and the existence of norms on a macro level
are, as pointed out, more or less automatically connected via the mechanisms of thin
trust and general reciprocity. If this is true, then the creation of norms is an external
effect of social interaction. The resulting norms may have features of a public good,
i.e. non-excludability and non-rivalry. Putnam’s (2000) example is that of a norm of
“keeping an eye on one another’s homes” (p. 20) in a neighborhood, which usually
keeps crime low for anyone in the neighborhood. There is underinvestment in social
capital because the benefits of this norm for everyone in the neighborhood are not
sufficiently taken into account by individuals when deciding on their optimal level of
social interaction and thus social capital.
The high level of interest Putnam exhibits on the effects of social capital on an entire
society or country also has an effect on his level of analysis: Different from Coleman’s
or Bourdieu’s analysis, it remains largely unclear what the engine of action of Putnam’s
individuals is. To pick up the stylized models of man introduced by Coleman, it is an
18Variants of this question are included in many popular surveys, such as the World Values Survey, the
Eurobarometer, the International Social Survey Program, and others.
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individual much closer to homo sociologicus than to homo oeconomicus. As a direct
consequence, the two main additions to Coleman’s concept of social capital introduced
by Putnam, i.e. generalized reciprocity and thin trust, are difficult to sustain from a per-
spective of methodological individualism. Consequently, other scholars had similarly
little success in explaining how individual level social capital leads to macro level so-
cial capital, leading Ha¨uberer (2011) to conclude that “the concrete mechanisms [how
individual level social capital leads to generalized reciprocity] are not discovered yet”
(p. 148). Neves (2013) states that: “theoretically, it is clear that relationships and
resources are main elements of social capital; it is not clear how norms, civic engage-
ment, or social trust [meaning thin trust, remark by the author ] can be elements of
social capital” (p. 600). This is especially problematic as the concept of generalized
reciprocity is central to Putnam’s (2000) main thesis that there is a lack of social capital
in the U.S., which is a problem, as “[a] society characterized by generalized reciprocity
is more efficient than a distrustful society” (ibid.). Putnam’s argument here is simple:
he draws an analogy to barter trade, which is less efficient than trading with money
as “every exchange [has to be balanced] instantly” (ibid.). The lack of social capital
in the U.S., according to him, embodies itself in the lacking effectiveness of a norm of
generalized reciprocity.
Even though Putnam’s concept of social capital may not offer a satisfactory link be-
tween micro and macro level social capital, it has raised widespread attention among
(especially) political scientists. Both “Making Democracy Work” and “Bowling Alone”
have been cited more than 40.000 times by other scientific publications. This popularity
is understandable as Putnam offers a new explanation for the efficiency of institutions
in a society, namely the level of social capital. Moreover, he underpins it with two, at
least at first sight, plausible case studies. Nevertheless, Putnam’s conceptual contribu-
tion to the theoretical literature on social capital is relatively small, a conclusion shared
by Fine (1999). Putnam needs the mentioned two relatively problematic extensions
relative to Coleman to create a link between the micro level of the individual and the
macro level of the community or society. Only with the use of thin trust and gener-
alized reciprocity can Putnam explain why social capital as an asset to individuals is
connected to the efficiency of society, e.g. by reducing transaction costs.
Not only Putnam’s theoretical, but also his empirical approach has come under fire.
Portes (1998) heavily criticizes Putnam’s (1993) empirical approach to identifying social
capital as the key driver in making Italian cities democratic. Portes argues that it is
tautological as it mingles cause and effect and tries to explain all observed differences.
19
19Nonetheless, Putnam is the pop-star in the social capital literature: Portes (1998) points out that his
research on social capital has earned him “a teˆte-a`-teˆte with President Clinton and a profile in People
magazine” (p. 19).
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2.1.6 Fukuyama’s Concept of Social Capital
The final social capital concept to be investigated here in depth is that of Fukuyama
(1995a). From an individualistic point of view, looking at Fukuyama’s concept of social
capital is interesting as it is the most holistic of the prominent concepts with relatively
few connections to those of the other four scholars discussed above. It readily reduces
social capital to an exogenous variable that explains macro level phenomena.
Fukuyama, who has become popular outside academia with his thesis about “the
End of History” (1992) 20 has elaborated on social capital in two often referred-to
works: his article “Social Capital and the Global Economy” (1995a) and his book “Trust”
(1995b)21. Fukuyama’s perspective on social capital is different from the ones of Bour-
dieu, Burt, Coleman and Putnam. Fukuyama argues that the level of social capital of
a society is a part of its culture, inherited from its past and unlikely to build up quickly
nowadays. The role for individuals and their behavior depending on the incentives they
face is consequently small in Fukuyama’s texts. Moreover, Fukuyama overtly ques-
tions whether methodological individualism is the right approach to tackle the concept
of social capital.
Definition of Social Capital in Fukuyama (1995a, 1995b)
Like Putnam, Fukuyama explicitly refers to Coleman when introducing a definition of
social capital. For Fukuyama (ibid.), social capital is a part of human capital22, “the
ability of people to work together for common purposes in groups and organizations”
(p. 10). This definition is relatively close to Putnam’s as it shares its focus on the
enhancement of groups’ possible actions by social capital. However, while for Putnam,
social capital belongs to an individual and the social capital in a society is connected
to the social capital accumulated by its members, Fukuyama sees social capital as a
direct attribute of societies or communities. Consequently, for Fukuyama (ibid.), the
ability to cooperate “depends [...] on the degree to which communities share norms
and values and are able to subordinate individual interests to those of larger groups”
(p. 10).
Furthermore, Fukuyama pursues a broader endeavor. He wants to explain why some
nations are economically successful and others less so. To do so, he explicitly spec-
ifies some norms that are especially important for the ability to associate and for the
“institutions of democracy and capitalism [...] to work properly” [Fukuyama (ibid.), p.
10]. These are norms of “reciprocity, moral obligation [and] duty towards community”
[ibid., p. 12], together with trust, meaning trust even thinner than the thin trust de-
scribed by Putnam. For Fukuyama (ibid.), this trust extends across the members of
20In short, Fukuyama’s (1992) argument is that western-style liberal democracy has emerged from the
struggle with communism as the dominant ideology for the time to come.
21However, without doing him any wrong, it can be said that the article is simply a summary of the book.
22Fukuyama (1995b) does not mention social capital’s analytical decoupling from human capital in Cole-
man’s (1990) Foundations of Social Theory. However, it is not central to his argument.
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entire nations. Moreover, Fukuyama does not elaborate in detail how this trust can
be created, beyond the point that it requires habituation across long periods of time.
His notion of trust has so little to do with Coleman’s (1990) idea of trust in networks
characterized by closure that Fellmeth (1996) argues that “Fukuyama’s theory of trust
relies on a misinterpretation of [...] Coleman’s theory of social capital” (p. 156).
Social Capital and Methodological Individualism
Highly important for Fukuyama (1995b) is the norm of subordinating an individual’s
own interests to the benefit of a greater good, meaning that individuals are “motivated
[...] by something broader than individual self-interest” (p. 9). He gives the exam-
ple of showing solidarity as a form of caring for other individual’s well-being. What he
aims at is homo oeconomicus: in his interpretation of this concept, individuals follow
their narrow self-interest without considering the pleasure or pain of other individuals or
“pursu[ing] some kind of common good” (ibid., p. 18). He rejects the idea of broadening
the definition of utility, which is what homo oeconomicus maximizes, to include “psychic
utility” (ibid., p. 19). What he means by psychic utility is utility from non-selfish goals.
His example is the “abolitionist dying to end slavery” (ibid.). Fukuyama’s argument is
that this would reduce utility to “a purely formal concept to describe whatever ends or
preferences people pursue” (ibid.), implying that the “premise” (ibid.) of utility maxi-
mization is reduced to the “tautology that robs the model of any [...] explanatory power”
(ibid.) when “people maximize whatever it is they choose to maximize” (ibid.). Regret-
tably, Fukuyama does not elaborate further on this point. His claim is that the model of
homo oeconomicus without including said psychic utility is “about eighty percent right”
[Fukuyama (ibid.), p. 17]. However, according to him, some part of individual behavior
is not the product of “rational calculation but [...] [of] inherited ethical habit” (p. 20). A
part of this inherited ethical habit, or culture, are the habituated norms described above
that facilitate the association among strangers in a society and thus social capital.
Summary and Discussion of Fukuyama (1995a, 1995b)
There are few connections between the concepts by Fukuyama on the one side and
Bourdieu and Burt on the other side. There is one notable exception: the argument
of shared norms as a central prerequisite for the formation of social capital can also
be found in Burt’s and, more prominently, in Bourdieu’s work. The latter argues that
“a minimum of objective homogeneity” [Bourdieu (1986), p. 249] of two individuals
is required for them to successfully engage in an exchange which is necessary to
maintain the relationship which is the essential prerequisite for social capital. This
objective homogeneity includes tastes and norms. Bourdieu’s (2008) main point is to
show that these tastes and norms differ between individuals within a society, reflecting
class differences. Bourdieu (1983) thus argues that individuals need to originate from
relatively similar classes in order to form relationships from which social capital can
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emerge. Fukuyama (1995b) in principle shares this argument, but extends its scope.
For him, as a result of history, norms are shared within nations to an extent which is
sufficient for individuals to relate.
In his concept of social capital Fukuyama separates it from the perspective of indi-
vidual utility maximisation and rational action used in economic theory. His examples
of individual acting, usually from workplaces as his analysis is concerned with the eco-
nomic performance of nations, are that of individuals acting as homo sociologicus, i.e.
fulfilling a role. Depending on the norms of the society they were socialized in, indi-
viduals trust or do not trust strangers. He goes as far as arguing that, at least when
it comes to social capital and, ultimately, culture, individuals do not act as “individual
utility maximisers” [Fukuyama (ibid.), p. 21). The level of trust in a society is subject to
change, but only over long periods of time. In the end, Fukuyama tells a story about the
influence of culture on the economic success of nations, an endeavor comparable to
that of Max Weber in his “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism” from 1920
[Weber (2013)]. A side effect of this argumentation is that there is no necessity for
Fukuyama to establish a link between micro level behaviour of individuals and macro
level norms. Norms are something which is de facto beyond individual-level explana-
tion. Although this is, albeit unintentionally, also present in Coleman’s and Putnam’s
concepts (see chapters 2.1.4 and 2.1.5 of this thesis), the separation between micro
level and macro level social capital is driven furthest by Fukuyama.
2.2 Social Capital in Economic Modelling
Economics is the social science where the individualistic perspective is most com-
mon. Since one of the aims of this thesis is to find a social capital concept that is
compatible with methodological individualism, looking at the treatment of social capital
in economics might yield interesting insights. However, attempts at integrating social
capital into the framework of mathematical modelling common in economics have been
sparse. There are three notable approaches: the first is to model social capital in anal-
ogy to private consumption goods. A proponent of this approach is Becker (1974). The
second approach is to model it in a way comparable to human capital. Here, the model
by Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2002) is the most prominent example. The third
approach is to integrate social capital into models of economic growth. Proponents are
Dasgutpa (2005) and Chou (2006). All all three approaches will be discussed in turn.
Becker’s Concept of Social Income
Esser (2008) refers to a model by Becker (1974) in his treatment on relational social
capital. In this model, social relations in the form of “characteristics of other persons”
(ibid., p. 1066) ultimately enter an individual’s utility function and their level can be
endogenously changed by that utility maximizing individual. What Becker aims at is
relatively similar to the concepts of altruism as e.g. proposed by Ahlheim and Schnei-
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der (1996): how does an individual’s behavior change if he is interested in e.g. the level
of consumption of market goods of other individuals, for example his family members.
Esser proposes that Becker’s model can be reinterpreted so that it is not another
individual’s characteristics that enter an individual’s utility function, but resources of
other individuals an individual has access to. Moreover, to simplify things, a slightly
modified version of Becker’s model will be depicted.
This model represents a very simple way to include connections to other individuals
into a neoclassical utility maximization framework. The mechanism is very straightfor-
ward: social connections come at a price, and thus generate opportunity costs. These
opportunity costs are represented in reduced consumption of a market good by the
individual. The individual thus has to trade-off between the marginal utility gains from
the two components in his utility function, with the usual result that in an equilibrium,
the marginal rate of substitution will equal the ratio of the prices of the two components.
The emphasis on the costs of social connections is an aspect the model shares with
the concept by Bourdieu (1983). It is insightful insofar as these costs are not as present
in the other concepts of social capital outlined in section 2.1.
In the model, an individual depends on the consumption of a market good and a
component dependent on the connections to other individuals23. This latter component
may represent several things: it may depict how many resources the individual under
investigation can access via other individuals, but also how close the connection to
other individuals is. This is important e.g. if it comes to thinking about the intrinsic
value derived from friendships. A peculiarity of Becker’s model is that the component
dependent on the connection to other individuals has a base level: there seems to be
some basic minimum of social connections that are there even without any effort.
The individual maximizes his utility subject to a budget constraint. Here, social con-
nections have a price that is measured in the same currency as market goods. The
price of social connections can e.g. be understood as an opportunity cost of the time
involved in maintaining these connections24. When adding the base level of social con-
nections described above, a sum results that Becker (1974) calls the “social income”
(p. 1063) of an individual. From this point onwards, the usual equilibrium conditions
can easily be derived.
Its simplicity is also the greatest weakness of the model when it comes to thinking
about social capital: there is no role for capital formation, i.e. either conscious or
unconscious investment. Social connections are modelled as a consumption good,
which can be consumed in lieu of other consumption goods. This may make sense
in the applications Becker proposes, e.g. when one family member transfers funds to
another family member as he is interested in the other’s well-being. However, what is
23Becker (1974) discusses the possibility of negative marginal utility from the characteristics of other
individuals, i.e. in the case of envy or anger. However, this is not the focus of this analysis and
will thus not be discussed further. Instead, a positive marginal utility from the connections to other
individuals will be assumed.
24A richer model that would explicitly depict the individual’s decision on time spent on earning money and
maintaining social connections is easily imaginable. However, it would yield few additional insights.
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interesting about social capital, i.e., as Bourdieu (1983) puts it, that it creates structures
which are not ad hoc and that can thus make a systematic difference in peoples lives,
cannot be captured with this simple model.
Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote’s Model
The model by Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2002) is interesting due to its close-
ness to classical human capital investment models. It can thus be interpreted to look at
social capital at an individual level and hence serve as a theoretical basis for deriving
hypotheses on the effects of certain variables, i.e. those included in the model such as
age or mobility, on social capital possession.
Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote describe their approach to modelling the creation
of social capital as one of modelling “the social component of human capital” (ibid., F.
438) as they focus on the individual and the benefits he reaps from the possession
of social capital. Consequently, in modelling the creation of social capital, they do
not consider any externalities of social capital the individual potentially creates when
creating social capital as externalities are usually assumed not to be taken into account
by individuals.
Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote effectively model what they call a “simple invest-
ment problem” (ibid., p. F440). They assume that individuals possess a stock of social
capital and receive a payoff which depends on their individual level of social capital.
This payoff is moreover a function of the exogenously given aggregate stock of social
capital. The aim of this formulation is to capture the externalities of the social capital
existing in a community, which they assume to be positive. This idea of externalities
of the social capital stock of a community is reminiscent of the macro level part of
the concept by Putnam, although, just as in Putnam’s concept, it remains unclear why
these positive externalities would necessarily interact with the social capital of a spe-
cific individual. Moreover, it is unclear what the social capital stock of the community
precisely is. Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote even warn of simply summing up indi-
vidual level social capital to obtain the social capital of a community as the aggregation
is complicated by the existence of positive and negative externalities.
As usual in investment problems, the social capital stock of the individual follows
an equation of motion, according to which the stock of social capital in the next pe-
riod is given by the sum of investment into the stock plus what is left of the current
stock after a given depreciation rate is taken into account. The authors additionally
assume that there is a certain chance hat individuals leave their community, leading
to an instant depreciation of their social capital by an exogenously given factor. The
reasoning is intuitive and also brought up by Putnam (2000): if an individual moves
away from his community, communication with the individuals he has relationships with
becomes more difficult and accessing their resources more costly, with cost increasing
in distance, thus depreciating the value of his social capital. This factor is, as Glaeser,
Laibson, and Sacerdote point out themselves, inspired by Becker’s (1964) notion of
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firm specific human capital.
Moreover, the authors assume that investment in social capital has a production
function with decreasing returns to scale and a time cost. Time is valued with the
opportunity cost of time usage. This may represent either “the wage rate of the value
of leisure time” [Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2002), p. F440], which should, of
course, be the leisure time not spent socializing. Individuals moreover live a given,
fixed number of periods and are impatient, i.e. prefer to experience a given level of
utility now rather than in the future.
The only variable that is under the control of the individual in the resulting invest-
ment problem is the individual investment into social capital in the current and future
periods. From this, an optimality condition can be derived. Glaeser, Laibson, and Sac-
erdote point to the following results of comparative dynamic analysis: the investment
in social capital is decreasing in the time preference rate, i.e. the more impatient the
individual is, the lower will be his investment in social capital. Moreover, it is decreasing
in the chance of relocation and the share of social capital lost with relocation. Further-
more, it is decreasing in the opportunity cost of time, decreasing in age and decreasing
in the rate of social capital depreciation. Finally, in line with Putnam’s concept, it is in-
creasing in the amount of social capital available in the community. Accordingly, there
is a net accumulation of social capital in the beginning of the life cycle and a net deac-
cumulation of social capital towards the end of the life cycle. Glaeser, Laibson, and
Sacerdote sum up that these “are not surprising results, and most would hold for any
type of capital” (ibid., p. F441).
The strength of the model by Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (ibid.) is its close
analogy to classic investment models and thus its ability to make strong predictions
about individual level investment in social capital and its determinants. However, there
are a number of problems: firstly, there is the problem of generating general results
from a very specific functional form. In this model, the individual’s social capital yields
a linear (!) payoff. Secondly, the assumption of constant depreciation of social capital
is problematic. As pointed out, there is a consensus in the literature that social capital
does not depreciate with use, but with non-use. The model is also problematic in
assuming convex investment cost in social capital - why should forming a relationship
to the third friend take longer than to the first friend? Even a contrary reasoning might
be possible, i.e. assuming a concave cost of investment. Moreover, as described in
section 2.1.2, Bourdieu (1983) suggests that the cost of investment may be a function
of the available amount of social capital - those who already have a lot of social capital
need to invest comparatively little to build or maintain it since having access to their
resources is highly attractive. How concrete actions other than investment in social
capital are influenced by the stock of social capital an individual and other individuals
in his community possess is beyond the scope of the model by Glaeser, Laibson, and
Sacerdote (2002).
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Social Capital and Growth Theory: Chou’s Model(s)
Putnam’s idea that social capital and economic performance might be connected has
been a starting point for growth theorists. Looking at these models is interesting as they
might, in principle, provide an answer to the question of the micro-to-macro-transition:
they start at investigating individual level investment decisions, but present results on
the macro level.
Chou (2006) proposes no less than three different growth models to incorporate the
different effects of social capital on economic growth. Other authors have also pro-
posed models to this end, e.g. Sequeira and Ferreira-Lopes (2011) and Bartolini and
Bonatti (2008). To avoid redundancy, the focus here will be put on the work by Chou
(2006). He identifies three effects of the presence of social capital that in the end
help to further growth: firstly that of a facilitated creation of human capital, an idea
Chou picks up from Coleman (1988), secondly that of improved financial development
and thirdly that of facilitated diffusion of information and thus innovation through net-
works which represent social capital. Although the three models aim at different effects
of social capital creation, they share the same basic mechanism: social capital has
spillovers on the creation of another type of capital or other sectors in the economy. As
individuals do not take these spillovers into account when deciding on their investment
in different types of capital, the overall production of social capital is too low relative to
the social planner’s solution. In what follows, an outline of the model by Chou (2006)
will be given where social capital facilitates the creation of human capital as it is the
model which is easiest to align with an individual perspective on social capital.
Chou’s model on social and human capital creation is in effect a relatively straight-
forward extension of Lucas’s (1988) incorporation of human capital into a model of en-
dogenous economic growth. In the decentralized solution, firms maximize profits and
households maximize utility. In order to maximize profits, firms sell an output, which
can be produced according to a standard Cobb Douglas type production function with
capital and the share of human capital used in production of the output as input factors.
Moreover, there is assumed to be a non-profit education sector in the economy, which
creates human capital. The sector sells new human capital at a price such that its
costs can be covered. Social capital does not enter directly in the production function
of the output, but merely as an input in human capital production.
The representative household maximizes the present value of its lifetime utility, which
is given as a CRRA utility function depending only on consumption. It would be intuitive
to have social capital enter the utility function directly to represent the intrinsic utility of
social contacts. Its lacking is justified by Chou (2006) with technical reasons, i.e. “for
tractability’s sake”25 (p. 896). The household maximizes utility keeping in mind several
equations of motion, i.e. one for economic capital, one for human capital and one for
social capital.
This maximization problem cannot be solved explicitly using the tools from dynamic
25This is an irritating point because the model can nonetheless not be solved explicitly.
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optimization, but only numerically. Also, comparative dynamics can only be done using
simulation methods and the results of this exercise are rather trivial: specifically, Chou
(2006) claims that the overall stock of social capital will be lower the more individuals
value present over future consumption. Moreover, the more efficient the creation of
social capital and human capital is, the more social capital will be created.
The clou of Chou’s model are the spillover effects of social capital on the creation of
different forms of capital and the effectiveness of other processes in the economy. To
do so, aspects of micro and macro level social capital are mixed. Individuals invest in
social capital, which is a feature of micro level social capital, but it then has spillover
effects, which is a feature of macro level social capital. Unfortunately, what would have
been most interesting about this model, the transition from the micro to the macro
level, is not modelled at all, but skipped as a representative individual model is used26.
The modelling of this transition has already not been satisfactorily solved by Coleman,
Putnam and Fukuyama as pointed out in the respective sections 2.1.4 to 2.1.6. While
it might be imaginable that relational social capital is “assisting [an individual] in the
accumulation of human capital” [ibid., p. 890], it is highly problematic to argue that
individuals high in social capital benefit more from “financial development” (ibid.) or are
able to capture the entire benefits of innovations they help diffusing via the networks
they are a member of without specifying the mechanism how this can come about.
What is to Learn?
Looking at the way social capital is modelled in economic theory is worthwhile. Different
from the social theorists looked at in section 2.1, with the notable exception of Bourdieu,
a much stronger emphasis is put on the costs of creating and maintaining social capital.
Here, the proverb “There’s no such thing as a free lunch” made popular in economics
by Friedman (1975) reverberates. Moreover, the two models that actually treat social
capital as capital, i.e. by Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2002) and Chou (2006),
agree that social capital is actually invested in purposefully.
The weakness of the models investigated here is the superficiality of the conceptual
treatment of social capital. This is especially striking vis-a`-vis the concepts outlined
in section 2.1. While Becker (1974) cannot be blamed for this as his model was only
recently reinterpreted by Esser (2008) to describe social capital, it is lamentable for
Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2002) and Chou (2006). Both approaches assume
some sort of spillover effects between individual and community or society level social
capital, but do not motivate this assumption in greater detail. The same is true for
details of the benefits that originate from social capital possession. Summing up, it
is fair to say that the social capital concepts developed outside economics are rather
picked up and used by economists, maybe with a small economics-related focus added,
26The transition from micro to macro is also a hotly debated issue in macro models, including endoge-
nous growth models which employ the representative individual framework, see e.g. King (2012) for
a critique.
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with neither any major contributions added nor any of the problems, e.g. the micro-to-
macro-transition in the concept especially by Putnam, solved.
2.3 Relational Capital and System Capital
As has been shown in section 2.1, the five most prominent authors in the debate on
social capital deliver five different social capital concepts. These concepts, although
they also share similarities, differ markedly in two related points: firstly, the question
whether macro level norms also constitute social capital and, if they do, whether they
are related to social capital on the individual level, and secondly, the question to whom
social capital belongs, i.e. whether it is an individual or a collective asset. This last
point is connected to the question whether the benefits connected to its possession
mainly accrue to the individual or to society as a whole. In the following section, an
investigation into these questions will take place using the concepts of relational capital
and system capital introduced by Esser (2008). Building on this, a re-examination
and comparison of the level of analysis of the five concepts presented above will be
undertaken. Moreover, a working definition will be presented for the term social capital
that will be used for the remainder of this thesis.
Esser (ibid.)27 argues that the two different forms of social capital identified in the
previous chapters, firstly, obligations and credit slips and, secondly, macro level norms
are theoretically very different and that subsuming them under the same term “social
capital” is bound to lead to confusion. Esser’s (ibid.) point is that the two forms are
different with respect to the degree of “autonomy or heteronomy in the production
and use” (p. 23, sic). An individual A is relatively autonomous on when and how to
do a favor which creates a credit slip or when and how to access another individual
B’s resources using outstanding credit slips, given that the individual B honors the
obligation connected to the credit slip. Social capital in the form of obligations and
credit slips thus comes with a large degree of autonomy. Consequently, it has many
features of a private good. However, an individual is less autonomous when it comes
to the question which macro level norms are valid in a society. Such norms exhibit
properties of, as Esser (ibid.) puts it, “collective goods” (ibid.). If effective, every person
in a society can benefit from them in the same way, i.e. they are non-excludable and
non-rival. Esser (ibid.) thus proposes to use the terms “relational capital” (p. 25) for
forms of social capital that have properties similar to that of private goods and “system
capital” (ibid.) for forms of social capital where the collective good aspect dominates.
In the following section, two concepts will be elaborated on in more detail. However,
this treatment will be kept short as large parts of it have already been pointed out in
the respective sections of parts 2.1.4 to 2.1.6 of this thesis.
27This article is a modified and translated version of a part of Esser (2000).
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2.3.1 Relational Capital
Esser (2008) claims that three aspects are important for an individual’s relational capi-
tal. The first aspect he points to is the individual’s “positional capital” (p. 30), the second
is the individual’s “trust capital” (ibid.) and the third is the individual’s “obligation capital”
(ibid.) In the next part, all three aspects will be addressed in turn.
The idea behind positional capital is that, in a network, some positions are more
valuable than others. This idea was introduced into social capital theory by Burt (1992)
(c.f. chapter 2.1.3 of this thesis). Especially non-redundant ties give an individual
access to a most diverse set of informations. However, Esser argues that optimizing
one’s position in a network is not sufficient since, in order to get access to information,
an individual needs to be trusted in by those he is connected to. His argument is that
this is impossible if the individual is optimizing his network too openly. This is especially
so since openly keeping contacts for purely utilitarian reasons is, according to Esser,
socially unacceptable in modern societies. An individual A thus needs to have at least
some friends that are redundant contacts, i.e. people he is friends with for reasons that
do not have to do with improved access to information. They serve as a signal to other
individuals that individual A is not merely interested in keeping contact to them due to
his interest in improving his position in the network.
Esser points out that bringing oneself into a strategic position is not enough to reap
all the possible benefits of positional capital. A lot of interesting information will only be
passed on to another individual if that individual is trusted not to misuse this informa-
tion. This is an individual’s trust capital. Trust can of course develop if the individual
did not misuse the information on previous occasions and if he honored the obligations
he had from getting these interesting informations in the past. Trust capital may thus
be seen as related to the concept of thick trust discussed above. However, even if two
individuals have never interacted with each other before, they both may have a reputa-
tion to be trustworthy. A reputation to be trustworthy of individual A facilitates obtaining
information e.g. from an individual B with whom an individual A has not interacted be-
fore. This is because individual B is more willing to hand out information as he expects
it not to be misused. Esser argues that having a reputation to be trustworthy allows
an individual A to access other individuals’ resources and hence constitutes capital by
itself.
The idea of reputation as a capital resource may be seen as sharing aspects with
Coleman’s (1990) action rights bank and Putnam’s (2000) favor bank: an individual A
has a deposit he can draw on in interaction with other individuals he has not previously
interacted with. However, there is a marked difference: especially Putnam’s favor bank
works such that an individual A, who has a deposit there, can ask some random in-
dividual B to do him a favor, although they share no acquaintances. It is unclear how
individual B is to know whether individual A really has a favor outstanding and how
individual B is to be compensated for his doing the favor to individual A, with all the
incentive problems involved (c.f. p. 31). This is different in Esser’s concept of trust
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capital. Here, having a reputation merely helps an individual A to be the first in a rela-
tionship to receive a favor as it signals his trustworthiness. Nonetheless, individual B
receives a credit slip on this occasion in order to have the favor returned by individual
A at a later point in time.
The last part of relational capital Esser brings up is obligation capital. It is precisely
what Coleman means when writing about obligations and expectations as a form of
social capital: one individual does a favor to another individual and receives a credit
slip in return due to a macro level norm of reciprocity effective in the respective society.
Credit slips can be redeemed at some future point in time more or less at the will of the
individual holding the credit slip, so the analogy to privately owned capital is apparent.
Favors do not cancel out completely [due to the infungibility of social capital Coleman
already discusses], so the longer a relationship between two individuals lasts and the
more favors have been done and returned, the more obligation capital they possess.
In addition to this process already described by Coleman, Esser points out that cre-
ating obligation capital is a delicate process. His argument is, as already mentioned,
that there is a strong norm on not maintaining social relationships for instrumental pur-
poses. Thus, he argues, if an individual A ever gives but the slightest hint that he is
keeping the relationship to another individual B mainly to gain access to individual B’s
resources, his investment in social capital will have been in vain. Thus, different from
other privately owned economic capital, the possibility to overtly invest in relational
capital is limited.
It is apparent that the three parts that form relational capital interact. Especially trust
capital and obligation capital are important in generating a payoff from one’s positional
capital. However, a high obligation capital also leads to a better reputation, i.e. higher
trust capital, as it means that an individual A has fulfilled his obligations in the past,
making it easier for individual A to start new relationships as he is immediately trusted
in. This in turn makes it easier for individual A to generate obligation capital or positional
capital returns from these new relationships.
2.3.2 System Capital
As mentioned above, the term system capital is used by Esser to describe those fea-
tures attributed to social capital in the literature where social capital is mainly seen as
a good owned by entire societies or at least very large groups. He mentions three
aspects that are important for the system capital in a society. The first aspect is “sys-
tem control” [Esser (2008), p. 38], the second is “system trust” (ibid.) and the third is
“system morality” (ibid.) In the next part, all three aspects will be elaborated on in turn.
The main point will be that, although relational capital can plausibly explain how these
mechanisms work at the scale of small groups that exhibit closure, it is unclear how the
micro-to-macro-transition to the level of the entire society can take place. Thus, rela-
tional capital and system capital may well describe conceptually more or less unrelated
concepts, that both share the term social capital as their name.
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For Esser, system control denominates the ability of a society to monitor the behav-
ior of its members. He argues that system control can help to “overcome problems of
collective behaviour fairly easily” [Esser (2008), p. 38]. This is “because free riders
will be detected” (ibid.) and credit slips can be given to those who “unselfishly con-
tribute[s] to the community” (ibid.). There is a marked resemblance to Putnam’s idea
of generalized reciprocity here: if an individual A does a favor towards a stranger, in
a society characterized by general reciprocity, it will be returned to him by someone
else. In Putnam (2000), the unsolved question is who among the many other members
of society is to be singled out to do individual A the favor? Esser proposes the same
solution to this dilemma already proposed by Coleman (1990): system control works
best in stable, close-knit networks which exhibit closure. Then, however, no transition
to the macro level of society is possible, which is also admitted by Esser.
System trust, the second aspect identified by Esser, is “a diffuse and generalized
trust in the proper functioning of the system” [Esser (2008), p. 38]. Its archetype is
trust as used by Fukuyama, but also Putnam’s thin trust. Esser (ibid.) also uses the
term “social trust” (ibid.) for system trust. He argues that system trust develops from
system control, i.e. that in a society where system control is working, people generally
put trust in each other.
The last aspect of system capital Esser (ibid.) points to is system morality. It repre-
sents what Coleman (1990) describes as internalized norms, i.e. norms (or values) that
individuals conform to (or act in line with) without extrinsic motivation. Without specify-
ing how the mechanism works precisely, Esser (2008) argues that system morality can
“considerably reduce the risk of social dilemmas” (p. 39) and reduce “the costs and
risks of all individually or collectively useful transactions” (ibid.). What readily comes
to mind here is the norm of reciprocity: if an individual has internalized a norm of
reciprocity, this will help him in creating relational capital as he will tend to honor the
obligations he has with other individuals for favors he has received in the past.
Esser (ibid.) also does not specify in detail how system morality comes into exis-
tence. He claims that it develops from system control and system trust, but he does
not describe a mechanism. Coleman disagrees here. He argues that the internalization
of norms requires socialization. This socialization should be aimed at by strengthening
“the internal sanctioning system” [Coleman (1990), p. 294] of an individual instead of
employing external sanctions. As applying external sanctions is the mechanism which
is mainly used in system control, the connection between system control and system
morality seems at least vague.
2.3.3 Level of Analysis
As has already been shown in section 2.1, apart from the definition of social capital
used and the question whether it is an individual or a public good, the level of analysis
is not the same among the five authors discussed either. This applies for the entire
literature on social capital. When studying the literature, the question is always: what
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level of analysis is used by the author to investigate social capital? Do authors look at
individuals and the incentives they face or do they rather look at societies as a whole
and give little attention to the incentives faced by the individuals? A brief summary of
the authors’ observations regarding this point will be given in the next section:
The author which is most clearly focussed on the individual is Burt (1992, 2000,
2005). At first sight, Coleman’s (1988, 1990) object of analysis seems to be the indi-
vidual, too. However, two reservations have to be made here: firstly, as pointed out,
Coleman is unable to explain how individual behaviour can lead to macro level norms,
which he defines as a form of social capital. Thus, a part of his concept remains exoge-
nous from a standpoint of methodological individualism. Secondly, Coleman implicitly
attributes the same level of social capital to all children who attend a catholic school
in his empirical research, thus making a step away from methodological individualism
and towards methodological holism. The same is largely true for Bourdieu (1983). He
attributes the level of social capital to individuals. However, as mentioned, he intro-
duces elements of methodological holism by giving the property of an agent to groups
at several occasions without explaining their internal mechanisms. Nonetheless, for
both Bourdieu and Coleman, social capital is a micro phenomenon insofar as they use
it to primarily explain phenomena on a micro level. As Bourdieu (1986) puts it, his con-
cept of social capital aims at explaining “all cases in which different individuals obtain
very unequal profits from virtually equivalent (economic or cultural) capital” (p. 248)28.
Lin (1999) argues that both authors take a “relational” (p. 32) perspective insofar as
their concepts focus on the relations between individuals on the one hand and between
individuals and exogenous elements of the social structure on the other hand. This is
also true for the model by Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2002), where spillover
effects from the societal social capital stock on the individual social capital stock are
assumed, but treated as exogenous by the optimizing individual.
Coleman’s notion of externalities connected to social capital is picked up by Putnam
(1993, 2000). In principle, he also sees social capital as the attribute of an individual.
However, as has been discussed above, he expands the concept to explain macro
level phenomena. In his empirical application, he also uses macro level observations
to explain macro level phenomena, e.g. by creating a social capital index for entire
US states. Thus, Putnam effectively adds a macro level perspective when it comes
to the effects of social capital. This is also true for Chou (2006), although it is at
first sight concealed because he uses the representative agent framework common in
endogenous growth theory. Fukuyama (1995a, 1995b) is concerned with macro level
phenomena too. Yet, very different from the four other authors discussed, his level of
analysis is fully holist. There is simply no role for any individually acting persons in
his theory as social capital is the property of communities [in fact, Fukuyama thinks
of nations by this term]. These communities also reap the benefits from their stock of
28Although, of course, Bourdieu (1983) ultimately aims to explain a macro phenomenon, i.e. the repro-
duction of social classes, he approaches it by always looking how this comes about at the level of
the individual.
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social capital. Especially the work of Putnam and Fukuyama continues to serve as the
(thin) theoretical justification for empirical studies regressing microdata on trust on the
values of macrovariables in different entities, typically US-counties [e.g. Rupasingha,
Goetz, and Freshwater (2006)], US-states [e.g. Andrews and Brewer (2012)] or entire
countries [e.g. Dinda (2008)].
Consequently, system capital has come to explain quite a number of macro level
phenomena. It includes less criminality [Putnam (2000)], higher overall wealth and eco-
nomic development [Westlund and Adam (2010), Woolcock (2010), Dinda (2008), Put-
nam (2000), Fukuyama (1995b)], better working democratic institutions [Rossteutscher
(2008), Putnam (2000)], facilitated cooperation for collective action [Woolcock (2010),
Ahn and Ostrom (2008), Paldam and Svendson (2001), Woolcock and Narayan (2000)],
or for environmental management [Adger (2010), Rydin and Pennington (2000), Os-
trom (1994, 1990)], more innovation [Akc¸omak and ter Weel (2009), Chou (2006)],
more entrepreneurship [Westlund and Bolton (2003)], superior public services [An-
drews and Brewer (2012)], higher financial development [Guiso, Sapieza, and Zingales
(2004)] and better community development and governance [Lelieveldt (2008), New-
man and Dale (2005), Bowles and Gintis (2002)].
2.3.4 A Definition of Social Capital
Given the variety of different concepts and social capital definitions, a working definition
for the remainder of this text is needed. As has already become clear, it should focus
on micro level social capital, i.e. relational capital, which is satisfactorily explainable
from the individual perspective adopted in this thesis. What readily comes to mind is
a functionalist approach much in the spirit of Coleman: whatever an individual finds
useful, or, in the language of economics, enhances his utility, and is available to him
because of his social connections constitutes his social capital. This approach seems
attractive at first glance since it readily includes a wide array of different phenomena
as social capital.
The problem with such a definition is that it is difficult to operationalize it empirically:
While it gives a clear enough picture what is meant by the term social capital for theo-
retical work, it leaves ample room for discussion how it should be measured. Van Der
Gaag and Snijders (2004) propose a more narrowed-down definition of social capital:
“The collection of resources owned by the members of an individual’s personal social
network, which may become available to the individual as a result of the history of the
relationships” (p. 155). When a wide definition of resources is employed, this resource-
oriented definition gives an analytical handle to pin down the aspects of social capital
that an individual finds useful, i.e. increase his utility. Thus, e.g. the access to informa-
tion and an individual’s reputation will be understood as resources, i.e. Esser’s (2008)
positional capital and trust capital, but also the possibility to spend time together with
others in an enjoyable or helpful way. The definition by Van Der Gaag and Snijders
(2004) will thus be used to operationalize social capital in this thesis.
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2.4 Is Social Capital Really Capital?
This section comprises the discussion whether capital is really a good term for the
concept of social capital. This is an important discussion as one of the main aims of
this thesis is to find out whether there is a concept of social capital that can be used
to complement the concepts of capital already prominent in economics. Moreover, two
prominent authors, i.e. Arrow (1999) and Solow (1999)], doubt whether social capital
is actually a good term on the grounds that the implied analogy to economic or human
capital is misleading. Arrow (1999) argues that capital entails three aspects, namely
“extension in time, [...] deliberate sacrifice in the present for future benefit, and [...]
alienability” (p. 4). All three of these aspects will be discussed in turn. Moreover, some
further details of the social capital concept outline above will be highlighted.
Durability
There is no principle disagreement on the point that Arrow (ibid.) lists as “extension
in time” (p. 4). Arrow (ibid.) admits that social capital has an effect that goes beyond
the imminent moment. This is also clear for Coleman (1988), but it is more apparent
in Bourdieu’s (1983) writing, who begins his essay on social capital by stating that the
“social world is accumulated history” [Bourdieu (1986), p. 241].
An interesting point connected to the aspect of durability is the question of deprecia-
tion, i.e the question of the time span over which social capital is durable. Astone et al.
(1999) argue that social capital depreciates, much like human capital and most forms
of physical capital but, as Adler and Kwon (2002) point out, unlike financial capital29.
This argumentation is also shared by Bourdieu (1983) and Coleman (1990). Indeed,
this is intuitive: social relationships that are not “maintained” [Bourdieu (1986), p. 250;
Coleman (1990), p. 321] can less easily be used by an individual A to access the re-
sources of another individual B, i.e. they lose their value. Interestingly, however, Adler
and Kwon point out that unlike physical capital but akin to human capital, social capital
does not depreciate with use, but with non-use. This is apparent in Coleman’s analysis
of social capital: according to him, obligations that form social capital do not cancel
out when used, but rather increase the total available amount of social capital. Thus, to
stay with the example of a bank account: a withdrawal and depositing of equal amounts
of social capital of two individuals on their hypothetical capital accounts would result in
both being richer in social capital than before.
The Question of Purposeful Investment
The aspect Arrow (1999) finds problematic is that of the “deliberate sacrifice in the
presence for future benefit” (p. 4). He claims that social capital is a byproduct of social
interaction made for other reasons, namely the intrinsic benefit of social interaction.
29Note that it may be argued that inflation represents the depreciation of financial capital.
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Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam, together with most of the social capital literature,
agree that most investment in social capital takes place unconsciously as a byproduct
of other activities aiming at the obvious utility gain that lies in the interaction with others.
However, there are cases where social capital is purposefully invested in and where
the intrinsic benefit of interaction does not serve as the main motivation, as both Bour-
dieu and Coleman admit, a point also stressed by Robison, Schmid, and Siles (2002).
Esser (2008), as elaborated on above, argues that a purposeful investment in social
capital has to be concealed because it is socially unacceptable to openly invest in so-
cial capital. On the other end of the spectre, economists dealing with social capital,
such als Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2002) and Chou (2006), naturally assume
that conscious investment in social capital takes place.
The argument brought up by Arrow (1999) has been further discussed in the lit-
erature. The question is whether the investment in social capital really needs to be
deliberate for social capital to constitute capital? Astone et al. (1999) propose to use
Samuelson and Nordhaus’ (1987) definition of capital, which splits up this aspect of Ar-
row’s capital definition into two parts: firstly, capital needs to be the product of a “prior
productive process” [Astone et al. (1999), p. 3]. In the case of economic capital, this
productive process usually entails foregoing consumption in the present period. This
part of the definition used by Astone et al. thus captures what Arrow (1999) means by
“deliberate sacrifice in the presence” (p. 4). As pointed out, some authors share the
view that social capital is predominantly purposefully invested into. Of course, if the
social interaction creating social capital is motivated by the intrinsic benefit it conveys,
no deliberate sacrifice takes place. However, the same may also be true for human
capital: to some individuals, accumulating human capital may give an enormous intrin-
sic benefit. The idea of the prior productive process as a perquisite for the creation
of capital as proposed by Samuelson and Nordhaus (1987), instead of a deliberate
sacrifice, thus appears to be more appropriate. Given this definition, social capital can
constitute capital.
The second part of Samuelson and Nordhaus’ definition of capital used by Astone
et al. claims that capital is productive in a production process, i.e. that social capital is
capital as it helps in achieving certain ends. This is the “future benefits” (p. 4) part of
Arrow’s (1999) definition. This aspect is present in Bourdieu (1983), but visible most
clearly in Coleman’s definition of social capital, namely that social capital “facilitate[s]
certain actions of individuals [...] within the structure” [Coleman (1988), p. S98]. These
two aspects are also brought up by Adler and Kwon (2002), albeit without explicit ref-
erence to Samuelson and Nordhaus (1987), to check whether social capital is capital.
Alienability
A third aspect Arrow (1999) brings up is the question whether social capital is “alien-
able” [Astone et al. (1999), p. 4], i.e. whether it is bound to a specific individual or
not. Both Arrow and Astone et al. claim that social capital is not alienable. This no-
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tion is explicitly confirmed, with reference to Loury (1987)30, in Coleman’s social capital
concept.
Bourdieu (1983) disagrees on this point. He assumes that the transfer of social
capital is in principle possible. However, this transfer process is problematic for two
reasons: firstly, its success is a priori unsafe, i.e. it is unclear for the transferring
individual how much of his social capital will be honored after the transfer to the new
individual. Secondly, it is time intensive and thus, after all, intensive in economic capital.
The logic behind this argument is that the amount of time available to an individual
is ultimately limited by his necessity to earn money. Beside the fact that it is, to a
certain extent alienable, Bourdieu argues that social capital is delegable, i.e. that the
entire social capital of a group can be placed in the hands of a single individual or
a small number of individuals. Social capital being delegable is, however, something
different from it being alienable. Delegating social capital is, according to Bourdieu,
only possible within a group, which is by itself based on relationships which constitute
social capital. Moreover, different from when it is alienable, it is not lost for the individual
delegating it.
Summing up, it is safe to say that social capital is not as easily alienable as economic
capital. However, this should not be a problem when discussing whether capital is a
good term for social capital. Astone et al. point out that, while physical capital is usually
alienable, the property of non-alienability also holds true for human capital. Even if
social capital is non-alienable, this would thus not be problematic for the use of the
term capital in social capital.
Dependence on Being Honored by Others
Bowles and Gintis (2002) argue that social capital is not a good term as capital “refers
to a thing that can be owned” (F. 420). According to them, social capital cannot be
owned. Adler and Kwon (2002) elaborate on this argument: social capital is different
from other forms of capital as its existence depends on being honored by other individ-
uals. While economic capital is usually guaranteed by the legal system, human capital
cannot be taken away from a person31 as it is deeply entangled to the person’s physical
presence. Social capital, is, as pointed out, also bound to a person’s physical presence
- but unlike human capital, it depends on other people honoring it, and unlike economic
capital, it is not protected by the legal system32. Both economic capital and human
capital might of course lose value if the demand for them in the general market dimin-
ishes, and for certain highly specialized kinds of economic and human capital, there
30Loury (1987) discusses this question in the context of affirmative action.
31Bourdieu (1983) makes the interesting case that the value of the cultural capital, which is, as pointed
out, related but not similar to human capital, increases if it is institutionalized, i.e. if the possessor
of the cultural title holds a title confirming it. These titles can, in principle, be taken away just like
economic capital can be expropriated. However, this is not the focus of discussion here.
32Adler and Kwon (2002) state that the value of a certain type physical capital goods, called network
goods, also depends on other individuals. A telephone is of little use, and thus of little value, if there
is no one to call.
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may only be one specific customer demanding it. This may create a situation where
the honoring, and thus the value, of that specific capital depends on the demand of
one specific other customer, a situation similar to that of the honoring of social capital.
But while this is a rarely occurring special case for economic and human capital, it is
the usual case for social capital. Both Bourdieu as well as Coleman accordingly agree
that investing in social capital is a comparatively risky investment as it is the form of
capital most likely to be defaulted on, as far as defaulting is an appropriate term for an
obligation which is not litigable.
As a consequence, in the language of credit slips and outstanding obligations used
by Coleman, social capital may be a usable resource only as long as the amount of
outstanding favours is somewhat balanced, or both individuals involved at least be-
lieve it to become balanced at some point in the future. This can easily be included
in Coleman’s concept: if social capital is represented by credit slips, an individual A
asking for a favor will give a credit slip to another individual B. Individual B may be
confident that the favor will be returned at some point. However, further requests for
favors by individual A that are not returned at some point will result in an imbalance
of outstanding credit slips, leading the individual B to become increasingly reluctant in
receiving further credit slips for fear of default. At some point, individual A will notice
that, just like a bank account, an account of social capital may run dry if withdrawals
are unaccompanied by corresponding deposits.
Fungibility
A final point Astone et al. (1999) bring up is the question of fungibility, defining it as “the
ability of a resource to be used in a variety of ways” (p. 4). They cite Coleman (1990),
who argues that social capital is “not completely fungible, but fungible with respect to
specific activities” (p. 302). Of course, and as Coleman and subsequently Astone
et al. and Robison, Schmid, and Siles (2002) agree, this is also true for human and
physical capital. It is, in effect, an almost trivial argument: specific resources are good
for specific causes, and some are good for a wider array of specific causes than others.
Bourdieu (1983) brings up a related issue, namely that different forms of capital can
be transformed into one another in a conversion process requiring time and implying
losses. Thus, complete fungibility of social capital could eventually be achieved, but at
a cost, a conclusion also drawn by Adler and Kwon (2002).
Adler and Kwon bring a related point into the discussion whether social capital actu-
ally constitutes capital. They argue that it can serve as a substitute for other forms of
capital as well as a complement to them. This is certainly recognized by Coleman, who
gives the example of social capital granted to a doctor as a substitute for higher pay.
Bourdieu does not make a statement concerning this question. However, he (2008)
finds that cultural and economic capital are imperfect substitutes for each other at least
for the individuals who possess them. The result of this incomplete fungibility are dif-
ferent outcomes between individuals with high cultural and low economic capital and
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those with high economic and low cultural capital. This may also be true for social
capital as it makes possible exchanges not usually made on economic markets.
2.5 Predictors of Social Capital Possession
The aim of this chapter is to develop various hypotheses on the predictors of individ-
ual social capital possession33, that can either be found in the literature or that follow
directly from the social capital theory outlined in the previous parts of this chapter. The
hypotheses developed here will be tested in an empirical study using the indicator that
will be developed in the next chapter of this thesis. The aim will be twofold: a first aim
is to test this indicator. An indicator that would reject all hypotheses that follow from
the theory would obviously be a problematic indicator. The question that would arise is
whether the indicator developed is actually related to the theory that was used to cre-
ate it. A second aim is to test the theory: some hypotheses are disputed in the theory,
some aim at different conceptions of social capital and in some cases the predicted
effects even run in opposite directions. Here, the indicator can be used as a tool to see
whether some hypotheses actually echo reality. In the case of conflicting hypotheses,
the indicator can be used to get an idea which effect dominates. A systematic devel-
opment and testing of hypotheses regarding individual level social capital possession
has hitherto not taken place. The study that comes closest to this research endeavour
is that by Pena-Lo´pez and Sa´nchez-Santos (2017). However, they include only a lim-
ited number of determinants and do not provide for theoretically developed research
hypotheses. Moreover, their study uses a conceptually different approach to individual
level social capital, as will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter of this thesis.
Thinking about predictors of social capital is complicated by the fact that it is not
always obvious whether a predictor is a determinant or an effect of social capital pos-
session. It is thus unclear in which way the causality runs, i.e. whether a certain
variable outcome determines an individual’s social capital or whether the individual’s
social capital determines a certain variable outcome. Moreover, in many cases, the ef-
fect is not unidirectional. Social capital and other variables might influence each other
at the same time. This is a direct consequence of the definition of social capital as
access to (other individuals’) resources: having access to resources enhances an in-
dividual’s possibilities and thus changes his life. This can include the variables that
originally caused the individual to be able to build up social capital in the first place.
While it is futile to go into more detail on this at this very abstract level, this matter will
be deeper investigated when discussing the respective aspects.
This section will proceed as follows: for each hypothesis, its theoretical background
is briefly explained. If there is a controversy on an hypothesis, some light will also be
33As pointed out by Lin and Erickson (2008) and discussed in section 2.1, the resources accessed by an
individual as his social capital are not really possessed by him, but just accessed. Nonetheless, the
term social capital possession will be used since it highlights the analogy to human and economic
capital.
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shed on it.
2.5.1 Demographic Variables
In this section, it will be illuminated whether an individual’s age or gender should be
expected to have an effect on his social capital.
Age Effects
Social capital theory predicts that, ceteris paribus, an individual’s age has conse-
quences on his stock of social capital. There are two opposing effects at work. Firstly,
social capital can be expected to increase as an individual grows older. The argument
is that people start their life with relatively little social capital. The reason for this is as
follows: as explained on page 51 of this thesis, social capital is more or less inalien-
able. If it is really inalienable, social capital cannot be bequeathed. Even if one follows
Bourdieu (1983) on this, the transmission of social capital is only possible to a relatively
limited extent as the transfer is time-intensive. Thus, the social capital of a newborn is
more or less limited to what comes from the sympathy of his immediate relatives and
other individuals who are attracted by his cuteness. Obtaining any further social capital
takes time. Thus social capital can be expected to increase as time passes, i.e. with
the individual’s age.
As a matter of fact, this does not mean that social capital grows inexorably with
an individual’s age. At some point, effects connected to an individual’s life-cycle may
dampen the creation of social capital, e.g. increased opportunity cost of time when an
individual enters into full-time work or starts a family. Time use research shows that
parents, and especially employed parents, are the social groups that have least leisure
time [Zuzanek and Smale (1999)]. This means that the creation of social capital should
be depressed during these years.
Secondly, from a certain age onwards, social capital may even begin to decrease
again. There are two arguments for this. One follows from the idea that social capital
cannot, or only to a limited extend, be bequeathed, as pointed out above. The incentive
to invest in social capital in order to pass it on to the next generation, a motive well
accepted in the literature on bequeathing economic capital [see e.g. Dynan, Skinner,
and Zeldes (2002)], is thus inexisting or at least depressed.
Moreover, the sum of utility flowing from social capital, be it intrinsic or triggered by
the access to resources, i.e. what economists would refer to as a net present value, is
decreasing as life is drawing to a close. It would thus be consequential to expect that
an individual A with a relatively small remaining lifespan would invest less to create
social capital. However, this effect is not limited to him. Due to the double-sided nature
of social capital pointed out by Coleman (1990), i.e. the fact that it always takes two
individuals to create social capital, said net present value of a social capital relationship
is also decreasing for any individual B an individual A with a relatively small remaining
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life span would try to form a social capital relationship to. Independent from his own
depressed incentive to create social capital, this makes it also more difficult for such
an individual A to do so. A final aspect is that longstanding social capital relationships
an individual A has become fewer as he grows older as it is more probable that the
counterparts die the older individual A, and consequently the counterparts, become.
Concerning the direction of the effect, it is relatively clear that an individual’s age de-
termines his stock of social capital and not vice versa. Our age (albeit not our lifespan,
but that is a different matter) is very much exogenous.
Summing up, the research hypothesis would be that a distribution of social capital
over the life cycle can be expected that looks as follows: individuals start with relatively
little or no social capital, which is then increasing as they grow older. However, as indi-
viduals grow old, their social capital should be expected to decrease again. Although
they do not take into account the varying opportunity cost of time and the possibility
of bequeathing social capital, the relationship between age and social capital depicted
here results in a pattern also predicted in the model by Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacer-
dote (2002) discussed in section 2.2.
The Role of Gender
Gender plays a subordinate role in economic theory. The major exception is literature
following Becker’s (1981) research. This area of research has become known as family
economics. Basically, its starting point is that, at least traditionally, women and men
specialized in different things34: women specialized in childrearing and “other domestic
activities” [Becker (ibid.), p. 14], while men have been active in the market sector. The
advantage of this division of labor is, according to Becker, that productivity advantages
that follow specialization can be reaped. Thus, the hypothesis developed here is not
really about gender, but about role models lived whose prevalence may be correlated
with gender. This may still be present today, although, as Becker states (already in
1981!), it used to be even more true in the past.
Moreover, in line with its gender specific role, an individual invests more either into
his (or her) productivity in the market sphere or into the private sphere of the house-
hold. In the social capital indicator outlined in the next chapter of this thesis, these are
precisely the spheres that are covered by the different measures. Thus, if an individual
specializes in one of these spheres according to his (or her) gender, this specialization
should, consequentially, also include social capital connected to this sphere. As a con-
sequence, if men and women live the traditional roles, this should also be reflected in
their distribution of social capital. However, Putnam (2000) argues that the workplace
can be a good place to form new connections and to get to know people, i.e. to create
new social capital also for private purposes. Moreover, he points out that “[t]he role of
34Becker (1981) also discusses the question whether the different positions of men and women that
result from his models are determined biologically. However, his conclusion is that his theory does
not lose explanatory power even if they are not. Thus, the author has no intention and no need on
lingering on this ideologically supercharged question.
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the housewife is often socially isolating” (p. 195). Consequently, while male individu-
als that specialize in the market sphere should have more work-related social capital,
female individuals that specialize in the private sphere might or might not have more
private social capital.
The caveat to this entire reasoning is of course that individuals live the traditional role
models. If female labor market participation is taken as an indicator for their prevalence,
this is an assumption which becomes increasingly difficult to sustain. According to
a report from the German Federal Statistical Office, the labor market participation of
women is only about 10 per cent lower than that of men in all age cohorts [Mischke and
Wingerter (2012)]. The same report, however, also states that women are much more
likely to hold part-time jobs in order to have time to fulfil their family- and household-
related duties. On the one hand, this leaves them, according to Zuzanek and Smale
(1999), as one of the groups with the least leisure time and thus the least time to
create social capital, which should depress their level of social capital. On the other,
being active in both the private and the market sphere may also boost social capital.
The likely direction of the effect is that the choice of the role model a woman follows
determines her stock of social capital. However, this does not need to be the case:
women who have little social capital may find it difficult to find appropriate childcare.
They would thus have little choice but to engage as a full-time or at least part-time
mother. While in Germany a legal entitlement to child care for children from the age
of one year onwards has been introduced in 2013, this has historically been an issue
for many mothers. Hence there may be cases where the effect runs both ways, i.e.
where a low stock of social capital forced a women to reduce work-hours, which in turn
reduced her social capital.
Summing up, only one clear hypothesis on the relationship between social capital
and gender related roles can be formulated: working men should have more work-
related social capital relative to women who do not participate in the labor market. For
women who are also active in the labor market, no clear-cut research hypothesis can
be formulated.
2.5.2 The Capital Analogy
In this section, it will be illuminated whether an individual’s stock of other capital should
be expected to have an effect on his social capital. Moreover, it will be investigated
whether conscious investment behaviour into social capital actually takes place and
what may be the effect of an individual’s attitude towards reciprocity on his stock of
social capital.
The Stock of Other Capital
Concerning the effects of an individual’s stock of other capital, i.e. economic and hu-
man capital, two effects are imaginable: firstly, social capital and other forms of capital
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might be substitutes. Secondly, social capital and other forms of capital might be com-
plements. Interestingly, there are good arguments and prominent proponents for both
perceptions: Coleman (1990) claims that specifically economic capital serves as a sub-
stitute for social capital. Bourdieu (1983) on the other hand argues that other forms of
capital are complementary to social capital. Both positions will briefly be illuminated in
turn:
Coleman (1990) thinks that there may be an inverse causality between an individ-
ual’s possession of economic capital and an individual’s dependency on social capital.
If an individual A can pay someone to help him out in certain situations, he is in no need
to access such resources via his social capital. Thus, his incentive to purposefully cre-
ate social capital to gain access to another individual B’s resources is depressed and
moreover no opportunity to create social capital as a side effect of social interaction
might be present since the latter might simply not be necessary. Consequently, ac-
cording to Coleman, a clearly negative effect of economic capital on the stock of social
capital can be expected. This view is shared by Xu and Wang (2015), who find that
individuals that have a high stock of social capital value thrift less. These individuals
should thus be expected to have less wealth. Their argument is that social capital
possession may serve as an informal insurance, which reduces the need to build up a
stock of economic capital for emergency situations.
Interestingly, Coleman takes a different stance when it comes to human capital.
Here, an argument analogous to that with economic capital outlined above could be
made. Moreover, a possible argument would be that human capital increases the wage
rate and hence the opportunity cost of time, which should, with time being the main in-
gredient in social capital formation, depress social capital creation. However, Coleman
(1990) argues that there “often” (p. 304) is a complementarity here. His example is that
of education: a child which has highly educated parents can learn more from them, i.e.
create more human capital, if the relationship between them is strong.
The example presented by Coleman is a relatively special case, and he does not
offer a more general explanation. The argument presented by Bourdieu (1983) why
there is a complementarity between social capital and other forms of capital may be
more convincing: Bourdieu argues that an individual A who possesses a relatively
high amount of economic or cultural capital35 is a more attractive partner to form a
connection to as he can give access to a comparatively large pool of resources. Thus,
as a consequence, such an attractive individual A needs to invest relatively little time to
keep alive a relationship to another individual B. Although Bourdieu does not explicitly
point this out, this also counteracts the effect that the opportunity costs of time are rising
especially in an individual’s human capital. Thus, following Bourdieu (ibid.), it should
be expected that social capital is increasing in both economic and human capital. A
complementarity between human and social capital is also predicted by Sequeira and
Ferreira-Lopes (2011).
35As already pointed out, Bourdieu’s (1983) concept of cultural capital is related to, but different from
human capital.
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Concerning the direction of the effect, it is helpful to differentiate between human and
economic capital. As described above, Coleman (1988) argues that social capital may
help in the creation of human capital. However, his example is limited to schooling,
and generally most (formal) human capital creation takes place relatively early in life.
In contrast, social capital creation takes place throughout life. Consequently, as an
individual grows older, the effect of his human capital on his social capital can be
expected to increase relative to the effect of his social capital on his human capital.
For economic capital, the bidirectionality of the effect is more apparent. Maybe,
as noted before, economic capital helps or establishes a disincentive to create social
capital. However, social capital may also help to create economic capital or create a
disincentive to do so. It may be helpful in getting or advancing in a job, or in raising
seed money and generating a customer base. However, the argument presented by
Coleman also holds true in the inverse: having social capital may well depress the
need of an individual to increase his economic capital and thus his effort to do so. As
a result, for economic capital, neither the direction of the effect nor whether the effect
is positive or negative can be inferred from the literature.
Summing up, the following can be said: Concerning economic capital possession,
the effect on an individual’s social capital is positive, zero (if the effects cancel out) or
negative. For human capital, there seems to be a consensus in the literature that it is
a complement to social capital.
Investment Behavior
The debate whether individuals consciously invest into social capital has already been
briefly touched on page 50 of this thesis. There is an eager discussion in the litera-
ture whether, and to what extent, purposeful investment in social capital actually takes
place.
The most extreme proponents on the side of those who argue that purposeful in-
vestment actually takes place are Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2002). In their
paper, they explicitly model the investment decision of individuals in social capital and
assume that the individual under investigation rationally solves a maximization problem
also taking into account his remaining lifespan, his opportunity cost of time and other
factors. An example of similar quality is the work by Burt (1992), who argues that in-
dividuals should actively try to form connections in order to bridge structural holes and
sever ties that are redundant. The contribution by Pena-Lo´pez and Sa´nchez-Santos
(2017) is a further example.
Then, there are more moderate points of view in the literature, which admit that
investment into social capital takes place, but that not all social interaction is connected
to the aim of creating social capital. Prominent proponents of this stance are e.g.
Bourdieu (1983) and Coleman (1990). Bourdieu argues that investment into social
capital may take place “consciously or unconsciously” [Bourdieu (1986), p. 249], thus
explicitly allowing for the possibility of purposeful investment in social capital. The same
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is true for Coleman (1990), who elaborates on this point in more detail: he explains
that “most forms36” of social capital are created or destroyed as a byproduct of other
activities” (p. 317) but also argues that for some uses, social capital is “the direct result
of investment by actors who have the aim of receiving a return on their investment”
(p. 313). His example is a “business organization” (ibid.), i.e. a firm, which is an
unfitting example as the obligations created therein are typically fixed by justiciable
employment contracts, a feature untypical for social capital relationships. A more fitting
example would be a voluntary trade association, where businessmen meet in the hope
to find new clients or partners for future business ventures.
Kadushin (2004) picks up this thought from Coleman, although he does not cite him
in this context: he is generally sceptical towards the idea that investment is a good
term for purposeful social capital creation, stating that “[t]he analogy to “investment” in
“real capital” is the weakest aspect of social capital theorizing” (p. 87). Nevertheless
Kadushin agrees that if something like purposeful investment in social capital takes
place, this is in the world of business. For the private sphere, he denies the idea of
conscious investment in social capital. The main point of his argument is that “most
people [...] enjoy being with their friends for non-instrumental reasons” (ibid.), an argu-
ment also shared by Daly and Silver (2008).
Esser (2008), makes an additional point on conscious investments on social capital:
having relationships for purely strategic reasons is contemned by society, or, as he
puts it, “[t]he process of creating [...] obligations through credit slips is not compatible
with open ‘rational’ and ‘egoistic’ reasoning and investments” (p. 35 f.). Esser argues
that having some good friends, who are obviously not there for purely instrumental
reasons, is an important signal an individual can send to potential contacts that he
can be “trusted to and obliged in” (p. 36). This is relevant as creating obligations
with another individual always means putting trust in that individual to redeem these
obligations some day. Thus, he argues, even an individual optimizing his position in
the social network, as Burt (1992) proposes, needs to have some close friends he is
friends with for intrinsic reasons.
Concerning the direction of the effect, it is relatively clear that people who invest in
social capital increase their stock of social capital, while it is difficult to imagine why
the effect should work the other way around, i.e. why having more social capital would
trigger more investment behavior.
Summing up, there is some scepticism in the literature whether a lot of conscious
and purposeful investment in social capital takes place. The place where at least some
authors like Coleman and Kadushin rather expect a conscious investment in social
capital is the work sphere. The research hypothesis would thus be that conscious and
purposeful investment in social capital should primarily be expected in the work sphere.
36As pointed out in section 2.1.4, Coleman’s (1990) four of his six forms of social capital are rather
different ways of how social capital can be useful, which can be aligned with the two main forms of
obligations and norms.
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The Norm of Reciprocity
In this section, an investigation into the role of an individual’s attitude towards reci-
procity on his social capital will take place. Reciprocity is important because, as al-
ready mentioned, social capital is not justiciable. Thus, with the mechanism of obliga-
tions and credit slips, its existence depends on the honoring of those credit slips by the
individuals who have them outstanding. This honoring, in turn, depends, as pointed
out above, on the adherence to a norm of reciprocity by said individuals. To make
things more complicated, there are different variants of the norm of reciprocity. Putnam
(1993, 2000) alone proposes three variants. A look into the literature on reciprocity
brings further insights.
As already seen in section 2.1.5, Putnam, in his two seminal works on social capital
employs three concepts of reciprocity but gives them only two names: “specific” [Put-
nam (ibid.), p. 20] and “generalized” (ibid.) reciprocity. In his earlier work, “Making
Democracy Work”, specific reciprocity is better described as comparative or matching
reciprocity [Kolm (2006)]: an individual does another individual a favor, the other indi-
vidual immediately returns the favor and the two individuals are done with each other.
Kolm argues that this type of reciprocity can cause the person which is indebted to
have feelings of “shame or guilt” (ibid., p. 380), which need to be relieved by returning
the favor. It is very apparent that such a form of reciprocity is of little help in creating
social capital: firstly, if all favors are returned immediately, there is no room for obliga-
tions to be outstanding. Secondly, feelings of shame or guilt are not a good basis for a
relationship of any sort.
The second form of reciprocity Putnam (1993) proposes is what he calls generalized
reciprocity, a concept very much akin to the reciprocity described by Coleman (1990):
if an individual does a favor to another individual, and there is an effective norm of this
type of reciprocity, then an obligation, or credit slip, comes into existence. This credit
slip does need not to be cashed in immediately and, moreover, when it is redeemed
one day, and a favor is done in return, it is not completely cancelled out. Thus, this type
of reciprocity induces that the relationship between two individuals becomes ongoing.
Kolm (2006) describes this form of reciprocity as “continuation reciprocity” (p. 380).
This kind of reciprocity, i.e. continuation reciprocity, can also be identified in the
writings of Bourdieu. Kolm (ibid.) describes that continuation reciprocity and the se-
quential exchange of gifts are synonymous. This sequential giving of gifts is a core
piece of social capital creation identified by Bourdieu (1983), who writes that social
capital is created by thus transforming “contingent relations” [Bourdieu (1986), p.249]
into “relations that are at once necessary and elective, implying durable obligations”
(ibid.).
The third form of reciprocity Putnam describes is generalized reciprocity as used
in “Bowling Alone” [see also chapter 2.1.5 of this thesis]. This form of reciprocity is
such that individual A does individual B a favor, and some other day, individual B does
individual C a favor, while some individual D does individual A a favor, and so on. It
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is rather connected to thin trust and thus not relevant for individual level social capital
creation.
Concerning the direction of the effect, it is clear apparent that social capital formation
is helped if an individual adheres to the norm of continuation reciprocity. However, the
reverse case is also plausible: Someone who has a large stock of social capital is
interested in sticking to a norm of continuation reciprocity as the existence of his stock
is effectively tied to a continued interaction with specific other individuals.
Summing up, the research hypothesis would be that individuals who see the ex-
change of favors primarily in the light of this continuation reciprocity should, ceteris
paribus, have access to a larger stock of social capital while those individuals who see
the exchange of favors primarily in the light of matching reciprocity should have less
social capital available to them.
2.5.3 Social Networks
In this section, the role of an individual’s social network in the creation of his social
capital will be discussed. The point might seem trivial, but is nevertheless worth look-
ing at: do connections to many people also improve the access to resources, i.e. do
they increase social capital? Is it helpful to have many different places to meet people,
e.g. a private network, a job, a voluntary organization and a social network site? To
investigate into this, it will firstly be thought about the time spent in the private social
network. Secondly, workplace effects will be looked at, i.e. an investigation will take
place into the question how important having a job is for an individual’s social capital
creation. Thirdly, it will be checked how important the membership in all kinds of volun-
tary organizations is for an individual’s social capital. Lastly, an investigation will take
place into the the effect of membership in an internet-based social network site.
Role of Time Spent in the Private Social Network
As already pointed out, it is stressed especially by Bourdieu (1983), but also implicitly
in the model of Becker (1974) in the interpretation by Esser (2008) and the model by
Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2002), that time is a highly important factor in social
capital creation.
The intuition is clear: Intensive and repeated interaction is where social capital is
created. In this kind of interaction, favors are done inevitably, even if there is no inten-
tional or conscious social capital investment. Of course, intensive interaction may also
take place in relatively little time and some intensive relationships between individuals
may not rely on repeated interactions in high frequency. Nonetheless, a connection be-
tween time and social capital creation can be postulated for two reasons: Firstly, many
of these intensive relationships that now may take relatively little time to maintain may
have taken relatively much time to build up. Secondly, individuals should be expected
to allocate their time such that they spend it with others they find it worthwhile spending
62
2 Theoretical Concepts of Social Capital
it with. Individuals who spend a lot of time with other individuals in their social network
should thus, ceteris paribus, be expected to have access to more social capital.
Concerning the direction of the effect, it is clear that the time an individual spends
with his family, friends and acquaintances in his social network and his social capital are
so close to each other that it is not actually helpful to ask what determines what: social
capital creation is a quasi-automatic byproduct of having friendly social interaction, and
it is of course easy to spent time having friendly interactions with those people that an
individual, for some reason, has social capital relationships to.
The research hypothesis would thus be that people who spend more time with their
friends, acquaintances and family should have access to more social capital. This
should, of course, be primarily true in the private sphere, but this may as well be true
when it comes to work-related social capital, especially when contacts outside an indi-
vidual’s immediate workplace come into focus.
Workplace Effects
Apart from the private social network, it is also possible to investigate into the effects
of regularly meeting other people at the workplace on an individual’s social capital.
Generally speaking, there are two competing effects at work when an individual enters
into the paid labor force. These have already been illuminated in section 2.5.1: firstly,
having a paid job increases the opportunity cost of time as the amount of free time
is then limited. This effect would thus work in the direction of reducing an individual’s
social capital as time is the fundamental resource necessary to create social capital.
Secondly, however, there is a consensus that the workplace is a good place to get to
know people, colleagues and customers, and thus to create social capital [see e.g.
Putnam (2000) and Kaasa and Parts (2008)]. This should be especially true for job-
related social capital for obvious reasons.
The arguments outlined so far should not only hold true for employees, but also
for individuals who are self-employed. Instead of colleagues, they have customers,
other self-employed individuals they meet via the chamber of commerce or voluntary
trade associations and their employees. All these factors combined should lead to
comparable opportunities to create social capital.
What about the unemployed, then? Gallie, Paugam, and Jacobs (2003) argue that
unemployment and social isolation are not directly connected, but that it is rather
poverty caused by unemployment which then, in turn, causes social isolation. It is
apparent that socially isolated individuals should not be expected to command over
a large stock of social capital. The opposite argument would be, as already pointed
out in the inverse direction above, that the unemployed have more time to spend on
their social contacts. Moreover, they would be more reliant on an exchange of favors
instead of buying comparable services on the market due to their depressed economic
resources.
As an additional problem, regarding workplace effects, it is unclear what is cause
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and what is effect. If unemployed individuals have less job-related social capital, the
question is the following: are these individuals having less social capital because they
are unemployed, i.e. because they do not have colleagues they meet regularly and
can create social capital and are unattractive people to know for their limited economic
resources? Or is it rather that they are unemployed because they have less job-related
social capital, especially bridging-capital in the sense of Granovetter (1973) and Burt
(1992), i.e. are they not part of a network where job offers are regularly circulated?
The theory does not allow for a clear-cut research hypothesis on this point. However,
there seems to be a tendency in the literature that being unemployed is hampering in
social capital creation and having a workplace is helpful.
Effects of Group and Organization Membership
The idea that an individual’s membership in organizations or groups37 and his social
capital are connected is already included in Bourdieu’s (1983) theory of social capital.
For him, individuals who belong to a group can use the group’s resources as a cre-
dential to multiply the number of resources they have access to via their social capital.
Thus, as it increases the amount of resources available, membership in a group is
profitable. Moreover, Bourdieu declares that some groups are “deliberately organized
in order to concentrate social capital” [Bourdieu (1986), p. 249], naming especially
“prestigious groups” (ibid.) as an example. Bourdieu (1983) does not give a precise
definition, but gives the examples of “rallies, cruises, hunts, parties, receptions, etc”
(p. 250) as events organized by such groups, which already brings to mind a relatively
clear picture. Thus, following Bourdieu (ibid.), it should be expected that the member-
ship especially in prestigious groups should enhance an individual’s social capital.
Coleman (1990) also finds that organizations and social capital belong together:
organizations, formed for whatever reasons, connect different individuals. In following
a common goal, individuals do favors for each other. Even if no common purpose is
pursued, but simple interaction takes place, trust between interacting individuals builds
up, as Ha¨uberer (2014) points out. Thus, obligations and credit slips can easily come
into being and social capital is created. This social capital can then be used by an
individual or multiple individuals who are members of the group to also achieve other
joint interests. This argument is shared by Putnam (1993, who, especially in “Bowling
Alone”, uses an individual A’s membership in all kinds of groups and organizations
as a proxy to assess the individual A’s social capital. However, it is not clear why
membership in many groups should per se be more helpful than membership in just
one group. This will be discussed in more detail in section 3.3.1.
Different from the private network, the direction of the effect with groups is clearer, but
some differentiation is necessary: being a member of a group connects an individual
to other individuals, thus enhancing his social capital. It is not clear why having social
capital makes it more likely for an individual to join a group that pursues some endeavor.
37For the sake of the argument in this section, both terms serve the same purpose.
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However, there are some prestigious groups where entry is not open to everyone, but
rather subject to being invited or at least being able to present a number of guarantors
within the organization. For these groups, having social capital is surely helpful for
joining.
Summing up, the following can be said: an individual’s membership in groups and
organizations should enhance his social capital. However, it should not just be the
number of groups an individual is involved with, but also the amount of time he spends
there which should have a positive effect. The research hypothesis would thus be that
individuals who spend more time in groups and organizations should have more social
capital. As a second hypothesis, this should be especially true for prestigious groups
and organizations.
Social Network Sites
Social network sites, of which Facebook in the privat sphere and Xing and LinkedIn
in the job-related sphere are probably the most prominent proponents, are a relatively
new phenomenon. Nonetheless, an ample literature on the effect of using such sites on
an individual’s social capital has quickly developed. The debate has two poles: firstly,
which is the point most authors make, the use of social network sites makes it easier
for individuals to stay in touch with people. Secondly, time spent on a social network
site is time spent alone insofar as people are usually alone with their computer when
they do so.
Regarding the first argument, Donath and Boyd (2004) and Neves (2013) argue
that social network sites reduce the cost of connections, i.e. they make it possible
to “keep in touch with unprecedentedly large number of people” [Donath and Boyd
(2004), p. 71] because of the web’s “low cost and high speed and ubiquity” [Neves
(2013), p. 602]. Donath and Boyd discuss that, while the number of close ties, i.e.
thick ties, an individual can have, may be limited, social network sites may especially
help to increase the number of an individual’s thin ties. Steinfield, Ellison, and Lampe
(2008), who investigate the use of social network sites among young adults in the
United States, confirm this. They find that social network sites help these individuals to
stay in touch with their friends when they move away from their hometown for tertiary
education.
Moreover, Donath and Boyd (2004) contend that social network sites also offer an
easy way to contact people hitherto unknown to an individual, and might thus offer
a way to create a new social network, e.g. when moving to a new city. However,
this might not be a superior possibility, as she points out that “the resulting personal
network is similar to the sort of network they would have had[,] had they met through
more traditional means” (p. 80).
The opposite argument goes, according to Valenzuela, Park, and Kee (2009), back to
Putnam (2000), who argues that media consumption, meaning primarily TV consump-
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tion, consumes time that would otherwise be used for social interaction38. Considering
the importance of time in the creation of social capital, it is clear that TV consumption
should, ceteris paribus, be expected to reduce an individual’s social capital. Valen-
zuela, Park, and Kee (2009) refer to Nie (2001), who extended this hypothesis, which
is called the “time displacement hypothesis” [Neves (2013), p. 604], to the computer.
However, this study stems from the beginning of the internet age, when internet users
were relatively few and, according to Nie (2001), better educated than the average of
the population. At this point in time, social network sites were not as common as they
are today, and Nie (ibid.) does not include them when listing the things people do on
the internet. Neves (2013) shares this point, claiming that “many online activities are
social” (p. 604). It is apparent that a medium that is mostly used for one-way commu-
nication, like TV, does not enhance the time an individual spends socializing39. Since
this hypothesis is about the use of social network sites and not about the internet in
general, the question arises how relevant the findings of Nie (2001) are in this case.
Concerning the direction of the effect, there are two conflicting possibilities. Firstly,
the use of social network sites may help individuals to stay or get in contact with other
individuals and thus to increase their social capital. Secondly, it might be that indi-
viduals that already have relatively much social capital find the use of social network
sites more helpful as it allows them to, for want of a better word, manage their existing
contacts at a lower cost.
Summing up, the research hypothesis is that the use of social network sites is espe-
cially helpful in keeping up weak ties. Thus, if any, they should have a positive effect
on an individual’s social capital.
2.5.4 Geographical Effects
In this section, various effects that can be subsumed under the headline geographical
effects will be discussed. These include effects of an individual’s within-country mobil-
ity, i.e. moving his residence within a country or migrating from one country to another.
Moreover, an investigation will take place into possible effects of the German Partition
from 1949-1989 and on whether living in a city or in a rural area has effects on an
individual’s social capital.
Mobility
The idea that an individual’s mobility, understood as his propensity to move within a
country from one place to another, has an effect on his social capital has been intro-
38Interestingly, Putnam (2000) himself is not as sceptical on the effects of the internet: in chapter 9 of
“Bowling Along”, he briefly touches upon the question whether the internet may help to create new
social capital, and is positively optimistic, stating that “[S]ocial capital is about networks, and the Net
is the network to end all networks” (p. 171).
39Neves (2013) points to the argument that people may also watch TV in groups, making it a social
activity. However, she dismisses this argument as watching TV together does not really cause social
interaction.
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duced by Putnam (2000)40. As has already been pointed out, keeping social ties alive
requires regular interaction. This is, of course, easier if the physical distance between
individuals is smaller, i.e. it is possible to meet without having to incur relatively large
cost in the form of travel time or travel cost. Thus, if an individual moves, it should be
expected that his social capital decreases at first. However, it should also be expected
that this decrease will be compensated after some time as the individual will build up a
new social network in the place he moved to. Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2002)
add an additional mechanism: individuals know their propensity to move and antici-
pate that moving will cost them a certain share of their stock of social capital. The
reasons for this are the same as outlined above. Since individuals include their indi-
vidual propensity to move in their maximization problem, individuals who have a high
propensity to move will have a depressed incentive to invest in social capital.
In addition, there may be a problem of cause and effect here: Boenisch and Schnei-
der (2013) and Kan (2007) argue that movement decisions may be endogenous, i.e.
that individuals who have a lot of social capital, especially of the bonding type, in one
specific geographic place may be more likely to stay there given the same migration
incentive. Thus, the additional question is whether people move and thus have less
social capital or whether they have less social capital in the first place and thus find it
easier to move. David, Janiak, and Wasmer (2010) extend this argument: Social capital
that is accessed via membership in organizations might make moving easier relative to
social capital that is accessed via thick ties to family members and friends since similar
organizations might be available at the new place of residence. As a consequence, an
individual hitherto active in a number of organizations might envisage the possibility to
build up new social capital quickly, whereas family members and friends typically stay
behind. This last point is, for the case of the family, also made by Alesina et al. (2015).
The prediction of the literature, and thus the research hypothesis, is clear: individuals
who have moved, especially those who have moved relatively recently, and who have
a higher propensity to move at all, should be expected to have lower levels of social
capital. This should be especially true for individuals who are not active in organizations
but rather access their social capital primarily via close friends and family members.
However, these predictions are typically made for a bigger country - the United States
- and stem from a time when communication technology was not as advanced as it is
today. Today, it is possible to stay in contact with far-away people virtually everywhere
at almost no cost. Moreover, distances in Germany, even when an individual moves,
are typically much smaller than in the United States. Thus, the effect may be mitigated
in Germany in 2015 relative to the United States 15 years earlier, the case investigated
by Putnam (2000) and Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2002).
40Coleman (1990) already discussed individual moving decisions, but in a different light: his focus is
on the social capital of other individuals that is lost if an individual decides to move away, not on the
moving individual’s loss.
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Migration Effects
It will secondly be investigated whether an individual’s migration background, i.e. whether
he or his parents migrated to their current place of residence from another country, has
an effect on his social capital. The question is whether an effect by the different cultural
background of immigrants should be expected, as e.g. proposed, although for a com-
pletely different understanding of social capital, by Fukuyama (1995a, 1995b). This will
be discussed specifically for the case of people from the former German Democratic
Republic as the next hypothesis, but of course the arguments there should in principle
also hold true for migrants from other countries from the formerly communistic eastern
states. For individuals from other cultures, there are few substantial arguments in the
literature why there should be an effect of their culture on their stock of social capital41.
Consequently, there is little reason to expect that migration effects should behave dif-
ferently from the intra-country mobility as outlined in section 2.5.4, especially with the
now greatly improved communication methods already mentioned there.
In the literature, what is moreover discussed are cases where migrants flock in com-
munities with little connections to mainstream society and other migrant communities,
i.e. communities that exhibit very high degrees of closure. Portes (1998) gives a num-
ber of examples what the effects of such communities can be: for entrepreneurs from
such a community, the access to start-up capital can be simplified, as can be the ac-
cess to the market and to potential employees. For non-entrepreneurs, the privileged
access to certain jobs in firms controlled by other members of the community remains.
Munshi (2014) also points to generally “improved outcomes for [the] members” (p. 50)
of communities which exhibit a very high degree of closure. These ethnic communities
function the way they do because individuals in them know each other for a long time
and the existing networks within them exhibit a high degree of closure. The overall
effects are to a certain extent comparable to those pointed out for all kinds of groups
and organizations in section 2.5.3.
Portes does, however, make a second argument in connection with ethnic communi-
ties, pointing out that the mechanisms they operate by might also be hindering for their
members, depending on the relevant community. When ethnic communities are impov-
erished, it may well be that they are no great help to their members, a point also made
by Di Falco and Bulte (2015). Portes (1998) gives the example of “poor urban commu-
nities” (p. 13). If connections are important for finding jobs, and entrepreneurs or other
members of the community an individual has connections to cannot offer such jobs to
him, or only to a smaller extent than is the case in other communities, his membership
in a community is of no help for him. Portes points to Granovetter (1973) to prove
this for teenagers who are looking for a job. The same may be true for entrepreneurs.
When an entrepreneur is expected by another member of the community to hire him
as he has no other chance for employment, the entrepreneur may face the choice be-
41Coleman (1990) brings the argument that the central market in Cairo is a place where the merchants
are especially rich in social capital. However, it is difficult to draw conclusions from such anecdotical
evidence on e.g. the social capital stock of all Arab people.
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tween the ruin of his business and his exclusion from the community. The latter may be
equivalent to a loss of virtually all his social ties. Di Falco and Bulte (2015) also point
to the disincentive to actually become an entrepreneur created by such a situation.
Concerning the direction of the effect, two cases have to be distinguished: second
generation migrants did not choose to have a migration background. Consequently, the
direction of the effect would be that their migration background influences their social
capital stock. For first generation migrants, basically the same argumentation holds
true as for individual mobility as discussed above: it is not clear whether they moved
and this influenced their social capital stock, or whether they had little social capital in
the first place and thus found it easy to move.
Concerning the research hypothesis: It is relatively clear that no effect for migration
per se should be expected that is different than the one for intra-country mobility out-
lined above, i.e. there could be a negative effect for recent immigrants. With regard
to the argument with close-knit immigrant communities, there are arguments for both
positive or negative effects. However, this latter aspect is certainly not relevant for all
migrants.
The Berlin Wall Experiment
As is common knowledge, Germany has been partitioned for over 40 years between
1949 and 1990 as a result of the Second World War. During these years, the two
German states featured two very different political systems. While a liberal democracy
was established in the Federal Republic of Germany in the west, a socialist dictator-
ship which closely spied on its residents was established in the German Democratic
Republic (GDR) in the east. Especially between 1961 and 1989, while the Berlin Wall
was standing, the direct communication between people in east and west was limited.
In this section, it will be investigated how this natural experiment, which is called the
“Berlin Wall Experiment” by Boenisch and Schneider (2013), (p. 391), had an impact
on an individual’s social capital.
There exist two arguments on the connection between social capital and commu-
nist dictatorships: firstly, Paldam and Svendson (2001) point out that dictatorships in
general are not eager on their subjects organizing beyond their control as this might
be a good starting point for organizing against them. Eastern block countries, such as
the GDR, typically had a secret police to control their residents’ doings. Such a secret
police is a very effective tool to achieve that people do not organize: besides that it
may find out if they do, its existence also creates distrust even among individuals who
are not spied upon, as it is never entirely clear whether the person an individual is in
contact with is an informer of the secret police or not. Thus, individuals face a strong
incentive to restrict their social ties to a small number of people they believe they can
trust, which are often acquaintances other people they know trust as well, i.e. they
prefer bonding over bridging ties, an argument also shared by Boenisch and Schnei-
der, 2013. Note that this is fine for the dictators as it is difficult to organize a revolt in
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a country separated into a multitude of small groups which are highly interconnected,
but where only very few connections between the numerous small groups exist.
For the communist states of eastern Europe, Paldam and Svendson (2001) describe
a second, contradicting incentive: in these states, many goods were not available via
the official channels. Thus, individuals, directors of firms as well as private consumers,
had to search for different ways to get access to the goods they required. These
goods were often only available via informal networks. It is apparent that the more
diverse the required goods were, the more important were bridging ties to acquire
them. Paldam and Svendson (ibid.) argue that such structures were, at least to a
certain extent, tolerated because they increased economic efficiency and helped to
mitigate supply problems for the normal population.
Burchardi and Hassan (2013) investigate into another aspect connected to German
reunification: in 1989, ties by people living in West Germany to people living in the
GDR suddenly had an economic potential as it was now possible to make business
with them, which had been impossible before. Burchardi and Hassan show that indi-
viduals that had this kind of ties benefited economically by experiencing a more-than-
average increase in their income. Moreover, they suggest that it was mainly persons
who were expelled from the former eastern territories of the German Empire after 1945
and their descendants who profited as their families were often torn apart after 1945
with one branch ending up in the GDR and the other ending up in West Germany.
Thus, expellees were more likely to have ties to the former GDR. The observed ef-
fect is, however, a one-time effect and should not have any lasting effect on the social
capital of expellees and their descendants in general.
Thus, the direction of the effect is clear since people were not selected to live in the
GDR for their stock of social capital. The overall effect of the communistic dictatorship
on the former GDR’s inhabitant’s social capital is, per se, unclear. If any, the research
hypothesis would be that they have fewer, but thicker ties. Moreover, more than 25
years after German Reunification, it is questionable whether these effects can still be
found, especially keeping in mind the huge migration flow from east to west Germany
following the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Differences between City and Countryside
An interesting point to investigate is whether an individual’s social capital differs de-
pending on whether he lives in a city or in the country. The alleged anonymity in big
cities is a recurring theme in both the scientific [e.g. Simmel’s (1995) “Die Großsta¨dte
und das Geistesleben” from 1903] and the fictional literature [e.g. Do¨blin’s (2002)
“Berlin Alexanderplatz” from 1929]. The argument has two lines, and both are, in
effect, simple stochastics: firstly, in big cities, relative to small towns, an individual is
less likely to meet someone he knows randomly on the street, in a restaurant or in a
night club. This is because there are many more streets, restaurants or night clubs he
can go to, and thus his chance to meet someone he knows is decreasing. Secondly, if
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the individual gets to know someone new, again compared to a small town, it is much
less likely that this person has a common acquaintance with him. Again, this is just
stochastics: if the pool of people there are to know gets bigger, the chance that two
random individuals know the same person out of that pool is ceteris paribus decreas-
ing. In the language of social capital, this second argument means that networks which
exhibit closure should be less likely to develop accidentally in big cities. Of course, the
contrast against which the big city is to be seen is the small town or village. Here,
things are reversed.
However, this closure of social networks that can allegedly be found in small towns,
in connection with the high probability to meet people, and thus also to observe them,
are ideal conditions for gossip to spread around town, and thus for social control to be
executed. This is a common feature of small towns as also described in the social cap-
ital literature, e.g. by Esser (2008), who classifies it as an example for “system control”
(p. 38). This can lead to the same phenomena already identified in connection with
migrant communities on page 68 of this thesis: it can help individuals, i.e. when in-
habitants of a village have preferred access to certain jobs or if entrepreneurs from the
village can count on the inhabitants as loyal customers, but it can also hinder individu-
als, e.g. when the community is impoverished and successful members are expected
to help out less successful members. It is thus per se unclear what effect this system
control has on an individual’s access to resources.
The question is whether the relatively simple story of denser networks in small town
still holds true today, if it ever did. Firstly, even in big cities, opportunities for individuals
to organize in networks that exhibit closure are abundant: it starts in school, continues
via all kinds of groups and organizations an individual can join and does not end at the
workplace.
Secondly, many big cities in Germany are actually not that big. Only four cities,
Berlin, Hamburg, Munich and Cologne, have more than a million inhabitants, and even
these have a number of suburbs that appear more as small towns in their own right
than as integral parts of the big city they formally belong to. That they are no longer
self-administered is an artefact of administrative reforms rather than the result of an
organic growing together.
Thirdly, even if people live in a village, this does not mean that it is the place where
their life actually takes place: firstly, they may need to commute long distances to reach
their workplace, maybe in the next big city, thus lacking time necessary to create social
capital. This effect could counteract a possibly positive effect of living in a small town or
village on social capital. Moreover, people may live in a small village now, not because
they grew up there, but because they moved there as a consequence of a trend of
suburbanization, attracted by the combination of fresh air and cheap property prices.
With their friends and workplace in some bigger city nearby, they may not integrate
into the village they live in, and thus, maybe, not benefit from its increasing effect on
social capital. It is, however, difficult to differentiate between “real” village dwellers and
“aliens” from the city.
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Concerning the direction of the effect, it may well be that there is a certain interde-
pendency here: individuals that have a lot of social capital in a small town might find
it more difficult to move away. The research hypothesis would be that inhabitants of
small towns have more social capital, although, for the reasons pointed out above, a
question mark is attached to this research hypothesis.
2.5.5 Intrinsic Reasons
In this section, the question what role certain personality dimensions of an individual
play in his accumulation of social capital will be discussed. To do so, the individual’s
preferences for sociability will be assessed directly. Moreover, the so-called Big-Five
model, which identifies five broad personality dimensions will be used. In the following
section, the model will briefly be introduced and it will be pointed out which effects of
the respective broad personality dimensions should be expected. Moreover, an investi-
gation into the relationship between an individual’s social capital and his subjective life
satisfaction will take place.
The Role of the Character
The basic idea of the Big-Five model is quite simple. It is a straightforward everyday
observation that people are different: some are quite outgoing and find it easy to make
new friends, while others are relatively shy and even find it difficult to actually talk
to strangers. Some people are easy to get to know and nice to have around, while
spending time with others may turn out to be somewhat awkward. This should, of
course, have an effect on these individual’s social capital: if it is relatively easier for
an individual to find friends he is more pleasant as company, he should be expected
to have more social capital simply because he should be more likely to know more
people.
To grasp these effects, the Big-Five model developed by personality psychologists
will be used [see John and Srivastava (1999) for a review]. The idea is as follows:
based on a lexical approach, i.e. by investigating the words in our language describing
personality, five broad personality dimensions are identified. These are extraversion,
agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability and openness to experience
[Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann Jr. (2003)], where the dimension of emotional stabil-
ity is sometimes also called neuroticism. John and Srivastava (1999) point out that
these dimensions do not entirely determine the character or personality of a person,
but rather “represent personality at the broadest level of abstraction” (p. 105) and that
numerous “more specific personality characteristics” (ibid.) are summarized by them.
Specifically, John and Srivastava (ibid.) give the following descriptions for the re-
spective personality dimensions. That they are sometimes little more than a listing of
different adjectives is possibly an artefact of the lexical origin of the approach. Ex-
traversion represents “an energetic approach to the social and material world” (p.121,
72
2 Theoretical Concepts of Social Capital
sic) with “traits such as sociability, activity, assertiveness, and positive emotionality”
(ibid.). Agreeableness stands for a “prosocial and communal orientation towards oth-
ers” (ibid., sic) and represents “traits such as altruism, tender-mindedness, trust and
modesty” (ibid.). Conscientiousness represents a “socially prescribed impulse control
that facilitates task- and goal-directed behaviour” (ibid., sic). Here, John and Srivastava
(1999) give the following examples: “[T]hinking before acting, delaying gratification, fol-
lowing norms and rules, and planning, organizing and prioritizing tasks” (ibid.). Neu-
roticism is described as “negative emotionality, such as feeling anxious, nervous, sad,
and tense” (ibid., sic). Openness to experience, as a last characteristic, is described as
“the breadth, depth, originality, and complexity of an individual’s mental and experiental
life” (ibid., sic).
Concerning the effect of these personality traits on an individual’s social capital, it is
clear that the following should be expected: personality traits that make it easier for an
individual to connect to others should also increase his social capital. Wolff and Kim
(2012) investigate into the effects of the Big Five personality dimensions on individuals
networking behaviour in connection with their job. They argue that extraversion and
agreeableness are the dimensions which are linked to “the domain of interpersonal be-
haviour” (p. 47). Thus, a high score in these two dimensions should identify individuals
who find it easier to connect to others and thus build a network. Moreover, they argue
that openness to experiences is related to an individual’s “intellectual life or idea-related
endeavours” (ibid.). Since networking is, according to Wolff and Kim (ibid.), also about
the exchange of information and ideas, which seems plausible given their focus on the
world of work, they expect that individuals who score high in openness also fare better
in networking. In contrast, they do not expect any effect of conscientiousness or neu-
roticism, as these dimensions refer to “task-related and feeling-related” (ibid.) domains.
The plausibility of the hypothesis developed by Wolff and Kim (ibid.) is apparent when
looking at the descriptions of the personality dimensions above. They are likely to hold
true for the private realm, too.
Beside their character traits, which may or may not make it easier for individuals
to connect to others, individuals may also exhibit a preference for sociability. That is,
they may prefer to spend their leisure time with others or choose a job where they
come into contact with many different people. Such a preference should enlarge an
individual’s personal network simply because meeting people and spending time with
them is a natural way of creating a connection to them. Thus, individuals exhibiting
such a preference should also be expected to have, ceteris paribus, more social capital.
Character traits are typically assumed to be stable, and character is thus an exoge-
nous variable. The direction of the effect is thus clear. The research hypothesis would
be that the character traits extraversion, agreeableness and openness have a positive
influence on an individual’s social capital. The same can be expected to be true for
individuals who directly express a preference for sociability.
73
2 Theoretical Concepts of Social Capital
Life Satisfaction
In this section, an investigation will take place into the relationship between social cap-
ital and life satisfaction, which is often used as a proxy for subjective happiness [c.f.
Valenzuela, Park, and Kee (2009)]. Putnam (2000) introduces this idea into the de-
bate: referring to undisclosed studies, he claims that “social connectedness is one of
the most powerful determinants of [...] well-being” (p. 326). Basically, his argument
is that man is an animal who does not do well in loneliness. Individuals who possess
social capital do, ceteris paribus, possess more and deeper social connections. They
are thus less likely to be lonely. Consequently, Putnam (ibid.) argues that there is a
strong link between social connectedness and life satisfaction.
However, although his argumentation is suggestive in that social connections cause
life satisfaction, Putnam (ibid.) explicitly states that there is a problem with the direction
of the effect here, a problem also stressed by Valenzuela, Park, and Kee (2009): does
social capital, through social connectedness, increase an individual’s life satisfaction,
or is it easier for more satisfied individuals to achieve social connectedness? Helliwell
and Putnam (2004) make a case for social capital being a determinant of well-being by
pointing out that “people themselves report that good relationships with family mem-
bers, friends or romantic partners [...] are prerequisites for their happiness” (p. 1437,
emphasis not added). Lin (1999) argues into the same direction, claiming that life sat-
isfaction might be a possible type of return from social capital possession. Valenzuela,
Park, and Kee (2009) argue, pointing to Inglehart (1990), that a reciprocal relationship
might be possible, i.e. that individuals who are more satisfied with their life due to their
social network might find it easier to keep and strengthen that social network because
it is easier for them to further socially connect.
Becchetti, Pelloni, and Rossetti (2008) try to solve this problem empirically, using
panel data from the German Socio Economic Panel. They do not use the concept
of social capital, but rather that of relational goods, which encompasses non-material
goods acquired through social interaction and which is thus vaguely similar to a part of
the definition for private social capital. As these items are not directly measured in the
SOEP, they use the time spent for certain leisure-time activities such as participation in
sports or attendance of cultural or religions events as proxies, which may or may not be
viable. Becchetti, Pelloni, and Rossetti (ibid.) find that the causal relationship is running
both ways, thus confirming the hypothesis by Valenzuela, Park, and Kee (2009). The
research hypothesis would thus be that life satisfaction helps to create social capital
but also that social capital increases life satisfaction.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter, it has become clear that social capital is a term used for two distinct
concepts, i.e., in the terminology of Esser (2008), system and relational capital.
System capital describes norms that are upheld at the macro level of society or at
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least very large communities. It aims at explaining differences in macro level variables
across different regions of a country or, for the same country, across different points
in time. Proponents of this concept are Fukuyama (1995a, 1995b) and Putnam (1993,
2000), who develops his concept building on the form of norms and effective sanctions
formulated by Coleman (1988, 1990). Attempts to find a theoretical bridge between
system capital and relational capital, e.g. through the concepts of generalized reci-
procity and thin trust, have, as has been shown, remained unconvincing.
Relational capital describes the resources, in the widest sense of the word, an indi-
vidual has access to via his ties to other individuals. Of course, the access to these
resources ultimately increases the individual’s utility. Unlike system capital, relational
capital, for want of a better word, belongs to the individual. The concepts of Bourdieu
(1983) and Burt (1992, 2000, 2005) can be said to describe relational capital. This is
also the case for the other of two forms of social capital introduced by Coleman, i.e.
that of obligations and expectations. Relational capital is the concept of social capital
most accessible from the viewpoint of methodological individualism, which was thus
selected to be used in this thesis.
However, further investigations were necessary to see whether relational capital is
really viable as a concept of capital in economics. Although social capital is special in
some respect relative to other forms of capital, e.g. in its dependence on being hon-
ored by others, its coming into existence partially without purposeful investment and
its limited alienability (although the two latter points might also apply for human capi-
tal), it could be concluded that the defined concept of social capital actually qualifies
theoretically as capital from the perspective of economics.
Finally, an investigation into possible predictors of individual social capital possession
took place. In many cases, the direction is not a priori clear, and social capital and the
respective variables under consideration might co-determine each other. Moreover, it
is often not clear whether a variable can predict individual level social capital positively
or negatively since there are good arguments for both sides. In these cases, only an
empirical investigation can yield further insights. To do so, a tool to measure social
capital is necessary. While this tool will be developed in the next chapter, the fourth
chapter of this thesis will present the results of a representative internet survey where
the hypotheses developed above are tested.
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In order to measure the empirical validity of the concept and the hypothesis concerning
the different predictors outlined in chapter 2, it is indispensable to measure social cap-
ital. However, how should an indicator that measures social capital be created? Firstly,
this chapter will look at how indicator construction can take place. To do so, an inves-
tigation of psychometric and compositional measures will be undertaken. Afterwards,
the resources that can be accessed via social capital will be specified and categorized.
Building on this, existing measures of social capital will be presented and discussed in
detail. Finally, a new indicator to measure social capital will be proposed.
3.1 Psychometric and Compositional Measures
Without telling too much of what will later be discussed in more detail, it can be said
that there is not one observation that can serve as a convincing proxy for an individual’s
social capital. Instead, it will be necessary to combine different observations into one
indicator. There are two alternative approaches to do this, that are appropriate in dif-
ferent situations: psychometric and compositional measures. In the following section,
the details of these approaches will briefly be investigated.
3.1.1 Psychometric Measures
Psychometric Measures aim at measuring an attribute which itself cannot be “directly
observed or measured” [Fayers and Hand (2002), p. 233], i.e. which is a latent vari-
able. To measure such a variable, psychometric measures use a number of items that
all supposedly represent a proxy for that attribute, i.e. help to “assess a single con-
struct” [Switzer et al. (1999), p. 401], which is the latent variable. Consequently, the
expectation would be that a respondent should more or less achieve the same score
across all items, at least if they are of the same scale. As a consequence, creating the
index is relatively simple: Because the items are expected to be a proxy for the same
latent variable anyways, and thus in the end measure the same thing, the score of the
items is often simply added up. This approach requires that they are of the same scale.
The value for a psychometric measure can thus theoretically be decomposed into a
“true” [Switzer et al. (ibid.), p. 401] value for the latent variable, which is unobservable,
and an error term, which is due to necessarily imprecise measurement. The size of
this error is also unknown. The best chance a researcher has to reduce the size of
the error is to make sure that his psychometric scale has a high internal consistency.
The reliability of the scale can be confirmed by measuring its internal consistency, i.e.
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that all items do at least show more or less the same score, as theoretically predicted.
This can be done by using statistical measures such as Cronbach’s Alpha, as e.g.
proposed by Switzer et al. (1999): A good scale should exhibit a high degree of internal
consistency. The details of using Cronbach’s Alpha will be investigated in section 4.2.
Psychometric measures are very popular in empirical applications. This holds true
especially for concepts originating in psychology, as the name psychometric measure
readily suggests, where unobservable, latent variables are an important field of re-
search due to the nature of the subject. Popular examples include the ten item inven-
tory to measure the big five personality traits [Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann Jr. (2003)]
and the positive and negative affect scales [Watson, Clark, and Tellegen (1988)].
When thinking about social capital, at first thought, it is apparent that one and the
same social tie can yield access to a variety of different resources. Thus, especially as
long as the resources assessed are more or less closely related to each other, creating
a psychometric measure from the set of items used to measure these resources might
be appropriate. Cronbach’s Alpha is one tool to assess the quality of such a measure.
However, when the resources are not so closely related to each other, creating a psy-
chometric measure might no longer be appropriate. Instead, creating a compositional
measure might lead to better results. This will be investigated in the next paragraph.
3.1.2 Compositional Measures
Compositional Measures, which are also known as multidimensional indices or clini-
metric scales [for this last term, see Feinstein (1987)], aim at a slightly different ques-
tion: How can the researcher create an indicator that does not represent a latent
variable, but rather aggregates the information of a number of different variables or
elements that measure quite different things? Simply summing up their values, as is
typically done in a psychometric measure, may thus be inappropriate. Consequently, a
number of questions arise for compositional measures that are not relevant for psycho-
metric measures: Which items are to be included into a compositional measure, i.e.
which pieces of information are to be included in the resulting aggregate? How should
they be combined, i.e. which weight should be assigned to the different items? To what
extent can they substitute each other, i.e. can a high score in one item compensate for
a low score in another?
Noble et al. (2006) propose three admittedly vague criteria for compositional mea-
sures: Firstly, their construction should be due to a theoretical model. This means that
the researcher should ex ante develop a concept what he aims to measure and which
components it includes. Secondly, compositional measures should operationalize this
model. Thirdly, the scale must “fit the purpose” [Noble et al. (ibid.), p. 172]. This last
point can, of course, only be assessed ex post. Different from psychometric scales,
there is no statistical way to assess the reliability of a compositional measure: Its in-
ternal consistency, for example, is not a helpful tool as the respondent might score
very differently in the different, more or less unrelated, variables that form the con-
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struct. Thus, the question whether a scale fits its purpose can only be answered by the
researcher: does it help him to answer his research questions?
As already mentioned, the combination of different items to form a scale is also non-
trivial because the question of their weight and their substitutability has to be solved.
As Noble et al. (2006) points out, “weighting always takes place when elements are
combined together” (p. 182, emphasis as in original). Thus, the weighting decision
should always be communicated explicitly by the researcher. In principle, four differ-
ent weighting schemes can be differentiated: Firstly, weighting all items the same way.
Cavapozzi, Han, and Miniaci (2015) claim that it is the weighting scheme used most
frequently. Mayer and Jencks (1989) argue that it might be appropriate in cases where
the researcher has absolutely no idea about the relative importance of the various
elements. However, this weighting is discredited by Noble et al. (2006) as “entirely
arbitrary” (p. 182). Secondly, weighting can be done using the weights assigned by ex-
perts. Decancq and Lugo (2013) demand that there should always be several experts
involved when deciding on the weights and that their proposals for weighting should
be aggregated to form an average. This is e.g. the procedure in the English Index of
Deprivation [Smith et al. (2015)]. Thirdly, a proposed procedure is that the respondents
assign the weights to the different elements. Thus, respondents that find a certain el-
ement particularly important give it a higher weight than others that do not find this
element particularly important. Benjamin et al. (2014) propose an approach to assess
these weights indirectly. However, the inevitable result from such a weighting scheme
is that the resulting values of the measure are no longer comparable across respon-
dents. The same is the problem for the fourth weighting scheme, namely to calculate
the index such that the result is most favorable for the respondent, i.e. that he scores
as high as possible. Moreover, such an approach may have the consequence that el-
ements that are particularly unfavourable for the respondent may be dropped from the
calculation altogether.
Concerning the question of substitutability, very little can be found in the literature.
Decancq, Decoster, and Schokkaert (2009) state that the different items that form the
compositional measure can either be perfect complements, perfect substitutes or any-
thing in between. Choosing the degree of substitutability appropriately is left to the
researcher and the specific measure under construction. They propose to use the
following formula to create a compositional measure:
MDecancqi =
(
p∑
j=1
wjz
(
β−1
β
)
ij
)( β
β−1
)
∀i, β 6= 1. (3.1)
zij is the value of item j for respondent i. p gives the total number of items. wj is
the weight allocated to item j. β gives the constant elasticity of substitution between
the items. The formula is closely related to the constant elasticity of substitution (or
CES) utility function commonly used in microeconomics [see Mas-Colell, Whinston,
and Green (1995) for a discussion]. Specifically, for β →∞, i.e. for an infinite elasticity
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of substitution, the case of simple summing up of items as in the construction of a
psychometric indicator is replicated, at least as long as equal weights are given to
the different items. This is e.g. the way the Human Development Index is calculated
[see United Nations Development Program (2015) for details]. For β → 0, a Leontief -
type function results, where the value of the function is equal to the lowest item value
included. There are some studies using this approach, e.g. Proud et al. (2015) and Pin
(2014).
An alternative formula is proposed by Firth (2002), which is used in the English Index
of Deprivation [Smith et al. (2015), Noble et al. (2006)]. It can be expressed as:
MFirthi =
p∑
j=1
wj · (−1) · ln[1− zij(1− e−λ)] ∀i. (3.2)
It is a generalized and slightly modified form of a formula Firth (2002) attributes to
Blalock (1982)1:
MBlalocki =
p∑
j=1
wj · ln(1− zij) ∀i. (3.3)
As above, zij is the value of item j for respondent i. However, here, 0 ≤ zij < 1 ap-
plies. p gives the total number of items. wj is the weight allocated to item j. In equation
3.2, λ is a parameter that is used to indicate the substitutability between different items.
What is used here is a logarithmized exponential function where, because the values
of the items are bound between 0 and 1 by definition, they are subtracted from one to
achieve that higher rather than lower numbers are spread out more. This is the feature
of the exponential distribution function that is useful here: that it gives more weight to
outliers on one end of the spectre. The application for the English Index of Deprivation
is that if an area fares good in one category and bad in another, this should not simply
cancel out.
For the English Index of Deprivation, a more precise specification of cancellation
properties was deemed necessary. Thus, the generalized formula 3.2 is used with
λ = 100/23 [Smith et al. (2015), Noble et al. (2006)]. This value implies imperfect
substitutability between the different items. The argument put forward by Noble et al.
to justify this value is that thus no more than 10 % of areas included in the Index, which
are ranked before being standardized to a bound between 0 and 1, achieve more than
50 % of the possible maximum depreviation score.
The clear advantage of the formula 3.1 proposed by Decancq, Decoster, and Schokkaert
(2009) is that the way it works and its parameters are more easily accessible to inter-
pretation by economists. This is mainly due to its closeness to the CES utility function.
A parameter value like λ = 100/23 in the formula by Firth (2002) is undoubtedly much
more difficult to interpret. Moreover, formula 3.1 is technically easier to use since it is
not dependent on values lying between 0 and 1.
1This formula cannot be found in Blalock (1982) exactly as Firth (2002) represents it.
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3.2 Systematization and Categorization of Resources
For every approach to measure something, the condicio sine qua non is a precise
definition and a working operationalization of that definition. This also holds true for
social capital, and this is also where the difficulties start: As has been shown in chapter
2, social capital is a term that is interpreted in different ways by different scholars.
Thus, the same term has come to describe different concepts. The basic intuition
these concepts share is described by Fernandez and Castilla (2001) as “networks
have value” (p. 85)2. Two important questions arise from this phrase: What is meant
by value? And to whom does this value accrue?
As presented on page 49 of this thesis, the definition employed, namely that “[t]he
collection of resources owned by the members of an individual’s personal social net-
work, which may become available to the individual as a result of the history of the
relationships” [Van Der Gaag and Snijders (2005)], is clearly oriented towards rela-
tional capital. Value is of course what yields individual’s utility, but what precisely this
is may be pinned down by capturing it using a wide definition of resources.
Even for relational capital, the question regarding how to measure social capital is
at best non-trivial. As already observed by Bourdieu (1983), there are some resources
which can only be acquired using social capital. It is unclear what their value in units
of economic capital would be since there is no possibility to buy them using economic
capital. Thus, simply adding up the market prices of the resources an individual has
access to via his social capital is impossible3.
Moreover, even if it were possible to simply add up market prices, the open question
in any case is which concrete resources can actually be accessed via an individual’s
social capital? It needs to be clear what has to be assessed to convincingly measure
social capital. An additional question is how these resources can be systematized and
categorized. These points will be investigated in the following section.
In the literature, even when only dealing with relational capital, the examples for
resources an individual can access via social capital are numerous. Sometimes, these
are broadly categorized, sometimes only the categories are given without any specific
examples and sometimes the examples just stand for themselves. To streamline the
presentation, firstly, the categories will be presented and then the subcategories with
the specific examples.
2Even this is actually too precise: Fukuyama (1995a, 1995b) argues that social capital is not networks
that have value, but that trust in the generalized other which is rooted deep in a nation’s culture has
value. But for the point that is to be made here, “networks have value” is sufficiently vague.
3Although Sobel (2002) argues that while it is not the precise services that can be, as he calls it,
“formalized” (p. 147), their function can in many cases be transferred to a normal market service. His
example is that of the owner of a delicatessen who acted as a “custodian for apartment keys” (ibid.)
for people he knew. The delicatessen is now closed, and the apartment blocks in the area have a
doorman. Thus, as economic development proceeds, the resources that can be exclusively accessed
via social capital and that thus have no market equivalent may be declining. As a consequence,
adding up market prices may become a more viable way to measure the value of an individual’s
social capital in the future.
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Economic Resources
The possibility to access other agents’ economic resources, meaning access to eco-
nomic capital, is frequently mentioned as a social capital resource. While some authors
do not go into further detail what specifically this access to economic resources entails,
as e.g. Daly and Silver (2008), Kan (2007) or Bourdieu (1983), others give more con-
crete examples. These can be readily categorized into three categories as follows:
Firstly, an often-mentioned example for an economic resource that can be accessed
via an individual’s social capital is the ability to borrow money informally, i.e. without
the involvement of a bank, from another individual [e.g. Ellison et al. (2014), Adler and
Kwon (2002), Fine (2001), Lin (2001) or Paldam and Svendson (2001)]. This is typically
assumed to be associated with thick ties between borrower and creditor. Portes (1998)
adds that the loan the individual can get via his social capital may also be subsidized,
i.e. come at better conditions than those the agents would be offered by a bank4.
A further special case is mentioned by Lee et al. (2011), Wouter and Tom (2008),
Davidsson and Honig (2003), Putnam (2000) and Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993),
who give the example of start-up financing as a social capital resource. Related to the
possibility to borrow money is the possibility to borrow objects, such as a car [Astone
et al. (1999)] or, on a much smaller scale, food [Kadushin (2004)].
Secondly, economic resources that can be accessed via an individual’s social capital
can also entail gifts given to the individual by other agents. While exchange of symbolic
gifts is a part of social capital creation for Bourdieu (1983), gifts may also be given uni-
directionally and have real economic value. Astone et al. (1999) give the downpayment
on a house and money for school fees as examples.
Thirdly, an individual’s access to other agents’ economic resources can also embody
itself in informal insurance. This is a resource mentioned especially in the context of
developing countries, where formal insurance markets are still underdeveloped [Daly
and Silver (2008)] or state-run social security systems are inexisting or insufficient to
cater for the needs of the population [Di Falco and Bulte (2015)]. Nonetheless, this
can also be a relevant resource in developed countries [Coleman (1988)], especially in
the case of emergencies not covered by the social security system or other insurances
[Kan (2007)].
The access to economic resources is based on thick ties between agents, the more,
the higher the value of the economic resource involved. The reason is as follows:
Typically, there is a risk involved with the repayment. There are two possibilities: Firstly,
the creditor expects full repayment. This creates a moral hazard situation since the
borrower cannot continuously monitor the lender’s actions. Thus, the creditor needs to
trust the borrower sufficiently that he undertakes whatever he can to repay the dept.
4The informal lending and borrowing of money may create an economic win-win-situation: While the
borrower may get money at better conditions than at a bank (or at all), the creditor may have better
information on the borrower relative to the bank and may thus be able to offer better conditions to
him. However, this is a side aspect: Money may be lent as a social capital resource even if it is not
economically beneficial for one of the parties.
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Trust is associated with thick ties. Secondly, the creditor does not expect full repayment.
Then, he is actually willing to give a part of the money as a gift to the borrower. Of
course, an individual would not give away money to someone he does not know very
well and towards whom he does not feel a strong attachment. So, again, thick ties are
involved.
Human Capital Resources
Besides the access to economic capital, social capital can also entail access to other
individual’s human (or cultural) capital or simply labor time. While labor time and hu-
man capital are two quite distinct things at first sight, they are not completely separable
either: Every use of human capital requires some labor time. On the reverse, every
(productive) use of labor time requires employing some skills, and thus there is always
some human capital involved. As with economic resources, some authors [e.g. Portes
(1998) and Bourdieu (1983)] do not specify what concrete examples they think of when
arguing that human (or cultural) capital is a social capital resource. The existing exam-
ples can be divided into two broad categories:
Firstly, an individual may have access to other agents’ human capital resources in
the private sphere. The examples differ markedly in their time horizon: Some require
relatively little time, i.e. receiving advice [Adler and Kwon (2002)], help in repairing
things [Kadushin (2004)], hunting or gardening [both Astone et al. (1999)]. Sobel’s
(2002) custodian for apartment keys would also fall into this category. Other services
may be more time intensive, i.e. the caring for elderly parents by their children, an
example by Astone et al. (1999), or helping parents in their childrens’ education, an
example by Coleman (1988). All these examples may also differ in the skill level (and
thus the amount of human capital) they require. Advice e.g. on financial matters may
be more human capital intensive than help with weeding the garden.
Secondly, his social capital may give an individual access to human capital resources
that help him advance in the job sphere. Lancee (2010) and Davidsson and Honig
(2003) argue that the access to unpaid labor by family members may be a valuable
resource for entrepreneurs. Advice may be a valuable asset not only in the private
sphere, but also if it is work-related [Adler and Kwon (2002)]. Again with a focus on en-
trepreneurs, Lee et al. (2011) give the specific examples of “marketing advice, knowl-
edge and referrals” (p. 1056) and “business strategy advice” (p. 1061). Adler and
Kwon (2014) point to Renzulli and Aldrich (2005), who add advice in legal, financial
and loan-related matters.
Whether the access to human capital is based on thick ties or thin ties depends on
the effort the agents that grant access to their human capital have to make. This is
analogous to economic capital, where the access to larger resources requires thicker
ties. However, since repayment is typically not expected to be in kind, the requirement
on the level of trust between agents may be relatively lower.
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Preferred Access Resources
Preferred Access Resources are resources where the individual has an advantage over
others in reaching his goals because of his social connections. This includes access to
information and access to desired objects. The two aspects will be discussed in turn:
The access to information features very prominently as an example for social cap-
ital resources in the literature. The economic benefit is that the individual can save
on transaction cost, especially search cost. As with economic and human capital,
some authors are unspecific when using the term information, such as Gedajlovic et
al. (2013), Esser (2008) or, with some minor exceptions, Burt (2000). However, Burt
(ibid.), as already pointed out in chapter 2.1.3, makes an often-cited argument that
new, non-redundant information is best accessed via ties that span structural holes,
i.e. bridging ties. These are ties that connect the individual with other agents that are
hitherto unconnected by his network. However, the larger part of the authors have
very clear ideas on the social capital resources that can be subsumed as access to
information:
The by far most often named aspect is that of information on jobs [e.g. Lancee
(2010), Daly and Silver (2008), Kaasa and Parts (2008), Garip (2008), Smith (2005),
Kadushin (2004), Adler and Kwon (2002), Putnam (2000) and Lin (1999)]. Very often,
there is a reference to Granovetter’s (1973) work included who investigated “job chang-
ers living in a Boston suburb” (p. 1371) and found that many of them found their job
through information passed on by other individuals they are connected to (c.f. page 19
of this thesis).
However, there are also other fields where the access to information on certain mat-
ters represents a social capital resource. Kadushin (2004) gives the example of a
recipe for baking, whereas Sobel (2002) and Lin (2001) point to information that is
helpful in finding a babysitter. The latter example can ultimately be traced to Coleman
(1990), who also gives the example of information on fashion trends. For the world of
business, Adler and Kwon (2002) refer to information on innovations, while Burt (2000)
describes information about markets, i.e. goods, sellers, buyers and prices.
Related to the access to information, the access to the desired objects the informa-
tion is about is also a regularly cited social capital resource, e.g. by Kan (2007), Putnam
(2007), Smith (2005), Sobel (2002), Lin (2001), Astone et al. (1999) and Portes (1998).
It may be even more valuable to know not only that there exists some opportunity, but
also to actually have a choice on whether to take it or not. As with information, eco-
nomically, the benefit is that the individual can save on transaction cost, besides search
cost especially application cost.
Again, the most prominent example is with jobs [Kan (2007), Putnam (2007), Sobel
(2002), Astone et al. (1999) and Portes (1998)]. Lin (2001) and Portes (1998) give the
example of access to a job not for the individual A an individual B has a tie to, but for
that individual A’s child. Compared to the proliferation of information in a network, it is
even more unlikely that actually giving access to jobs will take place via thin ties: Smith
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(2005) puts the argument that individuals may be reluctant to recommend other agents
for jobs as they are afraid that a bad performance by the individual they recommend
may damage their own reputation.
Besides jobs, there are other aspects where access can be valuable: Astone et al.
(1999) gives the example of housing. For the world of business, Portes (1998) elab-
orates on the access to protected markets. Following Bourdieu (1983), the possibility
to get to know new people that exhibit the degree of similarity, i.e.homogeneity in his
words, necessary to create a relationship that can include social capital would also fall
into this category.
Emotional Resources
Social capital is not only about access to resources with a more or less obvious eco-
nomic value. An important aspect of social capital that is often referred to in the liter-
ature, are emotional resources. Although it goes by different names, e.g. “emotional
support” [Kan (2007), p. 437, Astone et al. (1999), p. 9], “social support” [Kadushin
(2004), p. 76], “moral support” [Adler and Kwon (2002), p. 17] or “companionship”
[Putnam (2000), p. 20; Astone et al. (1999), p. 9], the baseline is always the same:
it may be a valuable resource for an individual to know another individual who listens
to his sorrows or problems and does something, however small it is, to make him feel
better. This action does not need to remove the original problem, but maybe just puts
it into perspective, as Kadushin (2004) points out. Emotional resources are clearly
associated with thick ties: an individual who talks about his sorrows makes himself
vulnerable. Typically, he would be expected to do that only with people he knows well
and whom he trusts.
However, emotional resources do not need to be limited to those called on in times
of need. Having people that spending time with is enjoyable may also constitute an
emotional resource. Astone et al. (1999) refer to Granovetter (1973), who points to the
“emotional intensity [and] intimacy” (p. 1381) connected with thick ties.
Business Resources
Moreover, there exist a number of resources that cannot be classified into one of the
categories outlined above. They share that they primarily affect businessmen or at
least people that are employed.
Resources for businessmen include the loyalty of customers, which may be a re-
source for owners of businesses [e.g. Sobel (2002), Coleman (1988)]. Another re-
source that can be valuable for businessmen is the possibility to hire people that can
be trusted to be reliable employees [Putnam (2000)]. Both is, according to Portes
(1998), especially true in ethnic communities that exhibit closure. However, especially
the latter point can be a double-edged sword: those agents that can be trusted to be
reliable employees may have as a resource that they can be expected to be hired, even
if the entrepreneur cannot afford their salary.
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For employees, the possibility to advance faster in their careers due to their social ties
is a resource [Lancee (2010), Westlund and Adam (2010)]. This can specifically lead
to higher income [Kaasa and Parts (2008), Lin (2001, 1999)] and, closely connected to
that, job promotions [Lin (2001)].
3.3 Existing Measures of Social Capital
The attempts to measure social capital have been numerous. As has been shown in
chapter 2, different scholars understand the term in very different ways. Consequently,
the instruments and indicators that have been developed to measure social capital
measure very different aspects. In the following section, a number of approaches to
measure social capital will briefly be introduced. A focus has been put on those mea-
sures that also aim, at least to some extent, at measuring relational capital, i.e. individ-
ual level social capital. Moreover, it will be analyzed how fit they are to measure social
capital as given by the resource-oriented definition from Van Der Gaag and Snijders
(2005) recapitulated in section 2.3.4. To do so, they should of course either measure
the resources an individual has access to, or at least a convincing proxy for that.
In general, three types of indicators can be differentiated: Firstly, indicators that aim
at assessing the respondent’s social capital with just one single question. Obviously,
whatever this question asks for must be a very convincing proxy for an individual’s so-
cial capital. Moreover, when using such an indicator, it is impossible to further differen-
tiate the respondent’s social capital, e.g. into different types or dimensions. Secondly,
indicators may use indirect measures that aim at assessing a respondent’s potential
access to resources by investigating into the general resourcefulness of his network
and his position within that network. The problem with this kind of indicators is that
they potentially fail to assess a network’s resourcefulness, as will be explained below
in more detail. The name generator and the position generator, two of the three most
prominent measures to assess relational capital [see e.g. Carrillo A´lvarez and Riera
Romanı´ (2017) or Pena-Lo´pez and Sa´nchez-Santos (2017)], but also the Personal So-
cial Capital Scale fall into this category. Thirdly, indicators may use direct measures
that aim at assessing an individual’s access to resources directly. The resource gen-
erator as the third prominent measure to assess relational capital belongs into this
category. The problem with direct measures is that they require an explicit collection of
resources the respondent can be faced with, which may not cover the entire width of
his social capital.
3.3.1 One Question Measures
There are two often-used one question indicators to assess social capital. They have
become popular because they have been included in surveys for many decades and
are thus readily available for relatively large time horizons. The fundamental problem
with them is, of course, that it is impossible to measure a construct with many aspects,
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like individual level social capital, with just one item. Nonetheless, these measures
are worth looking at due to their popularity, which is partly due to their inclusion in the
World Values Survey and hence easy availability for researchers. One indicator is a
question clearly geared towards Esser’s (2008) system capital. There are variants of
it, one example for it is: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be
trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in your dealings with other people?” [Grootaert
et al. (2004), p. 32]. Westlund and Adam (2010) give an overview about studies using
either this measure, the membership in associations-measure presented in the next
paragraph or both. It is obvious that this question, which aims at Putnam’s (2000)
thin trust, is not geared towards the resources an individual has access to and is thus
insufficient to measure individual level social capital as defined above.
The second indicator is the number of organizations an individual is a member of.
This indicator goes back to Putnam (1993), who, as pointed out in section 2.1.5, argues
that membership in organizations is a good proxy for regular interaction with other
people. Since regular interaction with others helps to create credit slips, membership in
organizations and access to resources might well be correlated for an individual. This
measure has been widely picked up in the literature [e.g. by Fidrmuc and Ge¨rxhani
(2008), Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2002)], sometimes together with the trust-
question given above [e.g. Xu and Wang (2015), van Oorschot and Finsveen (2010),
Kaasa and Parts (2008)] or pooled with other data about civic engagement such as
voting [e.g. Rupasingha, Goetz, and Freshwater (2006)].
However, it is far from being a good measure: firstly, although the literature strongly
suggests it, it is by no means a priori clear whether group membership does really
ensure an individual’s access to other individual’s resources. Secondly, groups and
organizations are highly heterogenous: while some groups may meet only every few
months for a couple of hours, others may meet for several hours a week and pur-
sue common projects. Moreover, in some groups, individuals meet who are rich in
resources. Their acquaintance may constitute more social capital than the acquain-
tances that can be made in groups where the individuals who meet are not as rich in
social capital. When only asking for the number of groups the respondent is a mem-
ber of, this factor is typically not taken into account. Thirdly, for the case of Germany,
about two thirds of its inhabitants are not a member of any organization or club that
meets regularly [Krimmer and Priemer (2013)]. However, most of these people surely
have some kind of social capital. Fourthly, as pointed out on page 64 in detail, it is not
convincing to argue that membership in more groups does automatically mean more
social capital.
Due to the apparent weaknesses of the two most popular one question measures for
social capital, it is worthwhile to look at more sophisticated measurement instruments.
There are three types of measures for individual level social capital: Indirect and direct
measurement instruments as well as mixed measures that combine elements from
both.
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3.3.2 Indirect Measures
In this section, indirect measures like the name generator, the position generator and
the personal social capital scale are further investigated. Looking at the name gener-
ator is interesting as its use prefigures modern social capital definitions. Thus, when
extracting a social capital measure from the name generator, investigations how social
capital developed across time can be made. Moreover, looking at the name generator
is worthwhile as the position generator has been developed based on it. The latter
measures social capital without explicitly naming resources, thus aiming at being in-
dependent of the culture and point of time it is used in. Finally, a look is taken at the
personal social capital scale, which takes a slightly different approach: it does not look
at the position of the respondent’s contacts, but rather how well these contacts are
embedded in different types of networks.
The Name Generator
According to Van Der Gaag and Webber (2008), the name generator is the “oldest
measurement tool for individual social capital” (p. 38), originating in the 1960s 5. It was
not developed in connection with social capital research, but stems from the research
on social networks (ibid.). Its aim is to generate an overview over the total sum of con-
nections a respondent has and their characteristics. Moreover, it asks for the structure
of the network the respondent is a part of.
A name generator survey consists of two or three steps [Van Der Gaag and Webber
(ibid.)]: Firstly, the respondent is asked to list the names of people he knows. This is
typically differentiated for social contexts, such as “role or content (neighbors, important
family or work matters) to closeness (confidences, intimacy, etc.), geographic limits, or
for specific periods of time” [Lin, Fu, and Hsung (2001), p. 62]. The respondent may
be faced with up to a dozen different contexts [Varekamp et al. (2015)]. Moreover, the
number of contacts listed may, but need not be limited (ibid.). To reduce interview time,
some scholars even reduce the number of possible contacts for each context to one.
The problem is that this reduced version no longer generates reliable estimates of net-
work measures that can otherwise be obtained using the name generator [Marin and
Hampton (2007)]. Secondly, the respondent is asked to provide additional information
on the people he listed in the first step. This step is sometimes called “name inter-
preter” [Marin and Hampton (ibid.), p. 164]. A possible third step asks for connections
between the individuals listed.
There are several ways how the data created by a name generator survey can be
used to measure an individual’s social capital [Lin, Fu, and Hsung (2001)]: Firstly, if an
individual’s social capital is connected to the structure of the network he is situated in
and his position in that network, as postulated by Burt (1992, 2000, 2007), the overview
generated by the name generator can be a helpful tool to assess his social capital as it
5Lin, Fu, and Hsung (2001) point to a study by Laumann (1966).
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can e.g. be used to identify structural holes that the respondent bridges. However, this
is only possible if the optional third step of the name generator survey has been con-
ducted, i.e. if the connections between the different individuals an agent is connected
to have also been assessed. Secondly, the information gathered on the contacts of the
respondent can be used to create a measure of the resourcefulness, understood as
“education, occupational prestige, or income” [Lin, Fu, and Hsung (2001), p. 62] of his
environment. The idea is that contacts more resourceful in human or economic capital
or in more prestigious positions can also provide the respondent with a higher level
of access to resources and thus constitute higher social capital. It is possible to take
as indicators both the mean resourcefulness of contacts as well as the highest level
[Lin, Fu, and Hsung (ibid.)]. Thus, the name generator is an indirect measure for social
capital.
Numerous points of critique are connected with the name generator: Firstly, Lin, Fu,
and Hsung (ibid.) and Batjargal (2003) argue that respondents often give the names
of people they have strong ties to but not the ones they are only weakly connected
with. When some resources, such as job resources, are often accessed via weak ties
[Granovetter (1973)], this becomes a problem because then their social capital is un-
derestimated by the indicator created through the name generator. The same is true for
the bridging of structural holes: Even if the respondent is asked to indicate connections
between his contacts, it is by no means clear whether he is really bridging a structural
hole between two of them when he states that they have no connection. There may well
be yet another actor unknown to him who creates this connection. Secondly, the names
generated are dependent on the social contexts the respondent is faced with and these
may be set more or less arbitrarily by the researcher, thus influencing the results [Lin,
Fu, and Hsung (2001)]. Moreover, respondents might interpret terms and thus contexts
differently, Marin and Hampton (2007) give the example of the interpretation of “friends”
and “close” (both p. 167). Thirdly, Van Der Gaag and Webber (2008) point out that the
name generator is an instrument that is very time-consuming to use, especially when
many contexts are included, as a large number of names is thus generated and further
information has to be collected on them. Marin and Hampton (2007) add that the use
of the name generator also puts a large cognitive burden on the respondent. A final
point they make is that respondents may have privacy concerns giving the full name of
their contacts and further details about them. Summing up, while Lin, Fu, and Hsung
(2001) state in 2001 that “the name generator is the more common methodology” (p.
62), Peigang et al. (2014) more recently point out that a “further review [...] indicated
that the Name Generator was no longer in use for research” (p. 1134).
The Position Generator
The position generator is a tool to assess social capital originally proposed by Lin and
Dumin (1986). Lin, Fu, and Hsung (2001) and Van Der Gaag, Snijders, and Flap (2008)
further elaborate on it. According to Verhaeghe, Van de Putte, and Roose (2012), it is
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a popular tool as they list 78 studies that have made use of it between 1985 and 2012.
It has been developed to overcome the mentioned weaknesses of the name generator.
The idea behind it is the following: The resources accessed by an individual via social
capital are embedded in the social structure. If that structure has a hierarchical order,
the hierarchy level the respondent has connections to tells something about his access
to resources: Someone who is connected to a large number of persons with a high so-
cial status should be able to access more valuable resources using these connections
than someone only connected to persons with low social status. Thus, an individual’s
“network location [is] a precursor of social capital, [i.e.] the social resources accessed”
(ibid. p. 76). Moreover, the position generator aims to capture the possibility to assess
resources before they are actually accessed. Ha¨llsten, Edling, and Rydgren (2015)
make this point, arguing that social capital is valuable for the possibility it offers to ac-
cess resources, although many of these resources are rarely used. This basic idea
is relatively similar to the measure of resourcefulness that can be created using the
name generator. However, the position generator is specifically designed to generate
these data, while its creation from the name generator is associated with the genera-
tion of much superfluous data. Moreover, it may even be incomplete, due to the name
generators bias towards strong ties.
In practice, the instrument works as follows: Respondents are faced with a list of
“ordered structural positions salient in a society” [Lin, Fu, and Hsung (2001), p. 63],
where positions can be “occupations, authorities, work units, class or sector” (ibid.).
The researcher thus a priori assigns a hierarchical position to each of these positions.
The number of positions asked differs amongst different questionnaires: Lin, Fu, and
Hsung (ibid.) include 15 positions, Lin and Dumin (1986) include 20 positions. Van
Der Gaag and Webber (2008) claim that position generators include between 10 and
30 positions. Ha¨llsten, Edling, and Rydgren (2015) use 40 positions. Verhaeghe, Van
de Putte, and Roose (2012) criticize that not only the number, but also the selection
of positions is not standardized and mostly left to the researcher. The respondent
is asked, for each position, whether he knows someone occupying this position on a
first-name basis. An exemplary position generator given by Lin, Fu, and Hsung (2001)
consists of four questions: “Among your relatives, friends or acquaintances, are there
people who have the following jobs? If so, what is his/her relationship to you? If you
don’t know anyone with these jobs, and if you need to find such a person for private help
or to ask about some problems, whom among those you know would you go through to
find such a person? Who would he/she be to you? What job does he/she do?” (ibid.,
p. 66).
The resulting dataset can then be used to obtain a number of measures. Lin, Fu, and
Hsung (ibid.) propose three measures: Firstly the “distance between the highest and
the lowest accessed positions” (ibid., p. 63) or “range” (ibid., emphasis in original), sec-
ondly the “number of positions accessed” (ibid.) or “extensity or heterogeneity” (ibid.,
emphasis in original) and thirdly the “status of the highest position accessed” (ibid.) or
“upper reachability ” (ibid., emphasis as in original) of a person’s contacts. Moreover,
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Lin, Fu, and Hsung (2001) suggest that it is possible to ask for further informations
about the contacts involved e.g. to gather information about the “strength of ties” (p.
63). Finally, these measures can be used to construct a single variable measuring a
person’s social capital [Ha¨llsten, Edling, and Rydgren (2015)]. However, there are ad-
ditional measures in use that can be constructed using the data generated by position
generator. Verhaeghe, Van de Putte, and Roose (2012)] propose the “volume of net-
work resources” (p. 167, emphasis in original), which simply adds up the total number
of contacts the respondents give irrespective of their position in the social hierarchy.
This last measure leads the idea of the position generator to tell something about the
position of the respondent in the social hierarchy ad absurdum.
The position generator does not ask for the access to specific resources. It is thus,
as Van Der Gaag and Webber (2008) point out, an indirect and not a direct measure of
social capital understood as access to resources. This is no coincidence: The position
generator itself is supposed to be “content free and role/location neutral” [Lin (1999), p.
88]. Access to specific resources shall “present itself in the data” [Lin, Fu, and Hsung
(2001), p. 64]. For example, Lin, Fu, and Hsung (ibid.) use job prestige and income as
dependent variables and find that social capital as assessed by the position generator
helps individuals to obtain both higher income and access to higher degrees. Job pres-
tige and income would thus be the resources accessed by the respondents via his or
her social capital. It is easily imaginable how this can be extended to other resources.
However, the apparent endogeneity problem is not discussed by Lin, Fu, and Hsung
(ibid.): Someone who has high job prestige should find it easier to get to know some-
one who also has high job prestige, firstly because he is a more attractive person to
know, an argument originally presented by Bourdieu (1983), and, secondly, because
he will meet people with high job prestige naturally as colleagues and business part-
ners. Moreover, the position generator is not as neutral as it claims to be: There is an
ongoing discussion in the literature whether the specific choice of positions influences
the results [e.g. Ha¨llsten, Edling, and Rydgren (2015)]. An interesting result is the one
by Fu (2008), who finds that respondents tend to name contacts of the same sex more
often than it could be expected by their total network of contacts. Moreover, Van Der
Gaag and Webber (2008) argue that respondents might wrongly state that they know
someone although they only have a professional relation with that person, e.g. their
physician. Thus, while the position generator might not have the problem of the name
generator in oversampling thick ties, it might have a tendency to generate information
on ties that are actually very thin.
A final point made by Van Der Gaag, Snijders, and Flap (2008) is that even con-
tacts that do not represent any prestigious position may still offer important resources
to an individual. To underpin this point, they introduce a differentiation between in-
strumental and expressive actions going back to Lin (2001). Instrumental actions are
associated with “gaining resources” [Van Der Gaag, Snijders, and Flap (2008), p. 27],
such as “finding a better job, house, and so on” (ibid.). Expressive actions are asso-
ciated with “maintaining resources” (ibid.), such as “personal support and the sharing
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of sentiments” (ibid., p. 28). They argue that the networks measured by the position
generator, i.e. “access to higher occupational prestiges and access to diverse net-
works” (ibid., p. 27) are helpful in supporting instrumental, but not expressive actions.
On the contrary, they claim that “support in the form of practical assistance may come
especially from network members in lower positions” (ibid., p. 28). The differentiation
between expressive and instrumental resources is also picked up by Pena-Lo´pez and
Sa´nchez-Santos (2017).
The Personal Social Capital Scale
A further instrument that has been developed to measure social capital at the individual
level is the Personal Social Capital Scale by Chen et al. (2009) and Archuleta and
Miller (2011). Peigang et al. (2014) argue that measures such as the position and the
name generator are problematic because they use “a listing approach to quantify the
amount of social capital” (p. 1134), i.e. confront the respondent with lists of different
positions or resources. According to Peigang et al. (ibid.), “it is incredibly difficult [...]
to exhaust all positions and resources in a survey” (ibid.) and thus to fully assess the
respondent’s social capital. Moreover, as already pointed out above, in different cultural
settings the same occupation may represent a different position in the social hierarchy
and the relevant resources may be different, too. Thus, the results from studies using
the position and resource generator, which will be discussed below, may exhibit only a
limited comparability across cultures. The Personal Social Capital Scale instead aims
at measuring “how well a person is embedded within their various networks of different
types of peoples [...] or organizations [ibid., p. 1135].
Scale # Scale Item
Bonding Social Capital
1
How do you rate the
number of people in each
of the following six
categories?
a. Your family members
b. Your relatives
c. People in the neighborhood
d. Your friends
e. Your coworkers / fellows
f. Your country fellows / old classmates
2
With how many of people
in each of the following
categories do you keep a
routine contact?
a. Your family members
b. Your relatives
c. People in the neighborhood
d. Your friends
e. Your coworkers / fellows
f. Your country fellows / old classmates
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Scale # Scale Item
3
Among the people in each
of the following six
categories, how many can
you trust?
a. Your family members
b. Your relatives
c. People in the neighborhood
d. Your friends
e. Your coworkers / fellows
f. Your country fellows / old classmates
4
Among people in each of
the following six
categories, how many will
definitely help you upon
your request?
a. Your family members
b. Your relatives
c. People in the neighborhood
d. Your friends
e. Your coworkers / fellows
f. Your country fellows / old classmates
5
When people in all the six
categories are considered,
how many possess the
following
assets/resources?
a. Certain political power
b. Wealth or owners of an enterprise or
company
c. Broad connections with others
d. High reputation / influential
e. With high school or more education
f. With a professional job
Bridging Social Capital
6
How do you rate the
number of the following
two types of
groups/organizations in
your community?
a. Governmental, political, economic and
social groups/organizations (political par-
ties, women’s groups, village committees,
trade union, cooperate associations, volun-
teer groups, etc)
b. Cultural, recreational and leisure
groups/organizations (religious, country fel-
lows, alumni, sport, music, dances, crafts,
games, etc)
7
Do you participate in
activities for how many of
each of these two types of
groups and organizations?
a. Governmental, political, economic and
social groups/organizations (political par-
ties, women’s groups, village committees,
trade union, cooperate associations, volun-
teer groups, etc)
b. Cultural, recreational and leisure
groups/organizations (religious, country fel-
lows, alumni, sport, music, dances, crafts,
games, etc)
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Scale # Scale Item
8
Among each of the two
types of groups and
organizations, how many
represent your rights and
interests?
a. Governmental, political, economic and
social groups/organizations (political par-
ties, women’s groups, village committees,
trade union, cooperate associations, volun-
teer groups, etc)
b. Cultural, recreational and leisure
groups/organizations (religious, country fel-
lows, alumni, sport, music, dances, crafts,
games, etc)
9
Among each of the two
types of groups and
organizations, how many
will help you upon your
request?
a. Governmental, political, economic and
social groups/organizations (political par-
ties, women’s groups, village committees,
trade union, cooperate associations, volun-
teer groups, etc)
b. Cultural, recreational and leisure
groups/organizations (religious, country fel-
lows, alumni, sport, music, dances, crafts,
games, etc)
10
When all groups and
organizations in the two
categories are considered,
how many possess the
following assets /
resources?
a. Significant power for decision making
b. Solid financial basis
c. Broad social connections
d. Great social influence
Table 3.1: Items in the Personal Social Capital Scale, Source: Own representation of
Chen et al. (2009), Appendix 1
The instrument consists of 10 scales, which consist of a total of 2 to 6 items each,
totalling 42 items. The entire instrument is constructed as a psychometric indicator.
Five scales are supposed to assess bonding social capital and five scales aim at bridg-
ing social capital. A detailed overview is given in table 3.1. Each item is assessed
using a five point Likert scale. Response options range from A lot (5 points) to A few
(1 point) for items 1 and 6 and from All (5 points) to None (1 point) for the other items.
To generate the score of a scale, the score of the items assigned to it is added up and
then divided by the number of items. The generation of a respondent’s total score for
bonding and bridging social capital works analogously. It is created by adding up the
scores of the five respective scales supposed to measure them. Finally, the total social
capital score is calculated by adding up the bridging and the bonding social capital
scores. A reduced version consisting only of 16 items has been proposed by Peigang
et al. (2014).
For bonding social capital, the items are the same for the first four scales. The
items ask for different categories of people from “your family members” [Chen et al.
(2009), p. 315] to “your country fellows / old classmates” (ibid.). The fifth scale asks
for certain resources or assets possessed by the entirety of these people. Thus, for
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bonding social capital, only scale four, that asks about the availability of help, and five
ask about resources while the other scales investigate into the size of the network and
the amount of thick ties. The resources listed in the items that form scale five include
human and economic capital as well as a general type of power or influence.
Regarding bridging social capital, analogously to the case of bonding social cap-
ital, the items are in principle the same for the first four scales aiming to assess it.
The difference between the items is that they are asking for either one of two types
of organizations in the respondent’s community, namely “[g]overnmental, political, eco-
nomic and social groups / organizations” (ibid., p. 316) and “[c]ultural, recreational and
leisure groups / organizations” (ibid.). Again, the fifth scale asks for certain resources
possessed by these groups. These are macro level resources, asking for the, for want
of a better word, power of the groups.
The Personal Social Capital Scale thus seems to combine indirect and direct aspects
of social capital measurement: On the one hand, the idea of the position generator is
picked up that a respondent’s access to resources is directly connected to the types
of people he is connected to. However, the position generator’s idea that people of a
higher prestige automatically mean more social capital has been dropped. In principle,
as pointed out above, there may be good arguments for this. The resulting problem
that it is now unclear how helpful the respondent’s contacts might be is counteracted
by asking for the existence of specific resources in questions 5 and 10.
However, while the general idea of the Personal Social Capital Scale might look ap-
pealing, there are some problems connected to it. It is by no means clear that the
respondent has access to the resources his contacts control. This is especially true
for the bridging part of the Personal Social Capital Scale, which appears to be heavily
orientated towards the idea that membership in organizations is a good indicator for an
individual’s social capital as proposed by Putnam (2000). The question is: why should
the respondent’s contacts grant him access to all the resources they have, instead of
just using some (or even none) of them? And, moreover, why does it increase the
respondent’s social capital when e.g. his old classmates or the local political parties
are especially resourceful, but he has no contact to them at all? In the bonding part, it
would seem intuitive that scale four, which aims at the availability of general support to
the respondent, independent of the concrete resources involved, is a prerequisite for
the usefulness of the resources listed in scale five for the respondent. That the answers
to the two scales are assessed independently from each other by simple summation
when calculating the score for bonding social capital does not take this point into ac-
count, but rather leads to the problem described above. Generally, the fact that answers
to the different items are simply added is questionable: having routine contact to a fam-
ily member might represent a contact of much higher intensity and quality than having
routine contact to an old classmate.
Moreover, what the scales measure is not bonding or bridging social capital. Bond-
ing social capital is about interconnectedness of social groups, i.e. closure. The bond-
ing part of the instrument rather measures thick ties to other individuals, at least if
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frequency of interaction is a good proxy for this. The same problem exists for the ap-
parently assumed connection between association membership with bridging social
capital. Of course, groups may bring together very heterogeneous people that do not
meet in other contexts, creating bridging social capital. However, they may also serve
to bring together people that know each other from other contexts already, thus helping
to create bonding social capital. So, what we measure here is group related social
capital, which may well be social capital embodied in thick ties as also measured by
scales 1 to 5 in the bonding part. Moreover, as can be seen from table 3.1, espe-
cially scale nine is quite difficult from the perspective of methodological individualism
as it presumes that the groups and organizations themselves help the individual. Of
course, it will always be other individuals within a group who will come to help an in-
dividual A, which makes this scale redundant to scale four. Besides the problematic
scale nine, it is not at all clear what the individual’s conceptually different benefit from
his affiliation to groups, as asked for in scales six to eight, rather than individuals, as
asked for in scales one to three, is supposed to be.
A further point is that the attempt to make the Personal Social Capital Scale inde-
pendent of the cultural context it is used in weakens its explanatory power. Resources
like certain political power or broad connections with others may be valuable in most
cultures. However, in the same culture, different people may understand very different
concepts by these terms: Does a certain political power mean that you need to know
the mayor of a town, or is it enough knowing a councillor, who may have very limited
de facto influence? Or is it already sufficient to be in contact with someone who knows
a councillor and may tell him about your needs? A comparable case could be made for
most of the resources included in the Personal Social Capital Scale.
A final point of critique that needs to be made is about the implemented weighting
scheme. The scores regarding the size of the personal network are simply added up
across all relevant items, making up three fifth of the total score for bonding social
capital. The resourcefulness of the respondent’s contacts only accounts for one fifth
of the total score. The final fifth is made up by the respondent’s possibility to actually
receive some support from his network. This weighting seems to be quite arbitrary, as
well as the simple addition of what the authors call bonding and bridging social capital
to form total social capital. However, Chen et al. (2009) point to high values of internal
consistency they have achieved in applications of the Personal Social Capital Scale,
which might mitigate this issue. However, the high value of internal consistency can
be questioned in the light of the high level of redundancy between the instrument’s
bridging and bonding part pointed out above since including redundant questions is
known to boost internal consistency ratings.
Summing up, the Personal Social Capital Scale measures thick ties and the overall
resourcefulness of the respondent’s environment, which need not be identical to his
network. It thus constitutes an indirect measure for social capital since the respondent’s
access to resources, potential or actual, is not directly assessed. If looked at the scale
from the theoretical perspective developed in this thesis, it does not really measure
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what it claims to measure. Hence, its usability is limited.
3.3.3 Direct Measures
In this section, measures are presented that directly assess the resources an individual
can access via his social capital. The appealing central aspect they are having is
that the way from the definition outlined above to the measure is short. However, the
apparent problem is the selection of the resources, which may or may not be relevant
for the entirety of the respondents. Specifically, the resource generator and the internet
social capital scale will be looked at. While the former asks for access to a broad variety
of resources, the latter includes a more condensed set.
The Resource Generator
The resource generator is a tool to measure social capital that has been proposed by
Van Der Gaag and Snijders (2005) and Van Der Gaag and Webber (2008). The basic
idea is simple: The resource generator directly asks for the resources the individual
can access via its connections to other individuals. It is thus a more direct measure
compared to the name generator or the position generator. Van Der Gaag and Webber
(ibid.) argue that directly asking for the resources available to the respondent via his
social network is “the most obvious indicator [...] for the concept of social capital” (p.
35). The resource generator does not have an apparent bias towards thick or thin ties,
but rather looks at whether specific ties are giving access to resources or not.
Van Der Gaag and Snijders (2005) highlight the need for clarification on a number
of points that come up when asking a respondent about the resources he has access
to: Firstly, the question is whether the researcher should ask for potential access to
resources or actual use of resources. Asking for potential access to resources might
be difficult due to the hypothetical nature of the question as it means asking for ac-
cess to unused resources. For some resources, the respondent might simply not know
whether they would be available to him. Accordingly, some people might overestimate
the access they have while others might underestimate it. Van Der Gaag and Webber
(2008) also point out that there might be problems of social desirability involved: the re-
spondent might state to have access to more resources than he actually does to avoid
to appear as a “social loser[...]” (p. 36)6. Nevertheless, Van Der Gaag and Snijders
(2005) argue that the alternative to asking for actual use is even more problematic as
it is correlated with a respondent’s lifetime and thus with age: The longer a respondent
is alive, the higher is the chance that he has actually used a resource via his social
capital. The solution to this would be, according to Van Der Gaag and Webber (2008),
the use of a specific time frame, e.g. one year. Then, however, the result might be
influenced by systematic differences in a respondent’s propensity to access other indi-
viduals’ resources: In the same situation where two persons have the possibility, one
6This is a problem shared by all the measurement tools presented in this chapter. The name generator
may be least affected by it.
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might do so while another might find a different solution because he shies away from
putting a burden on another person. Also, individual factors like wealth or “individual
need for help in general” [Van Der Gaag and Webber (2008), p. 38] might influence an
individual’s actual use of other individuals’ resources.
Secondly, there is the question which resources should be included in such an in-
strument. To do so, Van Der Gaag and Snijders (2005) propose to identify different
domains “potentially important for goal attainment” (p.3). The resources attainable via
social capital, which they call “social resources” (p. 3), should then be selected in such
a way that all domains are covered. The dimensions used to identify these resources,
and hence the items of the questionnaire, were adopted from a study by Bruggen
(2001) on goal attainment in the Netherlands. He identifies six domains: “(1) private
productive activities, (2) personal relationships, (3) private discretional or recreational
activities, (4) public productive activities, (5) public relationships and (6) public non-
institutionalised interactions” [Van Der Gaag and Snijders (2005), p. 5]. Van Der Gaag
and Snijders (ibid.) leave out the last dimension because it refers to interactions with
individuals unknown to the respondent.
In practice, the resource generator asks, for a given list of concrete resources,
whether the respondent knows someone who can provide him with access to it7. Refer-
ing to item response theory, Van Der Gaag and Snijders (ibid.) argue that the domains
are the latent variables that are measured while the items only serve as a proxy for
measurement of these latent variables. Consequently, the resource generator is not
one, but several psychometric scales, meaning the responses to items that aim at a
certain dimension can be added up to yield the total score of each dimension. Calcu-
lating scores for the dimensions is what the resource generator aims at. Constructing
a measure of the respondent’s total social capital is thus not the aim of the question-
naire, although Van Der Gaag and Snijders (ibid.) do it at some point by simply adding
up all item response values. The original questionnaire used by Van Der Gaag and
Snijders (ibid.) consisted of “33 social resource items, for each of which it was both
expected that members of the general population of The Netherlands would consider
its contents useful social resources, as well as find it acceptable to exchange or ask for
these resources with people they knew” (p. 10). Originally, Van Der Gaag and Snijders
(ibid.) differentiated for tie strength in access to the resource. This was done by asking
the respondents to indicate whether access was via an acquaintance, a friend or a
member of kin, but they later drop this in their investigations. They justify this by argu-
ing that some resources are best accessed using weak ties. Here, they generally refer
to the “social capital literature” in general without giving more details. However, they
apparently relate to the work of Granovetter (1973). Van Der Gaag and Webber (2008)
discuss the related topic whether measuring the number of other individuals giving ac-
cess adds extra value. They claim that it is not important how often the resources are
7This is not clear from the formulation of the items as depicted in table 3.2, but according to Van Der
Gaag and Snijders (2005), when a resource generator study is conducted, respondents are informed
by the interviewer that knowing someone who has a certain resource also means that this person
would grant him, i.e. the respondent, access to it.
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available in a social network, but whether they are available at all. Although they admit
that multiple alters giving access to a resource may be seen as a kind of insurance,
they argue that the usefulness of multiple alters for access to the same resource shows
at least diminishing returns. Accordingly, Van Der Gaag and Webber (2008) argue that
reducing the data to a binary format, i.e. whether the respondent has access to the
resource at all or not, is not associated with a great loss of information.
Van Der Gaag and Snijders (2005) also include some resources that are not relevant
for certain groups of the population despite their claim to use resources that “members
of the general population [...] would consider useful” (p. 10). An example is item 33
(“Do you know someone who can babysit for your children”, p. 13), which is obviously
not applicable for respondents who do not have children. The same is true for item 16
(”Do you know someone who is sometimes in the opportunity to hire people”, p. 12),
which is not relevant for people not active in the labor market, as is true for item 22 (“Do
you know anyone who can give advice concerning a conflict at work”) (p. 12). While
Van Der Gaag and Snijders (ibid.) recognize this problem, they claim that excluding
these items does not cause major differences in the results.
To group the items into dimensions, Van Der Gaag and Webber (2008) argue that it
is either possible to do this based on theoretical ideas or based on the empirical data
available. The obvious first possibility is to use the domains by Bruggen (2001), which
served to construct the resource generator, as dimensions. Following the second ap-
proach, i.e. to construct the dimensions using their empirical data, Van Der Gaag and
Snijders (2005) use Loevinger’s (1947) H-Coefficent as proposed by Mokken (1996),
which is a homogeneity measure. Their “exploratory cumulative scaling procedure”
[Van Der Gaag and Snijders (2005), p. 15] results in four dimensions with a reason-
ably high degree in homogeneity that “appear meaningful in content” (ibid.). These
four ex post dimensions have a higher degree of homogeneity than those identified by
them ex ante. They label the ex post dimensions as follows: “Prestige and education
related social capital” (ibid.), which includes access to people highly educated, rich
in economic capital or with good contacts to media, “political and financial skills social
capital” (ibid.), which includes access to people politically active or who are knowledge-
able about the legal system or financial matters, “personal skills social capital” (ibid.),
which includes both access to a car but also the ability to speak a foreign language and
readership of a professional journal and “personal support social capital” (ibid.), which
is about advice in the private and work sphere, but also about help when moving house
(see table 3.2 for details). It is not at all apparent that these ex post dimensions are, as
Van Der Gaag and Snijders (ibid.) claim, “meaningful in content” (ibid.). For example,
the fact that speaking a foreign language and knowledge of literature are in two distinct
categories seems illogical, as is true for owning a car and owning a holiday home. The
same problem exists for the internal consistency of the ex post dimensions: The rela-
tionship between knowing someone who owns a car and someone who has the ability
to speak a foreign language is unclear, as is the connection between knowing some-
one with completed secondary education and contacts to media. However, Van Der
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Gaag and Snijders (ibid.) do not interpret the dimensions they find in their data any fur-
ther. The fact that Van Der Gaag and Webber (2008) find quite different dimensions for
an application of the resource generator for the United Kingdom (“domestic resource
scale”, “expert advice scale”, “personal skills scale” and “problem solving resources
scale”, all p. 43) highlights the problems of an ex post allocation of the items to the
dimensions. To give an example, here, the items 17 and 18 from the study by Van Der
Gaag and Snijders (2005) (“Do you know anyone who knows a lot about governmen-
tal regulations” and “Do you know anyone who has good contacts with a newspaper,
radio or tv station”) both fall into the same dimension in the study by Van Der Gaag
and Webber (2008), namely the expert advice scale, whereas they are allocated to
different ex post dimensions in Van Der Gaag and Snijders (2005). The problem of this
inconsistent creation of the dimensions across datasets is that new interpretations for
the dimensions have to be found for each application. This makes a generalization with
respect to the question into which dimensions social capital can actually be subdivided
virtually impossible.
Item Item (“Do you know anyone who...”) Access
Number in %
Dimension: Prestige and education related social capital
7 has knowledge of literature 70
8 has senior high school (VWO)8 education 87
9 has a higher vocational (HBO)9 education 94
14 earns more than Dfl. 500010 monthly 76
15 owns a holiday home abroad 41
18 has good contacts with a newspaper, radio or tv station 32
Dimension: Political and financial skills social capital
11 is active in a political party 34
17 knows a lot about governmental regulations 69
20 has knowledge about financial matters (taxes, subsidies) 81
Dimension: Personal skills social capital
2 owns a car 87
4 can speak and write a foreign language 87
5 can work with a personal computer 90
10 reads a professional journal 78
Dimension: Personal support social capital
22 can give advice concerning a conflict at work 73
23 can help when moving house (packing, lifting) 95
29 can give advice concerning a conflict with family members 83
32 can give a good reference when applying for a job 64
8equivalent to 14 years of education starting at the age of 4
9equivalent to 13 years of education starting at the age of 4
10One Dutch guilder equals 0.453780 Euros according to the final exchange rate from December 31,
1998.
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Item Item (“Do you know anyone who...”) Access
Number in %
ltems not allocated to a dimension
1 can repair a car, bike, etc. 83
3 is handy repairing household equipment 72
6 can play an instrument 79
12 owns shares for at least Dfl. 10,000 54
13 works at the town hall 42
16 is sometimes in the opportunity to hire people 65
19 knows about soccer 80
21 can find a holiday job for a family member 61
24 can help with small jobs around the house (carpenting, paint-
ing)
91
25 can do your shopping when you (and your household mem-
bers) are ill
96
26 can give medical advice when you are dissatisfied with your
doctor
56
27 can borrow you a large sum of money (Dfl. 10,000) 60
28 can provide a place to stay for a week if you have to leave your
house temporarily
95
30 can discuss what political party you are going to vote for 65
31 can give advice on matters of law (problems with landlord,
boss, municipality)
65
33 can babysit for your children 57
34 you can pay social visits to11 93
35 can discuss intimate matters with you12 86
36 can do small jobs around the house13 86
37 keeps a spare key to your house14 80
Table 3.2: Dimensions, items and access to them in the resource generator by Van Der
Gaag and Snijders (2005), Source: Own representation based on Van Der
Gaag and Snijders (ibid.), tables 2 and 3
There are several points of critique directed towards the resource generator: Firstly,
as Van Der Gaag and Webber (2008) point out, the selection of the concrete resources
to include into the questionnaire is always to some extent arbitrary, or, as they put it,
“difficult to achieve with any theoretical rigor” (p. 41). Moreover, the resources need
to be “potentially productive, exchangeable, acceptable to ask for, and memorable for
the respondent” (ibid.). The perception which resources fulfil these criteria is, as Van
Der Gaag and Webber (ibid.) state, “culturally dependent” (ibid.). Thus, the resource
generator needs to be adapted for the specific population under investigation. However,
this is also true for the position generator, as the same occupation might be connected
to a different position in the social hierarchy in different countries and cultures. Thus,
11Item from the name generator included in the same survey
12see footnote 11
13see footnote 11
14see footnote 11
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both indicators exhibit, as Peigang et al. (2014) put it, a limited “cross-cultural utility”.
Connected to this is the issue that some items might not have the same significance
at different points in time: for example, knowing someone who can use a personal
computer might be a rarer resource in the early 2000s than in the late 2010s.
A second point is that the aim of the resource generator is to ask for concrete re-
sources the respondent may or may not have access to. However, it is unclear which
resources are aimed at when the respondent is, e.g., asked whether he knows anyone
active in a political party [Van Der Gaag and Snijders (2005), item 11] or who works
in a city hall [Foster and Maas (2014), item 5]. Is the resource aimed at getting the
respondent a job in the public sector? Or is it about getting some official paperwork
done quicker or with less problems? Arguments into that same direction could also be
made about other items included in the resource generator.
A third point, as Van Der Gaag and Webber (2008) put it, is that the “popularity of
the items” is rather high, meaning the high degree of affirmative answers typical for
the resource generator. In Van Der Gaag and Snijders (2005), an average of 76% of
respondents claimed to have access to any given resource. The number is even higher
in the application by Foster and Maas (2014) in the United States, where it is over 83%.
Even in the socially deprived sample of long-term welfare recipients used by Varekamp
et al. (2015), the average agreement rate to the items is at about 58%. This is of course
a weakness: What is the explanatory power of an indicator where the vast majority
of respondents says yes for the vast majority of items? Do the remaining differences
really yield a significant amount of explanatory power regarding the respondent’s social
capital understood as access to resources, especially given the fact, as pointed out
above, that these differences are often clustered in items with an unclear resource
association, such as knowing someone who works in the city hall or is active in a
political party? A final point connected to this is that the ex post allocation of the items
to scales using Loevingers H-Coefficient as done by Van Der Gaag and Snijders (2005)
and Van Der Gaag and Webber (2008) might result in social capital dimensions that are
quite arbitrary. This may well be a statistical artefact as the procedure simply focusses
on the items where there are significant differences between the respondents at all.
The Internet Social Capital Scale
A further scale to measure social capital is the Internet Social Capital Scale developed
by Williams (2006) and Ellison, Steinfield, and Lampe (2007). Both contributions refer
to neither the name generator nor the position generator nor the resource generator,
all of which have been developed earlier. Instead, their main reference is the work by
Putnam (2000), which is interesting insofar as Putnam (ibid.) does not design a ques-
tionnaire himself, but rather uses data created for other purposes for his study. The
Internet Social Capital Scale is divided into two parts: one is supposed to measure
bridging, the other to measures bonding social capital. While the former, as will be
shown, aims at system capital, the latter part is interesting to look at as it offers dif-
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ferent, more general formulations to assess resources relative to Van Der Gaag and
Snijders (2005) and Van Der Gaag and Webber (2008).
Williams’ (2006) subject of investigation is whether there is an effect of internet use
on the respondent’s social capital. Measuring social capital is a necessary prerequisite
to answer his research question. In order to do so, he employs four subscales. Each of
the four subscales consists of ten items, which are measured by five-point Likert scales.
Each subscale aims to measure one out of two specific types of social capital in one
out of two specific environments, respectively: Social capital is differentiated along the
lines of bridging and bonding capital, while the environment is differentiated between
online and offline, i.e. Williams (ibid.) aims at differentiating between social connections
maintained online and offline. Consequently, in the Internet Social Capital Scale, there
are two different groups of questions aiming at assessing bridging and bonding social
capital. The difference in the two inventories for the online- and the offline case is
merely a replacement of the word online by offline, however. A reduced version of this
scale, which only uses five questions for the bridging and bonding subscales and drops
the differentiation between online and offline has been proposed by Ellison, Steinfield,
and Lampe (2007). According to Appel et al. (2014), this is the version most widely
used in research. A summary of the subscales is given in table 3.3. Since there is
de facto no difference between the batteries investigating the online- and offline case,
the main interesting aspect about the Internet Social Capital Scale is looking into the
question batteries assessing bridging and bonding social capital in detail.
As pointed out above Williams (2006) is heavily influenced in his social capital con-
cept by Putnam (2000). This is especially notable when looking at the scale that aims
at measuring bridging social capital: They are supposed to measure four aspects. The
first is whether the respondent is “outward looking” [Williams (2006), p. 600], i.e. “open
minded, and more comfortable challenging [his] precepts” (ibid.). This aspect looks at
whether the respondent is interacting with “people outside [his] local area” (ibid.), but
also whether he is “curious about differences in others and different parts of the world”
(ibid.). A second aspect is whether the respondent is in “contact with a broad range
of people” (ibid.), meaning “people of different backgrounds” (ibid.). Although these
two points do not measure the individual’s access to resources directly, it is imaginable
that being open-minded and interacting with people of different backgrounds might be
advantageous in accessing informational resources and also, following Granovetter
(1973), in gaining preferred access, e.g. on the labor market. The possibility to get to
know new people, which is assessed by item nine, may actually constitute a social cap-
ital resource. The third aspect Williams (2006) aims at measuring in his bridging scale
is whether the respondent sees himself “as part of a broader group” (p. 600), which
means a “larger community” (ibid.) or a “feeling as if everyone in the world is con-
nected” (ibid.). The final aspect is “diffuse reciprocity with a broader community” (ibid.),
where “helping strangers” (ibid.) is the example given by Williams (ibid.). The influence
of Putnam (2000) is especially visible in the third and fourth aspect of Williams ques-
tionnaire, which aim at thin trust and generalized reciprocity, respectively. Especially in
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these latter points, the connection of the aspects measured to the resources accessed
by the individual via his connections becomes feeble. Moreover, the first two points
in the Internet Social Capital Scale are not directed at resource use, but rather aim at
what interaction with different people does to the respondent’s mindset: Questions like
“[t]alking with other people online/offline makes me curious about other places in the
world” [Williams (2006), p. 602] and “[i]nteracting with people online/offline makes me
interested in what people unlike me are thinking” (ibid.) rather aim at a very lofty idea
of the general benefits of interacting with others. This fits with Putnam’s (2000) ideas
of generalized reciprocity and thin trust but has little to do with bridging social capital in
the sense of Burt (1992, 2000, 2007), which is about spanning structural holes in order
to get preferred access to valuable information.
Item Item Included in
# Ellison,
Steinfield,
and Lampe
(2007)
Bridging Subscale
1 Interacting with people online/offline makes me interested in
things that happen outside of my town.
no
2 Interacting with people online/offline makes me want to try
new things.
yes
3 Interacting with people online/offline makes me interested in
what people unlike me are thinking.
no
4 Talking with people online/offline makes me curious about
other places in the world.
no
5 Interacting with people online/offline makes me feel like part
of a larger community.
yes
6 Interacting with people online/offline makes me feel con-
nected to the bigger picture.
no
7 Interacting with people online/offline reminds me that every-
one in the world is connected.
yes
8 I am willing to spend time to support general online/offline
community activities.
yes
9 Interacting with people online/offline gives me new people to
talk to.
no
10 Online/Offline, I come in contact with new people all the time. yes
Bonding Subscale
1 There are several people online/offline I trust to help solve my
problems.
yes
2 There is someone online/offline I can turn to for advice about
making very important decisions.
yes
3 There is no one online/offline that I feel comfortable talking to
about intimate personal problems.
no
4 When I feel lonely, there are several people online/offline I
can talk to.
no
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Item Item Included in
# Ellison,
Steinfield,
and Lampe
(2007)
5 If I needed an emergency loan of USD 500, I know someone
online/offline I can turn to.
yes
6 The people I interact with online/offline would put their repu-
tation on the line for me.
no
7 The people I interact with online/offline would be good job
references for me.
yes
8 The people I interact with online/offline would share their last
dollar with me.
no
9 I do not know people online/offline well enough to get them to
do anything important.
yes
10 The people I interact with online/offline would help me fight
an injustice.
no
Table 3.3: Subscales in the Internet Social Capital Scale, Source: Own representation
of Williams (2006), table 1, and Ellison, Steinfield, and Lampe (2007), table
5
Consequently, especially the last two aspects of the bridging scale aim at a different
concept of social capital than the one employed in this thesis, namely system capital.
Thus, for any measure of relational capital, they would need to be excluded.
The orientation at Putnam’s (2000) concept of social capital is less apparent when
looking at the scale that is supposed to measure bonding social capital. Instead, a
number of items (1,2,3 and 5) have been adapted from Cohen and Hoberman’s (1983)
Interpersonal Support Evaluation List. Again, as in the case of bridging social capital,
they were originally supposed to measure four aspects: Firstly, whether the respon-
dent has access to “emotional support” [Williams (2006), p. 601], i.e. has “someone
to turn to for advice, and ha[s] someone to go to with intimate personal problems or
to alleviate loneliness” (ibid.). This aspect clearly adresses emotional resources. The
second aspect is intended to capture “access to scarce or limited resources” (ibid.),
i.e. “something that is valuable both to the person giving and to the person receiving”
(ibid.), either “tangible, such as money” (ibid.), or intangible, such as reputation. Here,
it is also clear that resources are involved, either economic or other, depending on the
precise situation. The third aspect is the “ability to mobilize solidarity” (ibid.). Although
Williams (ibid.) agrees that this is, at least in larger groups, typically achieved through
“second-order networks”, e.g. by having friends who help the respondent “fight an in-
justice” at some cost to them, “even if it is only time” (ibid.), it is a sign of bonding social
capital. Here, again, resources are accessed, namely human capital resources if time
is involved. The final aspect brought up by Williams (ibid.) is “Out-Group Antagonism”,
i.e. whether the respondent is “connecting with people who share similar beliefs and
interests” (p. 602). This is the only point that does not directly capture resources.
However, it can be interpreted as an aspect implying the “minimum of objective ho-
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mogeneity” [Bourdieu (1986), p. 249] postulated by Bourdieu (1983) to be necessary
for social capital to work. So, while the first three aspects more or less directly aim at
access to resources by the respondent, the proposed final aspect asks for a precondi-
tion to social capital formation. Consequently, Williams (2006) admits himself that this
fourth aspect did not load onto the same factors as the other questions in the bonding
scale in the empirical tests of his instrument. Thus, this final aspect was eventually
deleted from the scale, reducing it to measure three aspects. However, while the bond-
ing measure of the Internet Social Capital Scale may put a focus on thick ties, it is by no
means clear why it should be measuring bonding ties. Conceptually, as the remaining
items all measure resources, the bonding scale of the Internet Social Capital Scale is
comparable to the resource generator as a direct measure, but with a much reduced
set of items. However, these items are of a much more general nature than the items
used in the Ressource Generator. Thus, the part that is called the bonding part can be
categorized to be a direct measure for social capital.
The Internet Social Capital Scale has been criticized by Appel et al. (2014). Their
main point of criticism is that the convergent validity of the Internet Social Capital Scale
is low. To measure this, they compare the results from the bonding-scale to a measure
generated from the name generator, while they compare the results from the bridging-
scale to a measure generated from the position and the resource generator. All of this
seems somewhat misguided: Of the three tools, the name generator is the only one
that is able to create information on bridging and bonding ties, but the bonding scale of
the Internet Social Capital Scale is actually, as pointed out, about thick ties. However,
as the name generator also tends to oversample thick ties, the comparison might be
in order. The position generator may tend to produce more information on thin ties
than the name generator, but it does not say anything about bridging ties. This is also
true for the resource generator: it that may generate information on both thick and thin
ties that may be bridging or bonding ties. Thus, the claim by Appel et al. (ibid.) of low
convergent validity of the Internet Social Capital Scale might be caused by comparing
apples and oranges.
Nonetheless, the Internet Social Capital Scale cannot be used as it is in this thesis:
Firstly, it does not measure what it claims to measure. The inventory aiming at bridging
social capital rather measures Putnam’s (2000) thin trust and moreover some vague
idea of self-improvement through contact with others. It is thus not a helpful tool to
measure social capital as understood in this thesis. The inventory intended to grasp
bonding social capital rather measures thick ties. Secondly, there is no systematic cov-
erage of resource types in the scale that aims at bonding social capital. Emotional,
economic and human capital are covered, but preferred access is left out. Thirdly, the
items may not be comparable across members of a population as different respon-
dents may interpret them differently: For example, item 2 (“There is someone online
/ offline that I feel comfortable talking to about intimate personal problems”) may, for
some people, mean advice in personal matters, e.g. on starting or ending a relation-
ship. For others, it might mean advice in financial or legal matters or advice how to
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advance their career. These points represent very different forms of advice and might,
but need not coincide. Thus, two people who completely agree here might still have
access to very different resources. A comparable argument could be made for items 1,
9 and 10. Other items, however, might be suited to assess access to certain resources,
such as items 5 or 7. Thus, while direct measurement tools may provide a straightfor-
ward way to measure social capital, the Internet Social Capital Scale has fundamental
weaknesses that inhibit its direct application.
3.3.4 Mixed Measures
There are some measures that use both direct and indirect items to assess a respon-
dent’s social capital. Not all of them can be discussed here in detail. Instead, only
two measures, namely those proposed by the World Bank and the one included in
the German Socioeconomic Panel, are presented for illustrative purposes. The first
one is included due to its huge popularity, the second one as it is explicitly designed
for the cultural setting of Germany, which is where the survey discussed below was
undertaken.
The World Bank Approach
In the early 2000s, the World Bank was interested in social capital as a possible con-
cept to use in development aid [Woolcock (2010)] and ran a website on the concept
[Adler and Kwon (2002)]. However, the World Bank’s interest on social capital has been
on its helpfulness to increase “community participation” [Woolcock (2010), p. 475] in
development projects. Consequently, the understanding of social capital developed by
the World Bank is, in Esser’s (2008) words, one of system capital. Nonetheless, it is
worthwhile to look at the indicator developed at the World Bank by Grootaert et al.
(2004), the so-called “Integrated Questionnaire for the Measurement of Social Capital”
(p. vii) since they also accept that relational capital is a part of social capital. It is
interesting to see whether some parts of it may be useful to measure individual level
social capital.
Grootaert et al. (ibid.) identify six different dimensions of social capital that they at-
tempt to measure using their questionnaire: “Groups and Networks”, “Trust and Soli-
darity”, “Collective Action and Cooperation”, “Information and Communication”, “Social
Cohesion and Inclusion” and “Empowerment and Political Action” (all p. 5). Grootaert
et al. (ibid.) argue that the dimension Trust and Solidarity aims at cognitive social cap-
ital, i.e. system capital and that the dimension Social Cohesion and Exclusion looks at
these aspects solely at the community level. Moreover, the dimension Collective Ac-
tion and Cooperation is exclusively restricted to aspects of the community’s ability for
collective action, which has no connection to the resources available to the individual.
The final dimension Empowerment and Political Action is solely concerned with the
perception of the political system by the respondent. However, the other dimensions
are worth looking at in more detail:
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Concerning the dimension Groups and Networks, the questionnaire poses a num-
ber of questions on group membership. It lists 19 different types of organizations and
asks the respondent if he is a member in orgnizations that belong to any of these
types. Moreover, it is asked how active he is in these groups. Additionally, the ques-
tionnaire inquires into the details of the two groups most relevant to the respondent,
e.g. how to become a member of them and how their internal organization works. As
discussed in section 2.5.3, group membership alone may be helpful in creating social
capital, but using group membership as a proxy for social capital may well be prob-
lematic. In addition to group membership, the questionnaire also directly asks for the
resources an individual can access due to his group membership. It thus constitutes
a mixed measure for social capital. To do so, it lists a number of broad resource cat-
egories and asks whether membership in said groups helps the household to gain
access to them (Question 1.9, p. 29). Specifically, these are: “Education or Training”,
“Health Services”, “Water Supply or Sanitation”, “Credit or Savings”, “Agricultural input
or Technology”, “Irrigation” and “Other”. While some of these resources are obviously
only relevant in the context of developing countries the questionnaire was developed
for, others, like “Credit or Savings” may well be suitable for use in developed countries
as well. Question 1.26 asks “If you suddenly needed a small amount of money [...],
how many people beyond your immediate household could you turn to who would be
willing to provide this money?” (p. 31) and question 1.27 continues to ask how many
of them were actually able to provide this money. Question 1.29 asks the respondent
the following: “If you suddenly had to go away for a day or two, could you count on
your neighbors to take care of your children?”. Although it surely assesses access to
a resource, it is an unfortunately selected one since it requires the respondent to actu-
ally have children that need to be taken care of, an assumption definitely not sensible
in developed countries with low birth rates. Finally, question 1.30 asks, in analogy to
question 1.26, for willingness of others to help the respondent in case of a long-term
emergency such as the loss of the breadwinner. Question 1.31 consequently asks how
many of these people were actually able to help.
The dimension Information and Communication investigates into the possibilities of
the respondent to access sources of information. The first couple of questions ask for
very basic things, such as access to a postoffice, telephone or newspaper. Then, the
questionnaire goes on to ask how the respondent receives access to information about
government dealings and market proceedings (questions 4.7 and 4.8). Besides formal
sources of informations, such as newspapers or the television, there are also informal
sources that would constitute social capital resources listed, such as “[r]elatives, friends
and neighbors” and “[b]usiness and work associations” (both p. 36).
Grootaert et al. (2004) provide only very vague instructions for the aggregation of
the different items. Regarding the items that aim at assessing access to resources
discussed above, i.e. 1.26, 1.27 and 1.29, they propose to calculate a “mutual support
score” (p. 12) from them. Unfortunately, they do not go into more detail on this. Such
a measure would actually be a direct measure. However, they propose to combine it
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with information on the respondent’s network size and diversity, thus creating a mixed
measure that combines direct and indirect aspects.
Summing up, while the World Bank questionnaire features a large number of ques-
tions on system capital, it includes only a few questions to assess the respondent’s
individual access to certain resources of other agents, both directly and indirectly.
Namely, these questions aim at the respondent’s access to money, help with child-
care and information. Money and information are two resource categories also found
in the literature, as pointed out above. Childcare may be a human capital resource, but
it is not a very good indicator since many respondents, especially in western countries,
might not have children that require childcare at all. Preferred access is completely
missing. Moreover, the whole questionnaire is clearly geared towards use in develop-
ing countries. Thus, the inspiration that can be drawn from this questionnaire for this
thesis is limited to the few aspects dealing with relational capital that are relevant in the
context of a developed country.
Social Capital as Measured in the Socio-Economic Panel
The German Socio-Economic Panel [SOEP, TNS Infratest Sozialforschung (2011)] also
has a section that aims at measuring social capital. It was last included in the SOEP
questionnaire in 2011. The section starts by asking for membership in various organi-
zations like churches, unions and NGOs. It then goes on to ask respondents how many
close friends they have. Since close friendship is obviously connected with having thick
ties to other agents, and thick ties are, as pointed out, a sine qua non-condition for ac-
cess to most of the resources listed above, it may be a good proxy for an individual’s
access to resources. However, the potential weakness associated with it is that close
friends of different people might differ in the resources they can offer: A bank manager
as a close friend can be more helpful in advising investment strategies compared to
someone who is untrained and unemployed.
In question 125, the SOEP [TNS Infratest Sozialforschung (ibid.)] also directly asks
for access to resources. Hence, like the questionnaire by the World Bank, it constitutes
a mixed measure for individual level social capital that combines direct and indirect
assessment tools for access to resources. To assess the access to resources, the
SOEP questionnaire names a specific resource and then asks the respondent to fill
in up to five categories of people who would provide this resource, e.g. their spouses,
parents, children, other relatives, co-workers, people they know from their associational
activities and others. An overview over the questions is given in table 3.4.
Items a), d) and e) clearly aim at emotional resources, although item d) does so in-
directly: As with asking about close friends, the idea is that if a conflict with someone
weighs an individual down, then this individual will have a thick tie on an emotional
level with him. Item b) is intended to grasp access to human capital and business re-
sources at the same time: While access to human capital is helpful for advancing in
one’s education, help in advancing one’s career is a business resource. Since these
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are two quite different resources, it is unclear whether asking for them in the same
question is convincing: E.g. knowing a school teacher might be very helpful to ad-
vance in education, but, once this is finished, it will typically be of relatively little help in
advancing one’s career. Finally, item c) also asks for access to human capital. This is
clearly a problematic part of the question: The situation mentioned is quite hypothetic
for many people, and asking someone to care for you is very much to ask for. A priori,
it is unclear how people react and thus whether access to this resource really exists as
presumed.
Item # Item
a With whom do you share personal thoughts and feelings or talk about things
that you would not share with everyone?15
b Who supports you in advancing in your career or education and helps you
to move on?16
c A hypothetical question: Whom would you turn to if you would be in long-
term need of care, e.g. after an accident 17
d With whom do you occasionally have conflicts that weigh you down?18
e Who can tell you inconvenient truths? 19
Table 3.4: Question 125 in TNS Infratest Sozialforschung (2011), Source: Own repre-
sentation and translation of TNS Infratest Sozialforschung (ibid.), p. 29
Summing up, question 125 can be characterized as the short version of an enhanced
resource generator: short, because it only comprises five items, enhanced, because it
does not only ask whether a given resource is available, but also, who would give the
respondent access to it.
The section on social networks in the SOEP [TNS Infratest Sozialforschung (ibid.)]
concludes by asking about job and other details of three people very close to the re-
spondent. This last section can be interpreted as a reduced version of the second step
of a name generator survey. Moreover, the existence of a number of family members
and how far away they live is asked for.
The part of the SOEP [TNS Infratest Sozialforschung (ibid.)] relevant for social capital
is thus heavily oriented at the three generators described above, namely the name
generator, the position generator and the resource generators. In the documentation
for the questionnaire [TNS Infratest Sozialforschung (2012)], it is also explicitly pointed
out that the items in the section of the SOEP are generator questions. Although, due to
the nature of the SOEP, no explicit instructions on how to aggregate the data are given,
15The German original is: “Mit wem teilen Sie perso¨nliche Gedanken und Gefu¨hle oder sprechen u¨ber
Dinge, die Sie nicht jedem erza¨hlen wu¨rden”
16The German original is: “Wer unterstu¨tzt Sie in Ihrem beruflichen Fortkommen oder Ihrer Ausbildung
und hilft Ihnen, dass Sie vorankommen”
17The German original is: “Nur einmal hypothetisch gefragt: Wie wa¨re es bei einer langfristigen
Pflegebedu¨rftigkeit, z.B. nach einem schweren Unfall: Wen wu¨rden Sie um Hilfe bitten?”
18The German original is: “Mit wem haben Sie gelegentlich Streit oder Konflikte, die belastend fu¨r Sie
sind?”
19The German original is: “Wer kann Ihnen auch mal unangenehme Wahrheiten sagen?”
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the most obvious way to do this is in a way similar to those proposed for the name, the
position or the resource generator.
Concluding, while the SOEP [TNS Infratest Sozialforschung (2011)] provides a use-
ful tool to measure access to human capital, emotional and business resources, it does
not ask about the respondent’s access to economic resources, access to information
and preferred access to desired objects. On the other hand, it provides additional in-
formation on how the access to the resources covered works, especially by whom it is
provided.
Summary
Individual level social capital is measured in numerous ways. An overview over the
different measures discussed in this chapter can be found in table 3.5.
Indicator Type Number of Items Number of Di-
mensions
General Trust in
Others
one-question mea-
sure
1 1
Number of Associ-
ations
one-question mea-
sure
1 1
Name Generator Indirect measure up to 12 typically 1 or 2
Position Generator Indirect measure between 10 and 40 typically 1
Personal Social
Capital Scale
indirect measure either 10 or 42 1
Resource Genera-
tor
Direct measure up to 37 about 4
Internet Social
Capital Scale
bridging: indirect
measure, bonding:
direct measure
either 10 to 20 2
World Bank Ap-
proach
Direct measure-
ment of some
resources
8 about resources 6
German Socioeco-
nomic Panel
Elements of direct
and indirect mea-
sures
12 unclear
Table 3.5: Summary of the Social Capital Measures discussed in this Chapter
Especially the early measures have been adapted from other purposes to mea-
sure social capital. The number of organisations he is connected to is a very rough
proxy for a person’s social capital, popular mainly for it’s availability in time series going
back much further than the empirical investigation into social capital that started in the
1990s. The name generator can be used to construct very detailed representations
of a respondent’s personal network. If e.g. applied to entire communities, it can be
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a powerful tool to assess not only thick and thin, but also bridging and bonding ties.
However, data collection is extremely time-consuming and puts a high mental burden
on both interviewee and interviewer.
Later measures such as the position and the resource generator have been devel-
oped to overcome especially this shortcoming of the name generator. The position
generator aims at measuring the resourcefulness of the respondent’s network by us-
ing the social status of his contacts as a proxy. However, two large problems remain:
Firstly, it is not always clear whether the respondent knows someone in a certain po-
sition personally or due to a professional contact, e.g. if the latter is a physician. Sec-
ondly, the selection of positions given to the respondents might well influence the result
of the study. Thirdly, even contacts that do not have a high social status can provide
valuable resources to the respondent. This is especially true for expressive actions,
e.g. emotional resources.
The resource generator, in contrast, directly asks for the resources available to an
individual. While this overcomes the problem that resources valuable to a respondent
need not always be entangled with the respondent’s contact’s status, it creates new
problems: The collection and categorization of items needs to be undertaken carefully.
An additional problem is that the resource generator has a large number of items,
which may lead to respondent fatigue. Additionally, the items are only assessed on a
binary basis (access or no access) and typically have very high availability rates. This
effectively bases the differences in social capital between different respondents on a
number of items where there are significant differences in responses independent of
their relevance. Due to all these points, the resource generator as proposed by Van
Der Gaag and Snijders (2005), Van Der Gaag and Webber (2008) and Varekamp et al.
(2015) can be improved on. Moreover, it shares with the position generator that it is
bound to a specific cultural context.
The Internet Social Capital Scale and the Personal Social Capital Scale have been
developed to overcome these shortcomings: They aim especially at the problem that
the selection of positions or resources is always up to a certain point arbitrary and that
the use of the instrument is dependent on the cultural context. Technically, both scales
intend to measure bonding and bridging social capital separately, and both share the
property that the measure for bridging social capital they propose does certainly not
measure bridging social capital, while their measure for bonding social capital is rather
one for thick ties. The Personal Social Capital Scale follows the principally attractive
idea to combine direct and indirect social capital measures. However, its assessment
of resources is so vague that it de facto constitutes a purely indirect measure.
Finally, a brief investigation has been conducted into the approaches to measure so-
cial capital proposed by the World Bank and the German Socio-Economic Panel. The
first approach mainly aims at system capital and only includes a small number of items
that cover access to resources. However, the selection of resources is unsuitable to
measure social capital as defined in this thesis because it is limited to help with child-
care and access to economic resources. The same is true for the battery included in
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the SOEP, which presents an interesting mixture of a name generator and a resource
generator survey, which can be seen in the Personal Social Capital Scale’s tradition
of aiming at combining direct and indirect measures. Probably in order to reduce the
cognitive burden on the respondent, both elements have been heavily reduced: The
second stage name generator is only applied for two people, and the resource gen-
erator is only applied for five items. Same as with the Internet Social Capital Scale
and the Personal Social Capital Scale, a problem is that the access to resources is as-
sessed unsystematically: In the SOEP battery, access to economic resources, access
to information and priviliged access are missing.
3.4 A New Proposal to Measure Individual Level Social Capital
As has been pointed out, all of the measures discussed above have notable weak-
nesses when trying to assess individual level social capital as defined in this thesis.
In the following section, a new measure will thus be proposed. In a first part, some
methodical considerations will briefly be presented. In a second part, a discussion of
the concrete dimensions and items of the measure will take place.
3.4.1 Methodical Considerations
Firstly, a number of criteria that the new measure should meet will be introduced. Then,
a specific structure for the measure will be proposed.
Criteria for a Measure for Individual Level Social Capital
Theoretical constructs can, as Zeller and Carmines (1980) point out, “be neither di-
rectly observed nor measured” (p. 3). Indicators are thus “intended to approximate
and locate concepts empirically” (ibid.). The indicators that are combined to form a
measure are thus necessarily “only a small subset of an almost infinite number” (ibid.)
of indicators and indicator combinations imaginable for any given theoretical concept.
Consequently, the task of selecting indicators and their combination is always up to a
certain extent arbitrary. In the realm of measurement construction, two criteria to as-
sess the quality of a measure have been established: validity and reliability. Reliability
is seen as a prerequisite to validity. As will be shown below, some aspects of these
two criteria can only be assessed after the measure has been used, and others only
even after it has been used repeatedly. However, looking at how an indicator needs to
be constructed to increase its chance to fulfill these aspects may serve as an ex ante
guideline.
Reliability is defined by Zeller and Carmines (ibid.) as the ability of a measure to
produces “repeatable [... and] consistent results” (p. 6). Drost (2011) sums up that
reliability can be separated into three different criteria: stability over time, equivalence
and internal consistency. All three can only be evaluated ex post. Stability over time
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asks whether the instrument reproduces its results when used again at a later point in
time. Equivalence can be seen as a weaker form in that it asks that at least the correla-
tion to alternative instruments to measure the same construct stays constant over time.
Finally, internal consistency aims at the question whether the indicator concepts aim at
measuring the same concept. This is, apparently, only true for psychometric measures
as discussed in section 3.1 of this thesis. Internal validity will be tested for in section
4.2 of this thesis.
Three recommendations are given by Drost to increase the reliability of an empirical
survey.
Firstly, items should be clearly formulated so that they can be understood by every-
one. To account for this point, in the instrument proposed in this thesis, items will be
formulated as concrete as possible so that respondents understand the same when
thinking about them. This is, for example, not the case in the Internet Social Capital
Scale and the Personal Social Capital Scale.
Secondly, test instructions should be formulated such that all respondents under-
stand what they should do. This has not been identified as a problem in the measures
for social capital discussed above and care is taken that this is also not a problem in
the measure proposed in this thesis. It has been pre-tested extensively to account for
this and the above point.
Thirdly, Drost points to a trade-off in length: Too few items limit the validity of a
measure, but too many items quickly lead to respondent fatigue. To account for this
latter point, in the measure proposed in this thesis, lists of 30 and more items, as
can be found in e.g. in the position generator, the resource generator or the Personal
Social Capital Scale, will be avoided. The same is true for very detailed questions on
a possibly large number of people, which may happen in the name generator.
The criterium of validity is defined by Zeller and Carmines (1980) as follows: “if a set
of indicants were perfectly valid, it would represent the intended [...] concept” (p. 7).
Drost enumerates four types of validity.
Firstly, statistical conclusion validity aims at the question whether a causal relation-
ship between the variables under investigation exists. This can be solved by either
convincing theoretical arguments or through a natural experiment. When looking at
the resource generator, it becomes clear that there might be a problem here: All the
items have very high rates of agreement and thus their explanatory power for the re-
spondent’s social capital might be affected. Thus, in the instrument to measure social
capital proposed in this thesis, care will be taken that the answers to the different items
can actually be used to differentiate between the respondents.
Secondly, internal validity asks whether there are confounding factors in the study.
Drost gives the example of a sampling bias. The instrument developed in this thesis is
validated using data from an internet survey, which might be a cause of bias. This is
discussed in more detail in section 4.1 of this thesis.
Thirdly, construct validity aims at “how well [the researcher] translated or transformed
a [...] construct [...] into an operationalisation” [Drost (2011), p. 116]. This can either
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be measured in comparison to outside measures or looked at in reference to the the-
oretical definition set up by the researcher. The indicators should “thoroughly cover its
domains and dimensions” (ibid., p. 118). Thus, in the measure proposed in this thesis,
all the types of resources associated with social capital in the literature will be included.
These have been described in more detail in section 3.2. Especially, the measure will
not be systematically blind towards one type of resources as e.g. the position generator
is towards emotional resources.
Fourthly, external validity asks whether the construct is generalizable across per-
sons, settings and times. In the context of social capital research, as has been ex-
plained earlier, this is difficult to achieve for different cultures and times. However, the
empirical study presented in the following part of this thesis should at least be gener-
alizable within the target population, which is represented by a representative drawing.
Hence the items included were selected with great care to be, at least in principle,
relevant for everyone.
Structure of a Measure for Individual Level Social Capital
As a consequence of the considerations outlined before, for the new instrument to
measure social capital the following structure is proposed: The instrument is related to
the resource generator insofar as each of the items but one asks the respondent about
access to a concrete resource. It is thus predominantly a direct measure for social
capital. This differentiates it from the measure proposed by Pena-Lo´pez and Sa´nchez-
Santos (2017), who combine 14 measures from the resource and 14 measures from
the position generator and thus obtain a measure that is half-direct and half-indirect.
The approach followed in this thesis, i.e. to mostly assess access to resources directly,
seems appropriate due to the problems associated with indirect measures outlined
above, e.g. the oversampling of very thin ties and the problems associated with as-
sessing emotional resources. As proposed by Van Der Gaag and Webber (2008), the
measure proposed in this thesis will ask about potential and not about actual access.
The aim is to generate an accurate picture about the respondent’s possibility to access
other people’s resources, not his necessity to actually do so. Each item is supposed to
represent access to a type of resource as given in section 3.2.
It comprises of ten items, that fall into two dimensions. In the spirit of the position
generator, the respondent will be asked for eight out of ten items how many people he
knows that will grant him access to the specific resource. Asking the respondent about
the number of people he knows that would grant him access aims at two things: Firstly
it aims at assessing the quality of access to the resources. Secondly, it aims at solving
a methodical problem connected to only assessing a narrow range of representative
resources: a typical problem is that no information is generated on the multitude of
concrete other resources that are of the same type. However, if the respondent knows
a high number of people that supply him with access to a certain resource, chances
are that there will be someone among them who can also supply him with access to
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similar resources of the same type.
The major advantage of only using a relatively small number of items, as pointed
out above, is that the cognitive burden put on respondents when using the measure
is reduced. Moreover, less time is needed to answer to a measure with only 10 items
relative to sometimes more than 30, as is the case in a number of measures used in the
past. Thus, the measure developed here can also be used in settings where individual
level social capital is not the main variable of interest, but rather an explanatory factor
among others.
There is also one major disadvantage of using such a short measure vis-a`-vis longer
measures that is worth pointing out: The diversity of information collected is of course
reduced when using a shorter measure. While, for example, the resource generator
often asks for resources that are relatively close to each other, i.e. that cover more or
less the same type of resource, the items are necessarily quite distinct when only using
ten items. Here, each type of resource is only assessed with one or two items. The
problem connected to that is apparent: a short measure is not as resistant to special
cases as a longer measure. When an item is not relevant for a respondent, he might not
have access to it and thus his access to a certain resource type, and consequently his
individual level social capital, might be underestimated. This is because there are no,
or maybe just one, alternative item(s) that assess(es) his access to a certain resource
type. The same is true the other way around: when a respondent knows very many
people that can provide him with one special resource for some reason, and this is
precisely the resource asked for in the measure, his access to social capital might
be overestimated. There is no first-best solution to this problem. Finding resources
that are equally relevant for every respondent is very difficult. In order to reduce this
problem, great care has been taken regarding the selection of the items in the measure
proposed in this thesis, which have been selected following extensive pre-testing and
a thorough literature research.
3.4.2 Dimensions and Items
In this section, the different dimensions to measure social capital and the items sup-
posed to measure them will be introduced. It will be differentiated between social
capital in the private sphere and, for those respondents where it is relevant, the job
sphere. This differentiation is necessary since not everyone is active in the labour
market, but for those who are, social capital may be an important asset which should
not be left aside. In the private sphere, the distinction of resources into those useful
for instrumental and those useful for expressive actions as proposed by Lin (2001) in
the interpretation of Van Der Gaag, Snijders, and Flap (2008) will be picked up. As
already pointed out on page 91, instrumental actions are associated with gaining re-
sources. Examples include “finding a better job, house, and so on” [Van Der Gaag,
Snijders, and Flap (ibid.), p. 27]. Expressive actions are associated with maintaining
resources. Examples include “personal support and the sharing of sentiments” (ibid., p.
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28). The aim of introducing this distinction is to better assess these two distinct sides of
a resource category, at least for those cases where both instrumental and expressive
action resources exist.
Social Capital in the Private Sphere
In this section, firstly, an introduction will take place of the expressive action resources
that are relevant for social capital in the private sphere. Afterwards, an investigation
into the instrumental resources in this field will be conducted.
Expressive Action Ressources
Four items fall into this category, that cover emotional, human capital and economic
capital resources. These four items will be introduced and discussed in turn.
Firstly, emotional resources are typically understood in two ways. On the one hand, it
is the possibility of the respondent to share his feelings and sorrows with others, which
is clearly associated with thick ties. Examples of questions that assess access to this
type of resource in other questionnaires include the following: ”Is there anyone who you
can really count on to listen when you need to talk?” [Essex (2003), p. 187], “Do you
know anyone who is there to talk about the day” [Foster and Maas (2014), p.7] “With
whom do you share personal thoughts and feelings or talk about things that you would
not share with everyone?20 [TNS Infratest Sozialforschung (2011), p. 29], “Having
someone who really cares no matter what” [Nieminen et al. (2008), p. 411],“There is
no one online/offline that I feel comfortable talking to about intimate personal problems”
[Williams (2006), p. 602], “When I feel lonely, there are several people online/offline I
can talk to” (ibid.), and “Do you know anyone who can discuss intimate matters with
you” [Van Der Gaag and Snijders (2005), p. 13].
To assess this kind of emotional resources which is about sharing feelings and sor-
rows with others, the following item is proposed: How many people do you know that
you can call anytime if you need someone to talk to?21. This item is not significantly
different from the other items used in the literature to assess this type of resource.
On the other hand, emotional resources are also understood to mean the concrete
assistance of others in situations of emotional turmoil. This can go well beyond simply
listening to the respondent’s sorrows or feelings. Situations of emotional turmoil can
have many reasons. However, they are often associated with fights with people that are
important to an individual. For example, in the TNS Infratest Sozialforschung (2011),
there is the following question included: “With whom do you occasionally have conflicts
20The German original is: “Mit wem teilen Sie perso¨nliche Gedanken und Gefu¨hle oder sprechen u¨ber
Dinge, die Sie nicht jedem erza¨hlen wu¨rden”
21The German original is: Wie viele Personen kennen Sie, die Sie jederzeit anrufen ko¨nnen, wenn Sie
jemanden zum Reden brauchen?
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that weigh you down?”22 (p. 29). While this item only aims at finding out who is
close enough to the individual to cause emotional turmoil more in the spirit of the name
generator, the item by Van Der Gaag and Snijders (2005), goes one step further: “Do
you know anyone who can give advice concerning a conflict with family members?”
(p. 12). This question does not only include that the respondent has a thick tie to the
person he asks, but also that there is some degree of closure in his network, i.e. it
also assesses the individual’s bonding social capital: In order to give good advice, the
person the respondent asks would ideally know the family members the respondent
is in conflict with. However, the weakness of this question is that it is limited to family
members, which may or may not be emotionally important contacts for the individual.
To assess the kind of emotional resource that is about concrete assistance in situa-
tions of emotional turmoil, the following item is proposed: Think about a person that is
important to you (e.g. your partner, your parents, your children, a close friend). How
many persons do you know who would put in a good word for you with that person,
e.g. after a bad fight?23 Relative to the item by Van Der Gaag and Snijders (ibid.),
this item is more open in the choice of the respondent to whom he is emotionally close
to. Moreover, it is more direct in assessing the bonding resource also present in the
items by Van Der Gaag and Snijders (ibid.) because it explicitly requires the two other
persons involved to know each other (otherwise, putting in a good word typically makes
little sense). The item is thus also an indicator for the bonding ties in the respondent’s
personal network.
Secondly, human capital resources can also constitute expressive action resources.
This is especially so if they do not help the respondent to achieve major goals, but only
to solve everyday problems. Here, the human capital accessed is typically not highly
specialized. Rather, it is the type of human capital people amass more or less by coin-
cidence in their free time. Consequently, solving problems with technical equipment in
the household or help with DIY24 tasks are consistently associated with this kind of re-
source. Numerous examples can be found in the literature: “Do you know anyone who
can give advice on using a personal computer” [Foster and Maas (2014), p. 7], “Do you
know anyone who can help with small household jobs” (ibid.), “Having someone to get
practical help when needed” [Nieminen et al. (2008), p. 411], “Do you know anyone
who knows how to fix problems with computers” [Van Der Gaag and Webber (2008),
p. 37], “Who from outside your home has recently helped you with tasks around the
home, such as painting, moving furniture, cooking, cleaning, or major or minor repairs”
[Marin and Hampton (2007), p. 171], “Do you know anyone who can help with small
jobs around the house (carpeting, painting)” [Van Der Gaag and Snijders (2005), p.
12], and “Do you know anyone who is handy repairing household equipment?” (ibid.)
22The German original is: “Mit wem haben Sie gelegentlich Streit oder Konflikte, die belastend fu¨r Sie
sind?”
23The German original is: Denken Sie kurz an eine Ihnen wichtige Person (z.B. Ihren Partner, Ihre
Eltern, Ihre Kinder, einen engen Freund oder eine enge Freundin). Wie viele Personen kennen Sie,
die bei dieser Person ein gutes Wort fu¨r Sie einlegen wu¨rden, z.B. nach einem heftigen Streit?
24Do it yourself
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are examples.
To assess the kind of human capital resource that is about solving everyday prob-
lems, the following item is proposed: How many people do you know that help you with
small jobs in your household, e.g. if you’re having problems with technical equipment
(TV, computer, phone), without a financial reward?25. It can be seen as an aggrega-
tion of the items listed above as it aims at practical everyday problems in general, but
specifically highlights technical issues. The assumption behind this is that technical
problems are faced by the majority of people at least occasionally. DIY tasks like paint-
ing or carpeting, which have been proposed by Marin and Hampton (2007) and Van
Der Gaag and Snijders (2005), respectively, have been left out since this kind of major
refurbishment can also be seen as an instrumental action. Moreover, it is possible that
people that live for rent, which is popular in Germany, are not faced with this kind of
problems at all as repairs are commissioned by their landlord.
Thirdly, economic capital resources can constitute expressive action resources. This
is especially so if access to economic capital resources is used to solve occasional
shortages of economic goods of minor value. Two scenarios are common: Firstly, that
the economic good in question is borrowed by the respondent and returned at a later
point in time or, secondly, that the economic good is de facto given as a gift since its
economic value is negligible. This kind of resource has been explicitly mentioned as a
social capital resource by Kadushin (2004), who gives the example of borrowing a miss-
ing ingredient for baking a cake. Examples of the inclusion of this kind of resource into
questionnaires to assess social inclusion are: “I borrow things and exchange favours
with my neighbours” [Essex (2003), p. 99], “Suppose you need to borrow some small
thing like a tool or a cup of sugar, from whom outside your household would you like
to borrow it?” [Marin and Hampton (2007), p. 171] and small amounts of money: “Do
you know anyone who can lend you a small amount of money?” [Van Der Gaag and
Webber (2008), p. 12].
To assess this kind of economic capital resources that is about solving occasional
shortages, the following item is proposed: How many people do you know who would
lend you groceries on a sunday?26. In this item, the relevant economic capital resource
has explicitly been limited to groceries. The other examples included by Marin and
Hampton (2007) and Van Der Gaag and Webber (2008) are problematic for the follow-
ing reasons: Concerning tools, firstly, not everyone is able to use tools. Secondly, not
everyone is in need of borrowing tools: Tools are a long-lasting good and some people
are very well equipped. Concerning money, many people do not get into the situation
to be in need of borrowing even small amounts of money as ATMs are widespread and
payment with debit cards is widely accepted in Germany. Moreover, many people find
borrowing even small amounts of money shameful and will go to great lengths to avoid
25The German original is: Wie viele Personen kennen Sie, die Ihnen ohne finanzielle Gegenleistung bei
kleineren Arbeiten in Ihrem Haushalt helfen wu¨rden, z.B. wenn Sie Probleme mit der Technik haben
(Fernseher, Computer, Telefon)?
26The German original is: Wie viele Personen kennen Sie, bei denen Sie sich sonntags Lebensmittel
leihen ko¨nnen?
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it. This is different with groceries: Everyone is in need of eating, and even respondents
with full pantrys may occasionally come into the situation where one specific ingredient
is missing. In a country like Germany, where shops are closed on Sundays, asking an
acquaintance for this specific ingredient is a socially acceptable thing to do.
Summing up, the proposal is to include four specific items to assess expressive ac-
tion resources into a new measure for individual level social capital. These include two
items that aim at emotional resources, one that is intended to capture human capital
resources and one that targets economic capital resources. While emotional resources
are typically expressive action resources, the two latter items are characterized by the
relatively low level of capital involved because a higher level of capital involvement
would characterize them as instrumental action resources.
Instrumental Action Resources
Three items fall into this category. They cover human capital and economic capital
resources as well as preferred access resources in the broadest sense of the word. All
these resources are primarily looked at in the private sphere. The three items will be
introduced and discussed in turn.
Firstly, human capital can also be instrumental action resources in the private sphere.
This is especially so if specialized human capital is accessed in order to achieve spe-
cific goals the respondent is pursuing. This kind of resource has theoretically been
described by Renzulli and Aldrich (2005). In the literature, two types of items have
been used to assess this kind of resource: Firstly, there are items that aim at receiv-
ing help with financial matters, e.g.: “Do you know anyone who can give advice about
money problems?” [Foster and Maas (2014), p. 7], or “Do you know anyone who
has knowledge about financial matters (taxes, subsidies)” [Van Der Gaag and Snijders
(2005), p. 12]. Secondly, there are items that aim at help with legal matters, such
as: “Do you know anyone who can give you sound legal advice” [Van Der Gaag and
Snijders (ibid.), p. 37].
To assess a person’s access to this kind of human capital resource that is about
specialized human capital to achieve specific goals, the following item is proposed:
How many people, besides your bank advisor, do you know who know a lot about
financial matters and on whose advice in these things you can rely on?27. Asking for
advice in financial matters has been chosen as this is something almost everyone has
to deal with relatively regularly: Even people who do not have significant wealth may
get into the situation of taking a small loan or may think about a savings plan for their
retirement. Most people are aware that their bank advisor has his own interests in
selling them certain products and that asking for neutral advice may be helpful. This
is different for legal matters: People may only very rarely get in contact with the legal
system and, if so, instantly rely on professional help, i.e. paid lawyers.
27The German original is: Wie viele Personen außer Ihrem Bankberater kennen Sie, die sich gut mit
Geldangelegenheiten auskennen und auf deren Rat in diesen Dingen Sie sich verlassen ko¨nnen?
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Secondly, economic capital can constitute an instrumental action resource in the pri-
vate sphere. This may especially be the case if larger amounts of money are involved,
or economic goods of higher value. In theoretical contributions, it is often the informal
access to money which is given as an example, e.g. in Ellison et al. (2014), Adler
and Kwon (2002), Fine (2001), Lin (2001), Paldam and Svendson (2001) and Portes
(1998). This kind of resource is consequently routinely found as an item in surveys
to assess social capital: “Do you know anyone who can lend a large sum of money?”
[Foster and Maas (2014), p. 7], “In the last five years have you received any amount
such as several hundred dollars from either a friend or relative?” [Kan (2007), p. 441],
“If you need to borrow a large sum of money, say $1000, whom would you ask for help”
[Marin and Hampton (2007), p. 171], “If I needed an emergency loan of USD 500, I
know someone online/offline I can turn to” [Williams (2006), p. 602] and “Do you know
anyone who can borrow you a large sum of money?” [Van Der Gaag and Snijders
(2005), p. 12] are examples.
To assess access to this kind of economic capital, the following item is proposed:
What is the maximum amount of money you could borrow from other persons if you
would get into a financial emergency on short notice. Assume you had no access
to your own funds28. This item is geared towards money as the economic resource
in question. This is because for non-trivial amounts of money, it is difficult to find a
good that most people, at least in principle, could be in need of borrowing: A car
comes readily into mind, but a significant number of people does not even have a
driving license: As of 2008, only 84% of adults in Germany possessed a driving license
[statista (2016)]. Different from the other items discussed so far, this item does not ask
how many people the respondent knows that could supply him with a certain amount
of money, but rather directly asks for the amount of money available. The reason is
that the total amount of money available is a more direct indicator for the quality of
access to the resource in question than the number of people that would supply any
fixed amount. It is easy to notice that this item reads as though it is geared towards an
expressive action understood as personal support by others in case of an emergency.
However, this is an artefact of the following problem: Typically, in Germany, the normal
thing to do if you needed to get a large amount of money is to ask for a credit at the
bank. Thus, respondents might find it problematic if they were simply asked what the
maximum amount of money would be they could borrow from others. This is because
they would wonder why they should borrow it from others instead of taking a regular
credit with their bank. Some respondents might have enough wealth so that they are
independent of the need to take any form of credit. Lastly, the willingness of others
to lend money might depend on the use the money is put to: A relatively riskless
investment might lead to a higher willingness to lend compared to a risky or morally
dubious investment. Consequently, a scenario was necessary where it would be clear
28The German original is: Wie hoch ist der maximale Geldbetrag, den Sie sich insgesamt von anderen
Personen leihen ko¨nnten, wenn Sie kurzfristig in eine finanzielle Notlage geraten wu¨rden? Gehen
Sie davon aus, dass Sie auf Ihre eigenen Mittel keinen Zugriff ha¨tten.
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for everyone that they needed to borrow money, that asking the bank was not an option
and where the purpose was at least approximately described. The item described
above is formulated as it is in order to meet this criteria. Moreover, it is theoretically
clear that lending a larger amount of money is an instrumental action resource, not an
expressive action resource.
Thirdly, preferred access can constitute an instrumental action resource in the private
sphere. As pointed out on page 84, most examples for this kind of resource refer to the
work sphere, e.g. access to or information on jobs. However, it may also be a valuable
resource outside the world of work. Astone et al. (1999) give the example of access
to housing. Sobel (2002) and Lin (2001) give the example of finding a babysitter.
Following Bourdieu (1983), a minimum of homogeneity between agents is necessary
for social capital to develop. The possibility to get to know new people who exhibit
this minimal degree of homogeneity such that one can create a relationship to them
could also constitute a resource that would fall into this category. Such a relationship
can be beneficial for two reasons: Firstly, it may generate new access to resources.
Secondly, it might help the respondent to have a good time. Williams (2006) aims at
this in item 9 of the bridging scale in his Internet Social Capital Scale: “Interacting with
people online/offline gives me new people to talk to” (p. 608). However, getting to know
new people does not necessarily constitute bridging social capital: It depends on the
degree of connectedness of these new contacts to other contacts in the individual’s
network.
To assess this kind of resource that is about preferred access in the private sphere,
the following item is proposed: How many people do you know where, each time you
get invited, you get to know new people that you find likable?29. This item is formu-
lated in the spirit of item 9 from the bridging scale of the Internet Social Capital Scale
by Williams (ibid.). The other examples proposed in the literature are quite specific:
Respondents who own a house will most probably not need access to housing, and
respondents who do not have children hardly need a babysitter. Moreover, access to a
babysitter in many situations constitutes an expressive action resource rather than an
instrumental action resource. As the item by Williams (ibid.), this item does not assess
bridging social capital. On the contrary, it asks for the possibility to create bonding
social capital. It presumes that the respondent and the person he gets to know both
share a third contact, namely the person that invited the two of them.
Summing up, the proposal is to include three specific items to assess instrumental
action resources in the private sphere: Firstly, an item to assess access to human
capital resources, secondly an item to assess access to economic capital resources
and thirdly an item to assess preferred access resources. The first two items differ from
those used to assess expressive action resources insofar as the amount of human and
economic capital involved is relatively high.
Thus, all in all, seven items will be used to create the indicator for social capital in the
29The German original is: Wie viele Personen kennen Sie, bei denen Sie, immer wenn Sie eingeladen
werden, Menschen kennenlernen, die Sie sympathisch finden?
122
3 Measuring Social Capital
private sphere. Four of these assess expressive action resources, while three assess
instrumental action resources.
Social Capital in the Work Sphere
Three items fall into this category, which aim at social capital in the work sphere. Here,
only instrumental action resources are relevant. While one item aims at access to
things, the other two items intend to measure business resources. As access to re-
sources in the work sphere is of course only relevant for those active in the work
sphere, the following items have only been shown to respondents that are active in
the work sphere or could potentially be active there. Consequently, housewives and
househusbands have been included, but pensioners have been excluded.
Firstly, preferred access in the work sphere means information about and access to
jobs. This has already been pointed out on page 3.2. This item is included in a number
of questionnaires that aim at assessing personal support: “If you need help finding a job
for yourself or a family member” [Essex (2003), p. 187], “Do you know anyone who can
sometimes employ people?” [Foster and Maas (2014), p. 7] and “Do you know anyone
who is sometimes in the opportunity to hire people” [Van Der Gaag and Snijders (2005),
p. 12] are examples. In the literature, this kind of resource is typically associated with
thin ties, although, as pointed out, especially access to sensible information might well
be connected to thick bridging ties.
To assess this kind of resource which is about preferred access in the work sphere,
the following item is proposed: How many people do you know who could place you in
a job that fits your qualification?30. This item aims at jobs, which is simply the number
one example in the literature for this kind of resource. However, it has been abstained
from including family members in the description since not everyone has family mem-
bers he might need access to a job for. Moreover, this would limit the comparability
between respondents since it is a matter of simple stochastic that those respondents
who have a larger family are more likely to also know someone who might be able to
place some member of that family into a fitting job. Moreover, it has been defined that
the job is not just some job, but a job which fits the qualification of the respondent. The
contact that can supply this kind of job is probably active in the same professional field
as the respondent. Thus, the question can also be used to assess the respondent’s
professional network outside his present company. Together with the assumption that
information on and access to jobs is, following Burt (1992, 2000, 2007), often asso-
ciated with bridging ties, this item also assesses the respondent’s bridging ties in the
work sphere.
Secondly, access to business resources can also be an instrumental action resource
in the work sphere. There are many concrete examples imaginable that help a respon-
dent to advance or solve problems in his job. However, most of them, like attracting
30The German original is: Wie viele Personen kennen Sie, die Ihnen einen Ihrer Qualifikation
angemessenen Arbeitsplatz vermitteln wu¨rden?
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customers, gaining access to markets or getting good conditions with subcontractors,
are only useful for a certain type of employee. The alternative typically used in ques-
tionnaires that intend to measure social capital is to formulate a relatively open item:
“Who supports you in advancing in your career or education and helps you to move
on?”31 [TNS Infratest Sozialforschung (2011), p. 29] or “Do you currently know anyone
who would give you sound advice on problems at work?” [Webber and Huxley (2007),
p. 488]. The item from the SOEP is not only directed towards the work sphere, but
also at education in general. Here, however, it is human capital that is involved as a re-
source. The same is, strictly speaking, true for the item by Webber and Huxley (ibid.):
This is not about concrete help on problems in the work sphere, but about advice,
which is a human capital resource.
To assess this kind of business resource, the following item is proposed: How many
people do you know who would put in a good word for you with your boss, e.g. to
support your promotion/tenure or to prevent a written warning?32 This item aims at
both the advancement of the respondent’s career with his current employer and his
ability of solving problems at work, since the two points are closely connected. The
key is in both cases the relevant network within the respondent’s current firm. Thus,
this measure also serves to assess the respondent’s bonding ties in the work sphere
and the access to resources connected to them. A restriction of this item is that it is
not relevant for respondents that are active in the work sphere, but who do not have a
superior, e.g. because they are self-employed or temporarily unemployed.
A problem of the two items introduced above is that, while they assess two resources
relevant for most people in the job sphere, they also leave out access to relevant busi-
ness resources, especially those that help the individual to do a better job. However, as
explained above, these resources vary considerably across different professional fields
and different industries. To assess this kind of access to resources, the item I have a
wide network of professional contacts at my command33 was included in the question-
naire. The respondents could answer to this item using a five-point Likert scale, where
the answers ranged from fully applies to does not apply at all. Thus, the quality of
access is not assessed by asking how many people the individual knows that provide
him with something specific, which is nonsensical if no concrete resource is involved.
Instead, the points on the Likert scale reflect the individual’s estimation of his quality of
access.
Summing up, three items are proposed to measure social capital in the work sphere.
Firstly, one item assesses preferred access resources in the work sphere which mainly
aims at the respondent’s access to jobs and thus the breadth of his professional net-
work. Secondly, two items to measure business resources: One item measures those
31The German original is: “Wer unterstu¨tzt Sie in Ihrem beruflichen Fortkommen oder Ihrer Ausbildung
und hilft Ihnen, dass Sie vorankommen”
32The German original is: Wie viele Personen kennen Sie, die bei Ihrem Chef ein gutes Wort fu¨r Sie
einlegen wu¨rden, wenn es z.B. um Ihre Befo¨rderung/Entfristung geht oder darum, eine Abmahnung
zu verhindern?
33The German original is: Ich verfu¨ge u¨ber ein ausgepra¨gtes Netzwerk an beruflichen Kontakten.
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resources that support the respondent in his advancement within his current company
and one item covers those resources that help him do a better job. Divergent from
the other items this last item does not include a specific resource as the variety of re-
sources that fulfil the requirement is quite different for different professional fields and
industries.
# Item Kind of Resource
Social Capital in the Private Sphere
1 How many people do you know that you can call
anytime if you need someone to talk to?
Expressive Action Emo-
tional Resource
2 Think about a person that is important to you (e.g.
your partner, your parents, your children, a close
friend). How many people do you know who would
put in a good word for you with that person, e.g.
after a bad fight?
Expressive Action Emo-
tional Resource, Bonding
Social Capital
3 How many people do you know that help you
with small jobs around in your household, e.g. if
you’re having problems with technical equipment
(TV, computer, phone), without a financial reward?
Expressive Action Human
Capital Resource
4 How many people do you know that would lend
you groceries on a Sunday?
Expressive Action Eco-
nomic Capital Resource
5 How many people, besides your bank advisor, do
you know that know a lot about financial matters
and on whose advice in these things you can rely
on?
Instrumental Action Hu-
man Capital Resource
6 What is the maximum amount of money you could
borrow from other persons if you would get into a
financial emergency on short notice. Assume you
had no access to your own funds
Instrumental Action Eco-
nomic Capital Resource
7 How many people do you know where, each time
you get invited, you get to know new people that
you find likable?
Instrumental Action Pre-
ferred Access Resource
Social Capital in the Work Sphere
8 How many people do you know who could place
you in a job that fits your qualification?
Preferred Access Re-
source, Bridging Social
Capital
9 How many people do you know who would put in
a good word for you with your boss, e.g. to sup-
port your promotion/tenure or to prevent a written
warning?
Business Resource, Bond-
ing Social Capital
10 I have a wide network of professional contacts at
my command
Business Resource
Table 3.6: Dimensions and Items proposed for a New Measure for Individual Social
Capital, Source: Own representation
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Concluding, the new instrument that is proposed to measure individual level social
capital consists of ten items. A summary can be seen in table 3.6. The advantage of
this new inventory over the resource generator is that it does not only measure access
to certain ressouces, but also the quality of access. Nine of the ten measure access
to concrete representative resources, while one measures access indirectly by asking
for the quality of the respondent’s network in the professional realm. The ten items fall
into two dimensions, i.e. one that measures social capital in the private sphere and
one that measures social capital in the work sphere.
It is apparent that not all items proposed by this measure are relevant for everyone.
Especially, the items that measure the respondent’s social capital in the work sphere
are not relevant for people that are not or no longer active there. Thus, since no data
can be generated for all items for everyone, it is not possible to calculate a value for
both dimensions for everyone.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, the resources that are accessed as an individual’s social capital were
systematized in a first step. To do so, a thorough investigation into the literature was
conducted. It was found that five types of resources exist: economic resources, hu-
man capital resources, preferred access resources, emotional resources and business
resources. Economic resources describe the possibilities of an individual to access
other individual’s economic capital. Human capital resources describe the possibilities
to access other individuals’ knowledge and time. Preferred access resources describe
an individual’s ability to gain access to economic goods or information that are of lim-
ited availability, using his social contacts. Emotional resources describe an individual’s
possibility to rely on the emotional support of other individuals when needed. Busi-
ness resources exist in those cases, where an individual can use his social network to
advance in his job or field of business.
In a second step, existing measures of social capital have been investigated. Espe-
cially, seven measures that are, at least in part, utilizable to measure individual level
social capital have been introduced. These can be grouped into three categories.
Firstly, some measures, like the name generator, the position generator and the Per-
sonal Social Capital Scale, measure the respondent’s social capital indirectly. They
all have specific weaknesses, especially the high cognitive burden connected to all of
them due to a large number of questions (in the case of the Personal Social Capital
Scale and some variants of the position generator) or a very time consuming data col-
lection procedure (in the case of the name generator). Moreover, they do not assess
the resources an individual has access to directly, but only indirectly. Secondly, other
measures, like the resource generator and the Internet Social Capital Scale, mea-
sure social capital directly. While the main weakness of the resources generator is
the very large number of items included, which, moreover, typically receive very high
acceptance rates, the problem of the Internet Social Capital Scale is its unsystematic
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assessment of resources. Thirdly, there are some mixed measures that combine ele-
ments from both the direct and the indirect measures. Here, again, resources are only
unsystematically assessed and a high focus is put on the problematic indirect proxy of
group membership.
Thus, in a third step, a new measurement tool for individual level social capital has
been introduced. This includes ten items in total, out of which seven aim at measuring
social capital in the private sphere while three are intended to measure social capital
in the work sphere. It is, with the exception of one item, a direct measurement tool that
aims at systematically assessing the resource types that can also be found in the the-
ory. In the next chapter, the empirical results of an internet survey representative for the
German adult resident population using the new measurement tool will be presented.
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Having developed a tool to measure social capital, the logical next step is to apply it in
a quantitative survey. An empirical application can be used to test the measurement
tool developed in chapter 3 as well as the hypotheses on the predictors of social capital
derived in chapter 2. In this chapter, firstly, the internet survey will be introduced that
was conducted to use the developed social capital measure. In a second section, the
results of the measurement tool for social capital will be presented. In a third section,
the indicators will be developed that will be used to test the different hypotheses on the
predictors of social capital. This section also includes the testing of these hypotheses.
4.1 A Short Presentation of the Internet Survey
To test the presented social capital measurement tool and the hypotheses on deter-
minants and effects, an internet based survey has been conducted. The survey has
been set up with the Questback Enterprise Feedback Suite (EFS) using the University
of Hohenheim’s Unipark licence. A pretest of the survey, using a preliminary version of
the questionnaire, took place in August 2015. Insights gained during the pretest have
been used to improve the questionnaire. The actual survey has taken place between
October 14, 2015 and October 26, 2015. To recruit participants who are representative
for the German adult resident population with respect to gender, age, income and edu-
cational attainment, the online panel provider consumerfieldwork has been contracted.
Participants in the survey received a small incentive worth less than 2 Euros to par-
ticipate in the survey. Thus, a dataset with 1001 participants has been created. An
overview over the characteristics of the respondents is given in table 4.1.
Menegaki, Olsen, and Konstantinos (2016) list a number of advantages of web-
surveys vis-a`-vis more classical face-to-face or mail surveys. Firstly, they are much
cheaper. Secondly, a well-programmed online questionnaire has a greater possible
richness in design. Thirdly, respondents may find it easier to answer intimate ques-
tions when there is no interviewer around. The anonymous atmosphere of internet
surveys should also reduce problems of social desirability in responding. Fourthly, web
survey data are available to the researcher immediately after the end of the survey, i.e.
there is no need to transfer the data from a paper questionnaire to a database. This is
not only convenient, but it also eliminates a possible source of error.
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Value Quota Actual Share
Share of male and female respondents, quotas as of 31.12.2013
male 48.52% 48.95%
female 51.48% 51.05%
Share of respondents of different age groups, quotas as of 31.12.2013
18-29 years 16.64% 16.78%
30-39 years 14.35% 14.29%
40-49 years 18.30% 18.38%
50-59 years 18.32% 18.28%
60-69 years 13.27% 13.19%
more than 70 years 19.07% 19.08%
Share of respondents with highest educational degree, quotas as of 2014
no degree 3.78% 1.40%
secondary degree with 8 or 9 school years 35.14% 37.66%
secondary degree with 10 school years 30.77% 30.67%
secondary degree with 12 or 13 school years 13.40% 13.29%
tertiary degree 16.53% 16.98%
Share of respondents in certain income groups, quotas as of 2012, net income
1300 Euro or less 18.99% 18.98%
1301 - 2600 Euro 31.06% 31.07%
2601 - 3600 Euro 18.61% 18.68%
3600 - 5000 Euro 16.11% 15.98%
5001 Euro or more 15.23% 15.29%
Table 4.1: Representativeness of the survey sample for the the German adult resi-
dent population, Source: partly based on Statistisches Bundesamt (2015b),
Statistisches Bundesamt (2015a) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2014)
Moreover, Menegaki, Olsen, and Konstantinos (2016) list three major disadvantages
of internet surveys: Firstly, they point to a lacking representativeness of internet sur-
veys. They find that participants in internet surveys are more likely to be female and to
be younger than should be expected given the composition of the population. However,
with a rising share of the population using the internet, and the use of quotas to ensure
the respondent’s representativeness for the German adult population, this should not
be as problematic as it was maybe in earlier years. Nonetheless, this point is still rel-
evant with respect to the respondents’ age: The contracted online panel provider was
the only one among the several panel providers contacted who was able to guarantee
that a quota of 19.07% of people above 70 years among the respondents could be
fulfilled. Nonetheless, it is probable that the distribution of the respondents above 70
years is skewed when compared to the German adult resident population, i.e. that the
number of respondents just above 70 years is too high in the sample, while the num-
ber of respondents who are much older than 70 is too low. The online panel provider
has additionally been unable to guarantee that 3.78% of respondents have not finished
any form of secondary education. In fact, only 1.4% of respondents have not finished
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any type of schooling. The remaining quota has been filled up with people who have
finished secondary education with the lowest possible degree1 , i.e. the degree which
can be achieved with only eight or nine years school years. Menegaki, Olsen, and
Konstantinos (2016) further list the relatively low response rate among participants as
a second problem of internet surveys. The third problem they bring up is that they
claim that there might be a problem with self selection. These two last problems go
hand in hand: If people are not interested in the topic of a survey they might chose to
not participate. In an internet survey, there is much less social pressure to participate
compared to a situation where the respondent is face to face with an interviewer or talk-
ing to a person on the phone. Still, self selection is only problematic if there is a group
that systematically decides to not participate in the survey. The reason for this is that
systematic non-participation of a specific group would lead to non-representativeness
of the sample in an unobserved dimension and thus to skewed results. This survey
was announced under the title “Friendship and Social Networks”2. It is not apparent
which group would systematically chose not to participate in such a survey.
The survey consisted of 83 questions3. However, since not all questions were rel-
evant for all participants, filters were used at some points so that not all participants
were confronted with all questions. Usable data for the time needed to finish the ques-
tionnaire is available for 976 participants. One participant took more than 6:39 hours to
finish the questionnaire, which is more than 7 times as long as the next slowest partici-
pants, who took 54:06 minutes. Closer examination of this participant yields that it took
her already 6:29 hours to finish the first page of the questionnaire, which consisted only
of four questions. The plausible explanation for the very long duration is thus that she
opened the questionnaire, but then did not start to answer it for a couple of hours. For
24 further participants, no data on the time they needed has been reported by EFS. The
remaining participants took between 3:17 minutes and, as already mentioned, 54:06
minutes. For these participants, the mean duration needed for completing the ques-
tionnaire was 13:29 minutes while the median duration was 11:49 minutes. This might
seem short, but Menegaki, Olsen, and Konstantinos (ibid.) also find that respondents
are typically quicker in internet surveys than in other survey modes.
It is always important to check whether there was a problem with the questionnaire
that might lead to erroneous results or protest responses. The first indicator is the
number of people who do not finish to answer the survey. In total, 57 respondents,
i.e. 5.38% of those respondents who started the survey, did not finish it. This is a
low dropout rate. Hoerger (2010) finds higher dropout rates of up to 30% in internet
surveys. The second indicator is whether respondents complain about the survey in
the comment box provided on the last page of the survey. Here, two respondents
1Due to the fact that education in Germany is organized by the La¨nder and that it was organized
quite differently in the former GDR, there is no universal name for this type of degree in Germany.
Possible names include Volksschulabschluss, Hauptschulabschluss and Polytechnische Oberschule
mit Abschluss 8. oder 9. Klasse.
2The German title was “Freundschaft und soziale Netzwerke”.
3The complete questionnaire can be found in the Appendix.
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remarked that they found the questions that asked for their wealth too intimate. Seven
respondents remarked that they were required to answer a question concerning their
job life although they are in pension now. This was due to an error in the set-up of
a filter in the questionnaire. Besides that, no further negative comments concerning
the questionnaire have been made. Thus, the conclusion that can be drawn is that
there were no major problems with the questionnaire that might lead to data quality
problems.
4.2 Results for the Social Capital Measurement Tool
In this section, firstly, a brief descriptive overview will be given over the results of the
questions included in the questionnaire to assess individual level social capital. In a
second part, the construction of the two social capital measures, i.e. one for social cap-
ital in the private sphere and one for social capital in the work sphere, will be elaborated
on.
Descriptive Results of the Social Capital Questions
The social capital measurement tool developed in section 3.4 consists of ten items. Of
these, seven items measure social capital in the private sphere while three items mea-
sure social capital in the work sphere. Of the ten items, eight were constructed such
that they start with “How many persons do you know...”. To reduce the cognitive bur-
den, the respondents were presented seven response options for this type of question.
Of the remaining two items, one aims at assessing the maximum amount of money a
respondent can borrow from other persons in case of an emergency. This questions
starts with “What is the maximum amount...”. Consequently, the nine response op-
tions here do not include numbers of people, but amounts of money. The response
options to these two types of questions were created based on the experience from
the pre-test, where open questions had been used. Finally, the question that aims
at assessing the professional network of the respondents, which starts with “I have a
wide network...”, is formulated as a statement to which respondents could agree or not
agree. Here, response options that create a five point Likert scale were presented to
the respondents.
It is easy to note that, for each item, the next higher category often encompasses a
wider range of people. In contrast, in the creation of the indicators that will be described
later on, the category number will be used instead of the number of people it stands
for. The idea behind this is that the marginal gain in access to resources is decreasing
with the number of people increasing. Knowing ten instead of nine people who provide
a resource might be helpful, but the gain in utility is maybe not as big as when knowing
two people instead of one. This gain in utility might be better reflected by the difference
between knowing ten people instead of seven. The same argument holds for the money
that can be borrowed: Its marginal utility is decreasing as the amount borrowed grows.
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Code How many people do
you know...
What is the maximum
amount...
I have a wide net-
work...
1 0 persons 0 Euro strongly disagree4
2 1 person 100 Euro somewhat disagree
3 2 persons 500 Euro neither agree nor dis-
agree
4 3 to 4 persons 1 000 Euro somewhat agree
5 5 to 7 persons 5 000 Euro strongly agree
6 8 to 10 persons 10 000 Euro
7 more than 10 persons 20 000 Euro
8 50 000 Euro
9 more than 50 000 Euro
Table 4.2: Response options to the social capital items
Not all social capital items were presented to all respondents since not all items
are relevant to all respondents. While all 1001 respondents answered the questions
concerning social capital in the private sphere, this is not true for the questions that aim
at assessing social capital in the work sphere. The question on getting help with a new
job was only posed to respondents who had answered that they were not in pension
already. 695 respondents answered these questions. The question on having someone
put in a good word with one’s boss was only posed to respondents who were not in
pension, not unemployed, not self-employed or housewife / househusband, i.e. those
that actually had a boss when answering the questionnaire. Only 476 respondents
answered this question. Of these, further 17 stated that they did not have a boss, so
that 459 valid answers remain. Due to a programming error, all respondents were faced
with the question asking for the size of their job network. However, only the answers
will be considered who are from those respondents that are not in pension already,
leading to 691 valid answers for this question.
The results for the different items show some interesting features that are worth
elaborating on. In the private sphere, in general, the answer patterns to the different
items are such that the median is typically at 3-4 persons and less than or around 10%
of respondents do not know anyone who can provide the requested resource to them.
In the case of lending money, the share of respondents who do not have any access
to that resource is comparable. The most notable exception is the question how many
people the respondents know who could give them sound advice in financial matters.
Here, the median is only one person, and more than a third of respondents do not know
anyone who could provide them with this resource. This reflects that financial matters
can be highly complex. Thus, this item measures, as intended, access to a specialized
and thus rare resource. Another item where the answer pattern is remarkable is the
item that asks the respondents how many people they know where they get to know
new likable people when they are invited. Here, more than 15 % of respondents do not
4In German, these response options were: trifft u¨berhaupt nicht zu, trifft eher nicht zu, weder zutreffend
noch unzutreffend, trifft eher zu and trifft voll und ganz zu, respectively.
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know anyone who can provide them with this kind of resource. This is an indicator that
quite a number of respondents live in networks which exhibit a relatively high degree
of closure.
# Item Mean Median Std.
Dev.
zero or
strongly
disagree
Social Capital in the Private Sphere
1 ... you can call anytime if you need
someone to talk to?5
3.73 3-4 persons 1.38 5.29%
2 ... would put in a good word for you
with that person, e.g. after a bad
fight?
3.51 2 persons 1.35 6.99%
3 ... help you with small jobs around in
your household [...] without a financial
reward?
3.74 3-4 persons 1.56 8.19%
4 ... borrow you groceries on a Sunday? 3.58 3-4 persons 1.58 11.29%
5 ... that knows a lot about financial
matters and on whose advice in these
things you can rely on?
2.12 1 person 1.08 35.66%
6 ... maximum amount of money you
could borrow [...]?
3.81 1 000 Euro 1.84 9.69%
7 ... each time you get invited, you get
to know new people that you find lik-
able?
3.45 3-4 persons 1.58 15.38%
Social Capital in the Work Sphere
8 ... place you in a job that fits to your
qualification?
2.48 1 person 1.51 37.12%
9 .. would put in a good word for you
with your boss[...]?
3.13 2 persons 1.55 15.90%
10 I have a wide network of professional
contacts at my command.
2.62 neither
agree nor
disagree
1.18 22.43%
Table 4.3: Answer pattern for the different social capital items; mean and std. deviation
coded as presented in table 4.2
In the work sphere, for the two items which are about knowing people, the median
number of people indicated is lower than for most items in the private sphere. The
median number of people respondents know who could place them in a new job ap-
propriate for their qualification is just one. The median number of people who could put
in a good word with their boss for them is two. Moreover, in the work sphere, not hav-
ing access to the two resources is quite prevalent: 37.12% of respondents do not know
anyone who could place them in a new job, and 15.90% of respondents do not know
anyone who would put in a good word for them with their boss. The median answer to
5The original German versions of these items can be found in chapter 3.4.
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the item that asks about the scope of network of professional contacts is “neither agree
nor disagree”. However, 22.43% of respondents completely disagree, thus claiming
that they do not have any significant professional connections. These results indicate
that respondents possibly find it easier to access social capital in the private sphere
relative to social capital in the work sphere.
One speciality has to be regarded concerning the item that asks for the maximum
amount of money the respondent can borrow in an emergency situation. For this item,
a case can be made that, in order to assess the value of the connection, it is more
meaningful to not look at the absolute value of money that an individual can borrow.
The reason is that this absolute value does not only depend on the strength of the
connection between the individuals involved and the resources the lender has, but also
on the resources of the borrower: If someone is rich in economic resources, the lender
will deem it more likely that he will be able to repay the money. It can thus be argued
that borrowing the same amount of money constitutes more social capital for someone
with little economic resources of his own. The straightforward way is thus to divide the
amount of money that can be borrowed by an indicator for the financial standing of the
borrower. Both income and wealth as well as a combination of the two could be used.
Since the data on income is of better quality, income will be used.
A technical question that arises here originates from the fact that for income, inter-
vals have been given as response options. As a straightforward solution, the midpoints
of the intervals will be used in the calculation. For the highest intervals, which is open
ended for both items, the lowest value included will be used as a conservative esti-
mate. For the lowest income interval, 1 000 Euro has been taken as a value instead
of the midpoint, 650 Euro. This is done because the distribution in this interval is likely
to be skewed towards the higher end of the interval since there is a minimum income
that is necessary for survival. This minimum income is significantly greater than zero in
Germany and de facto provided by the welfare state. The 1 000 Euro can be seen as
the midpoint between the subsistence level determined by the German federal govern-
ment, which was at 8 472 Euro per year or approximately 700 Euro per month in 2015
[Bundesfinanzministerium (2015)], and the upper bound of the interval at 1 300 Euro.
Construction of the Social Capital Measures
As explained in section 3.4, the items in the two spheres are supposed to be aggre-
gated to create two meaningful measures for individual level social capital: One for
social capital in the private sphere and one for social capital in the work sphere. As
pointed out in section 3.1, all weightings should be made explicit in scale construction.
This point is especially relevant for composite scales. An implicit weighting is not as
problematic for psychometric scales which aim at measuring the same latent construct:
If all items, at least in principle, are a proxy for the same latent construct, it is not as
relevant how precisely the resulting measure is composed from them. Nonetheless,
implicit weightings should be avoided here too, if possible. Moreover, since there is
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no objective reason why the resource measured by any one item should be more or
less important than that measured by any other item, weighting all items equally is the
obvious weighting decision when constructing the two social capital measures.
The social capital measures that are created here do not aim at measuring any
absolute quantity of social capital. What would be the purpose of such a measure?
Would it be meaningful that some respondent has, for example, a 4.3 in private social
capital and a 2.1 in work social capital? The answer is, of course, no. As already
pointed out by Coleman (1990), social capital has no currency. What is more interesting
is the following question: Who has relatively much social capital and who has relatively
little social capital, compared to the rest of the population. In this investigation, the rest
of the population is approximated by the rest of the sample, which is, as pointed out,
representative for the German resident adult population.
To answer this question, information on whether a respondent scores relatively high
or relatively low in the answer to a specific question is sufficient. The absolute value of
his answer can be left aside. It is more meaningful to know whether, in a standardized
measure, a respondent indicates that he knows more (or less) people than the category
average.
The straightforward way to create such a standardized measure is to normalize the
variables such that their mean is zero and their standard deviation is one. This proce-
dure is known as standardization in statistics. According to Schira (2005), it works as
follows:
zij =
xij − x¯j
σ(xj)
∀i, j. (4.1)
Here, zij is the standardized value of the variable j for respondent i, xij is the
non-standardized value of that variable for respondent i, x¯j is the mean of that non-
standardized variable j and σ(xj) is the standard deviation of that variable across all
respondents in the sample. Thus standardizing the variables has the additional advan-
tage of avoiding to implicitly weigh those items higher where a higher average score is
achieved, i.e. which tend to be accessed more easily. This would conflict with the aim
of weighting all items equally, which was explained above.
After standardizing all items, they can simply be summed up to form a psychome-
tric measure or they can be combined, e.g. as proposed by Decancq, Decoster, and
Schokkaert (2009), to form a compositional measure. In the private sphere, although
all seven items measure different aspects, the differences between the respective items
are not too big: It is plausible that someone who, e.g., knows people that help him with
small jobs around the house also knows people where he gets to know likable people
when he is invited. Thus, constructing a psychometric measure might be appropriate
here. In the work sphere, the three items measure quite different aspects. It is well pos-
sible that someone who has worked in the same firm for many decades knows quite a
number of people who would put in a good word for him with his boss, but maybe he
knows no one outside the firm who could place him in an appropriate job elsewhere.
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Nonetheless, such a person might have valuable connections to certain customers and
thus claim to have a good professional network at his command. Here, constructing a
psychometric measure seems less likely to be appropriate.
To see whether the constructed psychometric measure does consistently measure a
latent construct, the standard procedure is to test its internal consistency. A commonly
used tool for this endeavour is Cronbach’s Alpha. This can also be seen as an instru-
ment to assess an instrument’s reliability as discussed in section 3.4.1 of this thesis.
Do¨ring and Bortz (2016) give the following formula for the calculation of Cronbach’s
Alpha:
αCronbach =
p
p− 1 ·
(
1−
∑p
j=1 σ
2(xj)
σ2(x)
)
(4.2)
p gives the number of variables under investigation. As above, σ(xj) gives a vari-
able j’s standard deviation and σ(x) gives the joint standard deviation of all variables
under consideration. Of course, σ2(·) gives the variance as the square of the standard
deviation of the variables under consideration. Cronbach’s Alpha is higher, the higher
the inter-correlation between the items is relative to the sum of their internal variances.
This inter-correlation is hidden in the formula for their joint variance. For example, in
the two-variable-case, the formula for the joint variance of the sum of two variables xj
and xk is
σ2(xj + xk) = σ
2(xj) + σ
2(xk) + ρ(xjxk) (4.3)
where ρ(xjxk) gives the covariance of the two variable as a measure for their inter-
correlation. Using the formula for the sum of variables is appropriate here since a
psychometric index is typically constructed by summing up items.
By construction, Cronbach’s Alpha lies between 0 and 1. The higher it is, the higher
is the internal consistency of the scale under investigation assumed to be. However,
as is easy to see, Cronbach’s Alpha is, ceteris paribus, increasing in the number of
variables under consideration. Shrout and Yager (1989) investigate into this effect by
drawing random samples from a fixed number of items. For their sample, Cronbach’s
Alpha drops heavily when less than ten items are used for the construction of a scale.
This effect has nothing to do with the true consistency of the scale, but is rather an
artefact of the construction of Cronbach’s Alpha. Schmidt-Atzert and Amelang (2012)
propose to use the Spearman-Brown-Formula to extrapolate the value of Cronbachs
Alpha to a desired higher number of items. The formula is given by equation 4.4:
αcorrectedCronbach =
m · αCronbach
1 + (m− 1) · αCronbach (4.4)
In this equation, m represents the fraction of the desired and the actual number of
items. In the case of 7 actual items and 10 desired items, m would be 10/7. In the case
of 3 actual items and 10 desired items, it would be 10/3.
In the literature, several thresholds for Cronbach’s Alpha for which a scale is still as-
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sumed to have an acceptable internal consistency are discussed. The most commonly
listed value is 0.8 [e.g. Schnell, Hill, and Esser (2013), Schermelleh-Engel and Werner
(2012), Brosius (2008), Switzer et al. (1999)]. However, sometimes lower values are
also said to be acceptable. Brosius (2008) says that in some cases, a value of 0.7
for Cronbach’s Alpha might be acceptable, too. Unfortunately, he does not specify for
which cases the lower value of Cronbach’s Alpha would be acceptable. Switzer et al.
(1999) go even further and argue that a value for Cronbach’s Alpha between 0.5 and
0.8 is acceptable for “research in the early stages” (p. 402).
The value for Cronbach’s Alpha that can be derived from the seven standardized
items in the private sphere is 0.8042. Given the low number of items, this is a rela-
tively high value. If corrected by the Spearman-Brown-Formula to match the ten items
found as a lower bound by Shrout and Yager (1989), the corrected Cronbach’s Alpha
is 0.8544. This shows that constructing a psychometric scale by simple summing up of
the seven standardized items for social capital in the private sphere is an appropriate
approach. Do¨ring and Bortz (2016) recommend to test whether any one item does
not fit into the scale by testing the robustness of Cronbach’s Alpha for the removal of
single items. As can be seen from table 4.4, removing single items does not lead to
large changes in Cronbach’s Alpha. Thus, there is no immediate hint that the removal
of certain items from the scale would be necessary.
The measure that results from adding up all seven standardized items for social
capital in the private sphere has a mean of<0.0013 and a standard deviation of 0.6781.
# Item αCronbach
1 ... you can call anytime if you need someone to talk to? 0.7652
2 ... would put in a good word for you with that person, e.g. after a
bad fight?
0.7585
3 ... help you with small jobs around in your household [...] without
a financial reward?
0.7704
4 ... borrow you groceries on a Sunday? 0.7593
5 ... know a lot about financial matters and on whose advice in
these things you can rely on?
0.7929
6 ... maximum amount of money you could borrow [...]? 0.8259
7 ... each time you get invited, you get to know new people that you
find likable?
0.7702
Table 4.4: Robustness of Cronbach’s Alpha for the removal of items for social capital in
the private sphere
For the indicator for the work sphere, a further issue arises: All three items are only
relevant for respondents who are not yet in pension. This is a point ignored by all users
of the resource generator and its derivates, including Pena-Lo´pez and Sa´nchez-Santos
(2017). However, as pointed out above, the question that asks whether the respondent
knows someone who would put him a good word for him with his boss is not relevant
for respondents that do not have a boss, e.g. because they are self-employed, unem-
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ployed or students. In the sample, there are 267 respondents for which meaningful
data is only available for two out of three questions that assess social capital in the
work sphere. The problem of leaving these people out of the measure is that all data
on social capital in the work sphere is lost for self-employed and non-employed people.
The alternative solution is to compensate the missing item that assesses the intra-firm
social capital of the self- and non-employed respondents by giving a higher weight to
the two remaining items. The problem with this approach is that effects and determi-
nants that are systematically connected to this kind of intra-firm social capital might no
longer be mirrored by the constructed measure. Since there is no first-best solution to
this problem, the approach followed in this thesis is to test the robustness of the results
for both the indicator that leaves out the self- and non-employed respondents and the
indicator that includes these respondents and gives a higher weight to the two items
they answered. The first indicator will be called the employed respondents’ indicator,
while the second indicator will be called the non-retired respondents’ indicator. For the
employed respondents’ indicator, data is available for 424 respondents, while for the
non-retired respondents’ indicator, data is available for 681 respondents.
The value for Cronbach’s Alpha that can be derived from the three standardized
items in the work sphere is 0.6266 for the employed respondents’ indicator. Using
the Spearman-Brown-Formula to extrapolate to 10 items gives a corrected Cronbach’s
Alpha of 0.8483. Testing whether one item does not fit into the scale for the employed
respondents’ indicator yields that removing the question that asks for the respondents
job network leads to an almost unchanged Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.6379. For the non-
retired respondents’ indicator, Cronbach’s Alpha is still 0.5242. Using the Spearman-
Brown-Formula to simulate 10 items gives a corrected Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.8464.
If not corrected using the Spearman-Brown-Formula, Cronbach’s Alpha for the mea-
sures that deal with social capital in the work sphere is significantly lower than the
Cronbach’s Alpha for the measure that deals with social capital in the private sphere
discussed above. Given the different thresholds, the Cronbach’s Alpha lies only within
that defined by Switzer et al. (1999) for research in an early stage. Given that this is
the first empirical application of this newly developed indicator to assess social capital,
it could be argued that this is actually research in an early stage. It would thus be ap-
propriate to construct psychometric scales for the two indicators for social capital in the
work sphere. This is especially true when looking at the values for the corrected Cron-
bach’s Alpha calculated with the Spearman-Brown-Formular, which are much higher.
For the compositional measure, a formula as given by Decancq, Decoster, and
Schokkaert (2009) can be used. This formula has been discussed in detail in chapter
3. It is analogous to a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) utility function. It is
given by
Mi =
(
p∑
j=1
wjz
(
β−1
β
)
ij
)( β
β−1
)
∀i. (4.5)
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As in equations 4.1 and 4.2, zij is the value of item j for respondent i. p gives the total
number of items. wj is the weight allocated to item j. In the employed respondents’
indicator, to achieve equal weighting, this would be one third for all three items that
assess social capital in the work sphere. In the non-retired respondents’ indicator,
this would be one third for all three items for those respondents where data for all
three items is available. For the remaining 232 respondents that are self- or non-
employed, this would be one half for the two items on which data is available. Finally,
β gives the constant elasticity of substitution between the items. For β → ∞, i.e. for
an infinite elasticity of substitution, the case of simple summing up of items as in the
construction of a psychometric indicator is replicated. However, as already pointed out
in chapter 3, the choice of the elasticity of substitution is non-trivial. Since the items
are clearly substitutes and not complements, an elasticity of substitution smaller than
zero is clearly not appropriate. Since the extreme case of a very high elasticity of
substitution will be created in any case as it is the psychometric measure, a relatively
low elasticity of substitution of e.g. β = 2, arbitrary as it is, might be a value that yields
additional insights on the robustness of the results if a compositional measure instead
of a psychometric measure is used.
As can be seen from table 4.5, the summary statistics for the four thus created
indicators do not show a great deal of variation. When testing hypotheses in section
4.3, the number of observations is reduced by a small amount due to missing data
entries for some respondents.
Measure Obser-
vations
Mean Std.
Dev.
Employed respondents’ indicator, Psychometric 424 0.17 0.74
Employed respondents’ indicator, Compositional 424 0.12 0.65
Non-retired respondents’ indicator, Psychometric 691 0.05 0.78
Non-retired respondents’ indicator, Compositional 691 0.11 0.70
Table 4.5: Summary statistics of the four measures for social capital in the work sphere
There may be good arguments for both using a psychometric or a compositional
measure for social capital in the work sphere. The high degree of internal consistency
of the psychometric measure on the one hand and the necessary degree of arbitrari-
ness when selecting the elasticity of substitution for the compositional measure give a
slight edge to using a psychometric measure. Moreover, it has to be noted that the two
techniques yield remarkably similar results. Thus, to streamline presentation and to
make it consistent with the measure of social capital in the private sphere, the results
for the psychometric measure for work-related social capital will be given in the text,
while the results for the compositional measure can be found in the Appendix.
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4.3 Testing the Hypotheses on Determinants and Effects of Social
Capital
In section 2.5, a number of hypotheses concerning the predictors of individual level
social capital possession have been developed on a theoretical level. The aim of this
section is to test these hypotheses empirically using the social capital measures de-
scribed above. The proceeding in this section will be as follows: Firstly, the structure
used in section 2.5 will be picked up and the hypotheses concerning the different vari-
ables that were developed there will be restated. Then, it will be explained how the
variables under consideration have been assessed in the questionnaire. In a final step,
the empirical result will be presented. Not all numerical results will be presented here
but only a selected number. Technically, a baseline model is used which can be found
in the appendix. Not all possible predictors are included in this baseline model, but
only those which turn out to be significant at one point or which need to be included for
technical reasons, e.g. when a variable is split into several dummies and no sensible
baseline category would result otherwise.
Although it is probable for a number of variables under investigation that they repre-
sent both determinants and effects of social capital simultaneously, i.e. that the two are
cross-determining each other, a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression can
be used. The reason is that this econometric method only measures whether there is
a correlation between any two variables. No detailed information on the direction of the
effect is needed. A weakness of OLS is that it treats the dependent variables as con-
tinuous. However, the results are largely robust when using ordered logit regression
instead. Thus, OLS is used. As is standard practice, dummies have been created for
the different levels of an independent variable when treating it as continuous did not
seem reasonable.
When testing hypotheses using empirical data, an important question is when a
hypothesis is accepted or rejected. When the null hypothesis is that there is no effect
as measured by the variable’s coefficient, the p-value gives the probability that the true
coefficient includes zero, i.e. one minus the p-value is the size of the confidence interval
that does not include zero. The maximum significance level set by the researcher
gives the value of the p-value for which any effect is deemed present, i.e. where the
null hypothesis is rejected and thus the accompanying hypothesis is accepted. In the
social sciences using data not from a laboratory, a 10% significance level is customary.
Thus, throughout this thesis, any effect which has a p-value smaller than or equal to
0.10 will be deemed significantly different from zero, i.e. a 10% significance level will
be used.
As already mentioned, the short article by Pena-Lo´pez and Sa´nchez-Santos (2017)
is the study closest to the research endeavour pursued in this thesis. Unfortunately,
there is little transparency on the items they use to assess predictors of social capital
possession in their publication. Moreover, they consider a much smaller set of possible
predictors. However, where there is an overlap with the predictors also used by Pena-
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Lo´pez and Sa´nchez-Santos (ibid.), it will be pointed out whether the results found in
this thesis and the results found by Pena-Lo´pez and Sa´nchez-Santos (2017) in Spain
coincide.
4.3.1 Demographic Variables
As section 2.5.1, this subsection will deal with the effects of a respondent’s age and
gender on his or her stock of individual level social capital. The two topics will be
discussed in turn.
Age Effects
The argument presented in section 2.5.1 was that social capital is in principle increas-
ing with increasing age as respondents have more time to interact with other individuals
and thus create social capital. However, this effect is mediated by the fact that the avail-
able time is typically decreasing when individuals hold full-time jobs and start a family.
Moreover, as people grow old, many of the persons they hold social capital relations to
die and they themselves become unattractive people to form a social capital relation-
ship with as their remaining lifespan, and thus the payoff that can be expected from a
relationship to them, is relatively low, thus reducing their social capital. The research
hypothesis would thus be that social capital is decreasing especially in old age.
Age was directly measured in the questionnaire. The respondents were given seven
response options when asked for their age. Thus, more information was extracted than
was necessary to check whether the population was representative for the German
adult resident population as depicted in table 4.1, where six categories sufficed. The
distribution of the different age groups for seven categories is as follows:
Age group Share of Respondents
18-23 years 6.29%
23-29 years 10.49%
30-39 years 14.29%
40-49 years 18.38%
50-59 years 18.28%
60-69 years 13.19%
more than 70 years 19.08%
Table 4.6: Distribution of the respondents in different age groups
When treating age as a continuous variable, no age related effects can be found in
the data. It is, however, worthwhile to create three additional dummies: One for young
respondents, i.e. those with less than 30 years of age, one for respondents between
50 and 70 years of age and one for old respondents with more than 70 years of age.
Even with those dummies, there is no significant age effect on the stock of social
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capital in the private realm in the baseline model. This is a direct consequence of also
including whether people are retired in the model. 89.51% of the respondents who are
retired are older than 60 years. However, there is a highly significant negative effect of
being retired on a respondent’s social capital in the private realm (Coefficient: -0.24,
p-value <0.001). This can easily be interpreted as an age effect.
In the work sphere, there is no effect for young respondents, i.e. those under 30
years of age. However, there is a negative age effect for those respondents between
50 and 70 years in all indicators: Apparently, individuals find it difficult to maintain their
job-related network as they grow older. This finding of course fits with the fact that
people above 50 face more difficulties on the labor market, e.g. when trying to reenter
after a job loss [Wanberg et al. (2016)]. The results can be seen in table 4.7. The
dummy for respondents over 70 years of age has not been used in connection with
work related social capital as 181 out of 191 respondents over 70 years of age are
retired and thus not active in the work sphere.
Measure Coefficient p-value
Employed respondents’ indicator -0.156 0.046
Non-retired respondents’ indicator -0.11 0.056
Table 4.7: Effects for the age group 50-70 in the work-related social capital measures
What can be seen is that, as has been expected from theoretical considerations and
also found by Pena-Lo´pez and Sa´nchez-Santos (2017), the stock of social capital is
declining from a certain age onwards. This effect sets in earlier in the work sphere
than in the private sphere. This is consistent with the theory insofar as a respondent’s
involvement in the work life typically ends before his death.
Gender Effects
The research hypothesis developed in section 2.5.1 was that there should be no gen-
der effect per se. Rather, what should be expected is that women who live the tra-
ditional role model might have either more or less social capital: more social capital
because housewives should have more time to interact with others and thus build so-
cial capital and less social capital because the workplace is a good place to get to
know and interact with people. Of course, this reasoning should in principle also be
true for househusbands. Finally, women who are active in the work sphere but also
have household duties should have either more or less social capital: more, because
they do not have the potential disadvantage of housewives of not having colleagues in
the workplace and less, because these women potentially have very little free time in
which they could build social capital.
6The coefficients given throughout this chapter should not be interpreted beyond their algebraic sign
as no interpretation of the absolute values of the social capital indicators takes place for the reasons
outline on page 136.
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Gender was directly measured in the questionnaire. As stated in table 4.1, 51.05%
of respondents were female. Moreover, respondents were asked for their occupation.
6.09% of the respondents stated that they were either househusband or housewife. Of
these, 7.02%, i.e. 0.40% of the total survey sample, are male. Finally, an indicator for
employed women with other duties has been constructed: It encompasses women who
are either employed, self-employed or on maternity leave and who live in a household
with more people than just their partner. This is, of course, a rough measure. The
assumption behind this is that the other people in the household are either a child or
an elderly parent who needs care and that this care is done by the women. 11.59% of
respondents have thus been identified as employed women with other duties.
As expected and also found by Pena-Lo´pez and Sa´nchez-Santos (2017), there is no
significant effect of being female in any indicator. Moreover, there is no effect of being
an employed women with other duties instead of simply checking for being female in
any measure. However, there is a negative effect of being a housewife or househus-
band on the stock of social capital in the private sphere. There is also a negative effect
on social capital in the work sphere in the two indicators where housewives and house-
husbands are included, i.e. the non-retired respondents’ indicators. This can be seen
in table 4.8
Measure Coefficient p-value
Social Capital in the Private Sphere -0.2116 0.007
Social Capital in the Work Sphere
Non-retired respondents’ indicator -0.20 0.035
Table 4.8: Effects of being a housewife or househusband on the different social capital
measures
The conclusion would thus be that Putnam’s (2000) argument that the role of the
housewife can be socially isolating is correct. Although there is a strong theoretical
and, as will be shown below, empirically plausible argument that time is important in
creating social capital, housewives and househusbands apparently lack the access
to resourceful contacts to use the time they potentially have, because of their lack of
involvement in the labor market, to create social capital.
4.3.2 The Capital Analogy
Based on section 2.5.2, this section will discuss the effects of a respondent’s stock of
other capital, his investment behaviour and his attitude towards a norm of reciprocity
on his stock of social capital.
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The Stock of Other Capital
In section 2.5.2, no clear-cut research hypothesis on the effects of the stock of a re-
spondent’s human or economic capital on his stock of social capital has been formu-
lated. Two positions have been put forward. In favor of a complementarity between
social capital and other capital, it can be argued that having a higher stock of other
capital makes a respondent a more attractive person to know. This makes it easier for
him to build social ties and thus, ceteris paribus, increases his stock of social capital. In
favor of a substitutability between social capital and other capital, it can be argued that
having a higher stock of other capital lowers the respondent’s dependency on social
capital. The reason is that he can do more things himself or buy them on the market.
Moreover, especially a higher level of human capital increases his opportunity cost of
time, which is an important factor in social capital creation, as will be shown below.
To simplify things, when investigating into the empirical evidence, it will firstly be
looked at human capital and afterwards at economic capital.
To measure the respondents’ human capital, their educational status has been as-
sessed in the questionnaire. In addition to the five categories already presented in
table 4.1 used to ensure the representativeness of the survey, a sixth category has
been assessed: In Germany, after 12 or 13 years of schooling, two types of degrees
can be achieved: A higher one, the Abitur, which in principle allows a pupil to study
any subject at any university, and a lower one, the Fachabitur. The latter only allows a
pupil to study a certain range of subjects, often only at universities of applied sciences.
The accordingly differentiated participant data can be seen in table 4.9.
Educational Attainment Share of Respon-
dents
No degree 1.40%
Secondary degree with 8 or 9 school years 37.66%
Secondary degree with 10 school years 30.67%
Secondary degree with 12 or 13 school years (Fachabitur ) 4.30%
Secondary degree with 12 or 13 school years (Abitur ) 8.99%
Tertiary degree 16.98%
Table 4.9: Share of respondents by highest educational degree
Of course, it can be argued that human capital accumulation continues after the end
of formal education, e.g. through work experience. However, since work experience
is typically highly correlated with age and involvement in the labor market, two fac-
tors which have an influence on the stock of social capital on their own, only formal
education has been used as a proxy for human capital in this thesis.
There is a highly significant and positive effect of a respondent’s human capital, if
measured as formal education, on his stock of social capital. This can be seen in table
4.10. This effect is robust with respect to the exact specification of the variable, i.e.
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whether education is measured as a continuous variable or whether e.g. two dummies,
one for tertiary education and one for less than 10 years of schooling, are used.
Measure Coefficient p-value
Social Capital in the Private Sphere 0.07 <0.001
Social Capital in the Work Sphere
Employed respondents’ indicator 0.10 <0.001
Non-retired respondents’ indicator 0.08 <0.001
Table 4.10: Effects of education on the different social capital measures
The conclusion concerning human capital would thus be that Bourdieu (1983) is cor-
rect in his argument that individuals who possess more resources are more attractive
people to know and hence find it easier to create social capital. Apparently, the in-
creased opportunity costs of time that come with a higher level of human capital do not
outweigh these benefits. This empirical result is also in line with that by Pena-Lo´pez
and Sa´nchez-Santos (2017).
To measure the respondents’ economic capital, the straightforward way would be to
assess their wealth. To do so, three questions have been included in the question-
naire: Firstly, respondents were asked whether they possess real estate and what the
approximate value of this real estate is. Secondly, respondents were asked whether
they possess financial assets and what their approximate value is. Thirdly, respondents
were asked whether they have debts. Since talking about financial assets and liabili-
ties is considered a no-go in parts of the German population, each question included
a response option that stated that the respondent has real estate, financial assets or
debts, but does not know how much they are worth. The aim was to give respondents
who did not want to talk about their wealth an option to skip this answer without lying
or aborting the entire questionnaire.
Response Option Real Estate Financial Assets Debts
no real estate / no debts 55.34% n.a. 57.54%
less than 2 000 Euro n.a. 33.17% 6.29 %
2 000 - 19 999 Euro n.a. 27.67 % 14.09%
20 000 - 79 999 Euro 4.90%7 18.28% 9.69%
80 000 - 249 999 Euro 19.58% 8.09% 7.09%
250 000 - 599 999 Euro 13.89% 1.90% 1.50%
600 000 - 999 999 Euro 1.20% 0.70 % 0.00%
1 000 000 Euro and more 0.70% 0.50% 0.00%
Cannot estimate the value 4.40% 9.69% 3.80%
Table 4.11: Wealth of the respondents
7for real estate, the category was less than 80 000 Euro
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Thus, what can be created without making too many assumptions or loosing too
many observations is a variable that states whether a respondent has any wealth or
not. This is the case either if his combined wealth from real estate and financial assets
is larger than his debts or if he has either any financial assets or any real estate and
no debts at all. This definition of having any wealth nicely splits the sample into two
halves: 50.35% of respondents have any wealth according to this definition.
There is a highly significant positive effect of wealth possession on social capital in
the private sphere. There is, however, no comparable effect on social capital in the
work sphere in any of the four measures.
To rule out that this is an effect of the measure used, data on the respondent’s income
has been used to test for the robustness of this finding. The distribution of income of
respondents has been given in table 4.1. In addition to the data requirements needed
to test for the representativeness of the sample, respondents with more than 5 000
Euro net income per month have been asked whether they also earn more than 10 000
Euro. 3.60% of all respondents stated that they earn more than 10 000 Euro.
In principle, using income instead of wealth as a measure for a respondent’s eco-
nomic capital is problematic since income is a flow measure and does not measure
a capital stock. However, the assumption would be that there is a positive correlation
between income and the access to economic capital. The advantage of using income
instead of wealth is that the income measure is of higher quality since respondents did
not have the option to de facto not answer the question, i.e. there is information on
different levels of access to economic capital available. However, it should be kept in
mind that something different than wealth is measured.
When using income as a continuous variable instead of the dummy variable whether
there is any wealth present, there is a significant and positive effect on a respondent’s
social capital in the work sphere for the employed respondents’s indicator.
Measure Any Wealth Income
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Social Capital in the Private Sphere 0.08 0.029 0.03 0.033
Social Capital in the Work Sphere
Employed respondents’ indicator 0.02 0.778 0.06 0.026
Non-retired respondents’ indicator 0.01 0.829 0.03 0.115
Table 4.12: Effects of different measures for economic capital
As can be seen, it is unambiguous that there is a positive effect of economic capital
possession on private level social capital. For work level social capital, such an effect
can only be found when looking at employed respondents and when using income as a
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proxy. Here, however, two things have to be kept in mind: Firstly, it is possible that the
story is the other way around: It is not economic capital, that would be measured by
wealth possession, that triggers social capital in the job sphere, but rather social capital
in the job sphere that leads to higher incomes, independent of the respondent’s wealth.
Secondly, income is also a measure for occupational status, i.e. for a respondent
with high income, it is not only the respondent’s economic capital that makes him an
attractive person to build a social capital relationship to. It is also the fact that he
probably occupies a relatively high position.
Summing up, there is an effect of occupational status on a respondent’s social capital
since a person higher up in the hierarchy is a more attractive person to have a social
capital relationship with. Moreover, if there is an effect of income, it is probable that the
causality is such that respondents who have a large stock of work-related social capital
can use this stock to increase their income. There is no effect of possessing any wealth
on the respondents work-related social capital. Such an effect is only present for private
level social capital. Pena-Lo´pez and Sa´nchez-Santos (2017), who do not differentiate
between private and work related social capital, also find a positive income effect in
most of their models, but do not test for wealth.
Investment Behavior
The hypothesis developed in chapter 2.5.2 was that little open investment behaviour in
social capital takes place as it is socially condemned, especially in the private sphere.
If there is such behaviour, then it should be expected in the work sphere where it is
deemed to be more acceptable. If people purposefully invest in social capital in the
private sphere, this investment may be unconscious or well-concealed.
Two variables have been created to assess whether people consciously or uncon-
sciously invest in social capital. To test for unconscious investment, respondents have
been asked two questions: firstly, whether they sometimes deliberately look for new
friends or contact old friends to which they had lost contact and, secondly, whether
they sometimes contact people so that they do not lose contact. These two variables
have been used as to create a psychometric measure for unconscious investment.
To test for conscious investment, two further questions have been used. One asked
whether the respondent sometimes stays in contact with people because it might be
helpful to know them and the second question asked whether the respondent has ac-
tually tried to become friends with another person because it might one day be helpful
to know him. These two variables have been used to create a psychometric measure
for conscious investment. The answer pattern to these questions is given in table 4.13.
What can already be seen from the descriptive data is that there is indeed a strong
taboo on trying to befriend a person because it might be useful: almost half of the
respondent said that they had never done this in the past.
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Value Look for new
friends or
contact old
friends
Contact peo-
ple to stay in
touch
Stay in con-
tact because
person might
be useful
Try to befriend
because per-
son might be
useful
very often 3.40% 5.89% 2.80% 1.90%
often 11.19% 18.98% 8.69% 4.70 %
sometimes 40.36% 50.45% 29.67% 15.78%
rarely 33.07% 17.98% 32.87% 28.27%
never 11.59% 5.69% 25.57% 48.75%
Table 4.13: Investment behaviour of respondents in social capital
In the data, the following effects were found: In the private sphere, there is a neg-
ative effect of conscious investment, i.e. the purposeful creation of social capital by
keeping contact with other people because it might be useful to know them does not
actually help to create social capital. There is, however, a positive effect of uncon-
scious investment, i.e. people who care for keeping up their contacts without explicitly
stating that they do so because it might be useful have more social capital in the pri-
vate sphere. This finding is consistent with the argument by Esser (2008) that having
friends because it might be useful one day is socially unacceptable.
Measure Unconscious Conscious
Investment Investment
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Social Capital in the Private Sphere 0.02 0.092 -0.04 0.063
Social Capital in the Work Sphere
Employed respondents’ indicator 0.03 0.205 0.12 0.002
Non-retired respondents’ indicator 0.04 0.046 0.12 <0.001
Table 4.14: Effect of conscious and unconscious investment
In the work sphere, the effect of unconscious investment is still positive when looking
at all respondents who are not in pension. When looking only at employed respondents,
i.e. excluding non- and self-employed respondents, the effect is no longer significant.
What is more interesting is that the effect of conscious investment is positive and highly
significant here. Apparently, it is more acceptable in the world of work to keep contacts
purely for utility reasons. This is in line with the expectations of Coleman (1990) and
Kadushin (2004).
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Summing up, it is apparent that investment in social capital takes place. While un-
conscious investment has a positive effect on both kinds of social capital, conscious
investment is only helpful when it comes to social capital in the work sphere. In the
private sphere, its effect is negative. This is probably because it is socially unaccept-
able to befriend people because they might be useful. This is not to say that it does not
take place and might not work out. However, people who openly talk about doing this
in a questionnaire might also fail to conceal their intentions on other occasions, thus
violating the condition put up by Esser (2008) on making friends because they might
be useful: if it is done, it must be very well concealed.
The Norm of Reciprocity
In section 2.5.2, the hypothesis developed was that the effects of a respondent’s agree-
ment to two different forms of reciprocity are as follows: For continuation reciprocity, i.e.
reciprocity that aims at the continuation of a relationship where favors are not balanced
immediately, a positive effect on the social capital stock was expected. For balanced
reciprocity, i.e. reciprocity that aims at the immediate annihilation of outstanding favors,
no or a negative effect on the social capital stock was expected.
To measure the attitude of the respondents towards the two forms of reciprocity,
two items have been used: To assess continuation reciprocity, the respondents were
confronted with the statement that friendship is a give and take. The response options
represented a five-point Likert scale that ranged from “completely agree” to “completely
disagree”. Ko¨vecses (1995) interprets this statement in everyday use to signify the
reciprocal basis of friendships. Since friendships are social relationships that are made
to last, agreeing to this statement is interpreted to signify that the respondent believes
in continuation reciprocity in social relationships.
For balanced reciprocity, the item that has been used to assess the attitude of the
respondents is a statement that one has the feeling of being indebted after receiving
a favor. This question aims at assessing the feeling of guilt adherents of balanced
reciprocity feel after receiving a favor. In order to free themselves from this feeling of
guilt, they try to immediately balance their account of credit slips by redeeming the
favor. This, together with the feeling of guilt, is of course not helpful in creating long-
lasting obligations.
Value Continuation Reciprocity Balanced Reciprocity
strongly agree 57.04% 17.28%
somewhat agree 31.27% 36.46%
neither agree nor disagree 8.89% 23.68%
somewhat disagree 1.70% 15.08%
strongly disagree 0.70% 7.19%
Table 4.15: Attitudes towards different forms of reciprocity, Missing to 100%: No answer
150
4 Empirical Evidence
What can be seen from descriptive statistics already is that there is a very strong
adherence to continuation reciprocity among respondents. Almost 90% of respondents
agree to the statement used to assess it. Agreement is more mixed towards balanced
reciprocity.
In the data, there is no significant effect of continuation reciprocity as can be seen
from table 4.16. There is a negative effect of balanced reciprocity on a respondent’s
social capital in the private sphere. This effect is also present in the work sphere for
the non-retired respondent’s indicator when the compositional measure is used, this
being the only noticeable difference in the results between using a psychometric and
a compositional measure. In both cases, the variable created is a dummy that is one
only if respondents strongly agree to the statement. If a continuous variable is used
instead of the dummy, the nature of the results does not change.
Measure Continuation Balanced
Reciprocity Reciprocity
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Social Capital in the Private Sphere 0.05 0.203 -0.12 0.014
Social Capital in the Work Sphere
Employed respondents’ indicator 0.05 0.425 -0.05 0.512
Non-retired respondents’ indicator 0.03 0.533 -0.07 0.230
Table 4.16: Effect of adhering to different types of reciprocity
Summing up, the expected negative effect of balanced reciprocity can be found, at
least up to a certain extent. That no positive effect of continuation reciprocity is found
might very well be due to the skewness of the answers to this item. If almost everyone
adheres to continuation reciprocity, it may be difficult to find a significant statistical
effect due to missing differences among respondents with respect to this point.
4.3.3 Social Networks
This section picks up the topics from section 2.5.3 and tests the hypotheses developed
there. Specifically, it will be looked at the role of the private social network, workplace
effects, effects of group membership and the effects of social network sites in turn.
Role of Time Spent in the Private Social Network
The hypothesis developed in section 2.5.3 was that respondents who spend more time
with their social network, i.e. their family and friends, have more social capital. The idea
is simply that time is a very important factor in social capital production. The reasoning
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is that social capital is mostly based on thick ties between individuals and that these
do not develop quickly.
Value Relatives Friends
0 hours 17.28% 10.39%
1 hour 27.87% 21.58%
2 hours 22.68% 21.88%
3 - 4 hours 16.68% 24.78%
5 - 7 hours 7.69% 11.79%
8 - 10 hours 3.40% 5.79%
more than 10 hours 4.40% 3.80%
Table 4.17: Time spent with relatives and friends in an average week
To measure this aspect, two items have been used. A first item asks for the time the
respondent spends in an average week with meeting, writing or calling his relatives.
A second item asks the same question for the respondent’s friends. The descriptive
statistics for the items are given in table 4.17. In the end, it is not relevant whether
the respondent rather spends his time with his family or his friends, but the total time
he spends with his social contacts, irrespective of being related to them or not. The
variable to measure this time spent with social contacts has been constructed as fol-
lows: The time spent with relatives and with friends in an average week is added up.
For intervals, midpoints have been used, i.e. 3.5 hours if the respondent used the re-
sponse option “3 - 4 hours”. For the highest response option, i.e. more than 10 hours,
10 hours have been used as a conservative estimate. The results are robust to using
conservative, i.e. lower bound, estimates throughout.
Measure Coefficient p-value
Social Capital in the Private Sphere 0.04 <0.001
Social Capital in the Work Sphere
Employed respondents’ indicator 0.03 <0.001
Non-retired respondents’ indicator 0.03 <0.001
Table 4.18: Effects of time spent with relatives and friends on the different social capital
measures
The time spent with friends and relatives is, as theory predicts, a highly significant
predictor for the respondent’s stock of social capital. This is true for social capital in the
private sphere as well as in the work sphere. The results can be seen in table 4.18
The conclusion would be that, just as Bourdieu (1983) predicts, time is a highly
important factor in social capital creation.
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Workplace Effects
The hypothesis developed in chapter 2.5.3 about workplace effects on social capital
in the work sphere is clear: A lack of such social capital may actually be the cause
for unemployment. No clear hypothesis was developed in chapter 2.5.3 concerning
workplace effects on private level social capital. While some authors argue that the
workplace is a good place to get to know people and to maintain social contacts and
thus to build social capital, the opposite argument would be that the unemployed have
more free time to build social capital and would need social capital as a substitute for
dwindling economic capital.
To measure employment effects, respondents have been asked for their occupational
status. The results of this item are given in table 4.19. Originally, 5.00% of respondents
reported that they have an “other” type of occupation. After controlling for their answer
in the associated text box, 80% could be assigned to one of the other 10 categories.
For 1.00% of the sample, a new category “unable to work” has been created due to
their answers in said text box.
Occupational Status Share of Respondents
Self-employed with not more than one employee 5.49%
Self-employed with two or more employees 1.30%
Employee in the public sector or civil servant 8.99%
Employee in the private sector 35.26%
In education or study 5.79%
Registered as unemployed 4.50%
In pension / retired 30.77%
On maternity leave 0.70%
In military or voluntary service 0.00%
Housewife / househusband 6.19%
Unable to work 1.00%
Table 4.19: Share of respondents by occupational status
The effects of being outside the labor force as a housewife or househusband have
already been investigated in section 4.3.1. The effects of being a pensioner have
already been investigated in section 4.3.1 in connection with age effects since the
correlation coefficient between the highest age category and being a pensioner is very
high (0.6766). Thus, what remains is looking at the self-employed, the unemployed
and those in education or study.
Concerning the self-employed, what can be found is that, vis-a`-vis the employed,
there is no significant difference in private level social capital for them, but they have
a higher work-related social capital. This is not a surprising result as especially their
network can be expected to help them to recruit customers. What can be seen in ta-
ble 4.20 is that unemployed respondents have less social capital vis-a`-vis employed
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respondents in both the private and the work sphere. In the private sphere, the con-
clusion would be that the social contacts made in the workplace and the resources
acquired there, which are both lacking for the unemployed, outweigh their benefits of
having more free time to build social capital and their higher dependency on it. The
effect has been expected in the work sphere: Had the unemployed respondents more
social capital here, i.e. someone who could place them in a job, they would possibly not
be unemployed. For students, a similar effect can be observed regarding social capital
in the works sphere. It is probable that they lack access to social capital in the work
sphere because they have never or only marginally been involved in it. The finding that
respondents active in the work sphere have a higher level of social capital is also found
by Pena-Lo´pez and Sa´nchez-Santos (2017).
Measure Self- Unemployed Education
employed or Study
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
p-
va
lu
e
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
p-
va
lu
e
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
p-
va
lu
e
Social Capital in the Private
Sphere
-0.12 0.117 -0.17 0.061 -0.13 0.139
Social Capital in the Work Sphere
NRRI8 0.16 0.042 -0.24 0.042 -0.43 <0.001
Table 4.20: Effects of being self-employed, unemployed or in education or study vis-a`-
vis being employed on the different social capital measures
Effects of Group and Organization Membership
The hypothesis developed in section 2.5.3 was that there should be a positive influence
of group membership on social capital and that this should be especially true for certain
groups that are rumoured to be particularly rich in social capital. However, it was also
argued that group membership alone is not a good tool to measure social capital,
although this is e.g. done by Putnam or Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2002).
To measure group membership, three items have been used: Firstly, individuals have
been asked in how many organisations they are an active member. The term active
was not precisely defined in the questionnaire, but it aimed at excluding organisations
from the list where respondent’s do not do more than paying their membership fees.
Respondents were given a number of examples what is meant by the term organiza-
tions, namely organizations that people belong to for leisure time endeavours: Leisure
time clubs such as sport clubs, music clubs, shooting clubs or heritage societies, citi-
zen action committies, parents’ associations, the local council, their church or voluntary
8Non-Retired Respondents’ Indicator
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fire fighters. Secondly, individuals were asked in how many of these organisations they
have a function, e.g. in youth work, as a trainer, as an officer, by collection donations
or by doing publicity work. The idea was that individuals who accept this responsabil-
ity have a higher commitment with their organisations and the people within and thus
have better access to social capital. The summary statistics for the responses to these
questions can be found in table 4.21. What can already be seen is that membership
in organizations is a difficult measure for social capital as almost two thirds of respon-
dents are not an active member in any organization and thus no information that could
be used to differentiate between these non-members’ respective social capital stocks
would be available.
Value Membership Function
0 organizations 63.54% 77.02%
1 organization 20.28% 18.08%
2 organizations 11.69% 4.00%
3 - 4 organizations 4.00% 0.90%
5 or more organizations 0.50% 0.00%
Table 4.21: Membership and function in organizations
Thirdly, individuals were confronted with a number of types of special organisations
which are supposedly especially helpful in creating social capital and were asked
whether they are a member of any of them. The list included student fraternities,
Rotary- and Lions Clubs and similar charity organisations, soldiers- and veterans clubs,
parties and political organisations and organizations that can only be joined by invita-
tion. Additionally, respondents were asked whether they had been awarded a schol-
arship during their studies. The organizations that provide these scholarships typically
also invest in connecting their scholarship holders, thus creating resourceful networks.
All in all, 17.78% of respondents are members of at least one such a special organiza-
tion or received a scholarship. The distribution of membership in the specific organiza-
tion types can be seen in table 4.22.
Type of Organization Share of Respondents
Fraternity 1.60%
Rotary- or Lions Club or similar charity organization 3.30%
Soldiers- and veterans club 1.20%
Party or political organization 6.49%
Organization that can only be joined by invitation 7.89%
Received a scholarship 1.90%
Table 4.22: Share of respondents with membership in certain special types of organi-
zations
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When investigating into the data, there is little sense of looking at active membership
in organizations and holding a function in organizations separately as they are highly
correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.7162. Thus, only one of the two items,
namely active membership in organizations, will be used to measure organizational
membership effects as it is closer to the measure proposed by Putnam (2000).
What can be seen is that there is a positive effect of membership in organizaions on
a respondent’s social capital in the private sphere, but not in the work sphere. On the
other hand, there is a positive effect of special type organizations in the work sphere,
but not in the private sphere.
Measure Membership Member in a Spe-
in Organizations cial Organization
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Social Capital in the Private Sphere 0.07 0.003 0.01 0.864
Social Capital in the Work Sphere
Employed respondents’ indicator, Psy. -0.01 0.859 0.22 0.012
Employed respondents’ indicator, Comp. -0.03 0.402 0.18 0.019
Non-retired respondents’ indicator, Psy. 0.04 0.217 0.24 <0.001
Non-retired respondents’ indicator, Comp. 0.03 0.312 0.21 0.001
Table 4.23: Effect membership in organizations and special organizations vis-a`-vis
non-membership on the social capital stock
The conclusion would be that organizations that individuals join in their leisure time
to pursue their hobbies help them to create social capital in the private sphere. They
are not particularly helpful when it comes to creating social capital in the work sphere.
Apparently, there is too little overlap between the two realms. On the other hand, while
special type organizations apparently do not create relationships that are especially
helpful in the private sphere, membership in these organizations is very helpful in the
work sphere. It seems that, here, people come together who, although they mean
nothing special to each other on a personal level, are homogeneous and resourceful
enough to help out each other in the work sphere very effectively. A positive effect of
associational membership, which is also broadly expected by theory, is also found by
Pena-Lo´pez and Sa´nchez-Santos (2017), although they do not differentiate between
leisure time and special organizations.
Social Network Sites
The hypothesis developed in section 2.5.3 was that, if any, social network sites should
have a positive effect on a respondent’s social capital.
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There are two types of social networks: Firstly, private social networks, like Face-
book, tumblr and Instagram, where people connect with their friends primarily for pri-
vate reasons. Secondly, there are work-oriented social networks like Xing or LinkedIn.
Respondents were asked whether they are a member of such a network. While 66.53%
of the respondents were a member of a private social network, only 19.28% were a
member of a work-oriented social network.
Measure Coefficient p-value
Social Capital in the Private Sphere 0.08 0.035
Social Capital in the Work Sphere
Employed respondents’ indicator 0.10 0.176
Non-retired respondents’ indicator 0.08 0.194
Table 4.24: Effects of membership in social network sites on the different social capital
measures
Of course, the idea would be that membership in a private social network helps to
create private level social capital, while membership in a work-related social network
facilitates building work level social capital. Looking at the data, while there is a signif-
icant effect of private social network site membership in the private realm, there is no
significant effect of membership in work-related social network sites on the stock work
level social capital. The results can be seen in table 4.24
Response Option Affirmative
Answers
Private Social Network Sites
I wanted to find new friends 17.87%
I wanted to find old friends that I had lost contact to 59.16%
I wanted to stay in touch with my current friends 62.01%
I wanted to have the possibility to participate in other people’s lives 28.83%
Other 11.86%
Work Related Social Network Sites
I wanted to find a new job 43.01%
I wanted to increase my income 17.62%
I wanted to acquire new orders for my company 18.13%
I wanted to find new possibilities for cooperation 50.25%
I wanted to find a new employee 11.40%
Other 12.44%
Table 4.25: Motivation of joining of social network members
More insights can be gained when looking at the motives of membership in social
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networks. For both types of social networks, respondents who answered that they were
a member were asked for their motive for joining. The results are given in table 4.25
From these items, two variables have been created: Firstly a variable was created
for respondents who joined a private social network site with a motive of maintaining
or increasing their social network, i.e. who answered affirmatively to one of the first
three questions given in table 4.25. Moreover, respondents who answered other and
stated a reason that fits to one of these three motives were included. All in all, 57.34%
of total respondents or 86.19% of respondents who are member of a private social
network site fall into this category. Secondly, a variable was created for respondents
who joined a work related social network site and who answered affirmatively to any
of the motives listed (i.e. one of the lower five items starting with I wanted) or stated
something equivalent in the other -category. All in all, 17.48% of total respondents or
90.67% of respondents that are member of a private job network fall into this category.
Looking at the data, having such a motive when joining a social network site in-
creases a respondent’s stock of social capital in the private sphere and in the work
sphere. The results can be found in table 4.26
Measure Coefficient p-value
Social Capital in the Private Sphere 0.10 0.007
Social Capital in the Work Sphere
Employed respondents’ indicator 0.14 0.073
Non-retired respondents’ indicator 0.12 0.046
Table 4.26: Effects of investment motive of social network site membership on the dif-
ferent social capital measures
The conclusion would be that it is not mainly membership in social network sites
alone that helps to increase a respondent’s social capital (although this is also helpful
in the private sphere), but what he aims at using them for, i.e. if he wants to use it to
increase or maintain his social network. There is a close relationship to the investment
motives discussed above: People, although maybe unknowingly, invest in social capital
and this investment may well be effective. It is, however, not certain whether it is the
membership in social network sites which helps those people create social capital, or
whether it is their attitude towards increasing and maintaining their social networks
also in other parts of their life which is just reflected in their motive for joining a social
network site.
4.3.4 Geographical Effects
Referring to section 2.5.4, this section will pick up several effects that are, in the widest
sense of the word, geographical effects. This includes the effects of individual mobility,
migration effects, effects of originating from or living in eastern Germany and effects of
town size and centrality. All four aspects will be looked at in turn.
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Mobility
The hypothesis developed in section 2.5.4 was that there should be a negative effect of
individual mobility on the respondent’s stock of social capital: Moving away makes stay-
ing in touch with people more difficult, especially if people move away over a greater
distance.
To assess their individual degree of mobility, respondents were asked three ques-
tions: Firstly, whether they still live in the same place where they visited their elemen-
tary school, i.e. where they are probably rooted since the days of their childhood.
36.56% of respondents still live in the same place where they visited their elemen-
tary school at. Secondly, respondents were asked whether they moved to their current
place of residence from another village or town in the last five years. 24.08% of re-
spondents affirmed this. Thirdly, respondents were asked how far their last place of
residence was away. The results are given in table 4.27.
Answer Share of Respondents
Has never lived at another place 21.38%
1 - 20 kilometres 32.67%
21 - 100 kilometres 21.88%
more than 100 kilometres 24.08%
Table 4.27: Distance to their last place of residence
In the data, there is no effect whether someone never lived elsewhere or already went
to the elementary school in the same town. There is also no effect when someone
moved to his current place of residence in the last five years on private level social
capital. There is a slight negative effect, as would be expected, when looking at work
sphere social capital for the indicator that only looks at workers. The results can be
seen in table 4.28. The results are robust for looking at the effect of moving more than
20 kilometres in the last five years, which is true for 15.28 percent of the respondents.
Measure Coefficient p-value
Social Capital in the Private Sphere 0.00 0.975
Social Capital in the Work Sphere
Employed respondents’ indicator -0.12 0.079
Non-retired respondents’ indicator -0.05 0.334
Table 4.28: Effects of moving in the last five years on the different social capital mea-
sures
Summing up, there is a slight negative effect of moving in the work sphere for em-
ployed persons, but not in the private sphere. This may be because moving is often
also associated with a new employer, where old intra-firm ties often loose their value.
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This is also what separates the group in this indicator for work-related social capital
from the respondents included in the other work related social capital measure where
there are respondents included that have no intra-firm ties that can be lost.
Things are apparently different for private level ties, which either build up quicker or
do not get lost as abruptly in the first place. Here, new communication technologies
not imagined by Putnam (2000) or Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2002) at the be-
ginnings of the 2000s and the generally smaller distances in Germany compared to the
US, where they undertook their research, might play a role. Pena-Lo´pez and Sa´nchez-
Santos (2017) even find a positive effect of mobility. However, they are themselves
surprised by this finding and struggle to make up an explanation.
Migration Effects
In section 2.5.4, no clear-cut hypothesis on migration effects could be formulated. In
any case, effects are expected to be limited to ethnic communities that exhibit a high
degree of closure. Here, resource rich communities can be a source of social capital for
the migrants included in them, while communities poor in resources can be detrimental
to the respondent’s social capital stock.
Answer Share of Respondents
Yes, I 5.59%
Yes, my mother 7.09%
Yes, my father 8.09%
Table 4.29: Migration background of respondents
To measure their migration background, each respondents was asked whether he
or any of his parents have or had in the past a different nationality than German. The
answer to this question can be found in table 4.29. In total, 10.39% of respondents
have a migrations background. If late repatriates9 are added, which, together with
their descendants, comprise 5.99% of the sample, the share of people with migration
background rises to 13.79%. Late repatriates sometimes deny the non-German part of
their background but are assumed to have a migration background by definition of the
German Federal Statistical Office. What can be noticed is that the share of respondents
with migration background in the sample is lower than in the actual population, where
it was 21.0% in 2015 according to Statistisches Bundesamt (2016).
Moreover, the respondents who answered affirmatively to any of the items above
were asked which other nationality they have or had in the past. Since the abso-
lute numbers are often very small, it seems sensible to sort the respondents into five
groups: firstly, respondents with an origin from a German speaking country or with
German roots, i.e. late repatriates. Secondly, respondents with a western European
9Late repatriates are people of German descent that were not expelled after World War II and migrated
to Germany from Eastern Europe after 1945.
160
4 Empirical Evidence
origin, including Greece. Thirdly, respondents with an eastern European origin and
from successor countries of the former Soviet Union, also including late repatriates.
Thus, late repatriates are included in two categories, which is appropriate given that
they do have German roots, but are often heavily influenced by the eastern European
countries they or their predecessors lived in. Fourthly, people from Turkey. Fifthly,
people from elsewhere in the World.
Answer Share of Respondents
German 10.29%
Western Europe, including Greece 2.50%
Eastern Europe and former USSR 8.09%
Turkey 0.90%
Rest of World 1.50%
Undisclosed 0.10%
Table 4.30: Migration Background of the Respondents by Origin
In the data, there is virtually no effect of having a migration background on any sort
of social capital. This is true for looking at having a migration background in general as
well as having a specific migration background. The results for the latter are given in
table 4.31.
Measure German Western Europe Eastern Europe
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SCPS10 -0.14 0.130 -0.08 0.522 0.12 0.218
Social Capital in the Work Sphere
ERI -0.09 0.488 -0.14 0.412 0.06 0.683
NRRI 0.04 0.691 0.02 0.875 -0.07 0.561
Measure Turkey Other
SCPS11 0.09 0.625 0.18 0.299
Social Capital in the Work Sphere
ERI 0.50 0.088 0.23 0.410
NRRI 0.29 0.201 -0.11 0.551
Table 4.31: Effect of migration background on the stock of social capital
The sole exception is a Turkish migration background in the form of work-related
social capital where only employed persons are investigated, where a just significantly
positive effect is present. However, given that there are only six employed respondents
10SCPS: Social Capital in the Private Sphere, ERI: Employed respondents’ indicator, NRRI: Non-retired
respondents’ indicator
11SCPS: Social Capital in the Private Sphere, ERI: Employed respondents’ indicator, NRRI: Non-retired
respondents’ indicator,
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with a Turkish migration background in the sample, it is questionable whether this effect
is really more than a statistical anomaly. Pena-Lo´pez and Sa´nchez-Santos (2017)
find a positive effect of nationality, however, they regretably do not explain what they
measure under this label, i.e. whether it is Spanish or foreign nationality.
There are three possible explanations for this: Firstly, maybe the members of close-
knit ethnic communities do not participate in an online questionnaire in German, i.e. are
not included in the sample. This could be due to a language barrier. Secondly, maybe
they do participate in the sample but their absolute numbers are so small that they are
not grasped by the relatively rough categorization into regions of origin. Thirdly, maybe
the benefits and disadvantages of being a member of such a community simply cancel
out and thus no significant effect results.
The Berlin Wall Experiment
The hypothesis developed in section 2.5.4 was that if there is an effect of the commu-
nist reign in eastern Europe, it should be that those people subject to these regimes
have fewer ties all in all, but thicker ties. Since the measure of social capital used
here measures resources that are preferably accessed via thick ties, the hypothesis
is thus that people from such countries should have more social capital. Germany is
unique in the sense that the area of the former GDR in the eastern parts of today’s
Germany formerly was a communist country, while the western regions were a liberal
style democracy.
To assess the county in which people live, they were asked for a specific identifying
part of the licence plates issued there. Thus, respondents were sorted into 16 states,
which could then again be used to assess whether they live in eastern or western
Germany. Respondents from Berlin were assumed to live in western Germany. With
this measure, 14.97% of respondents come from east Germany. Since Germany is
a reunified country since 1990, it was also important to assess whether there is an
effect of being socialized in the GDR. Thus, an indicator was formed for people that
were older than 40 years, live in the GDR and claim that they never lived elsewhere
was created. This holds true for 2.60% of respondents. Of course, this indicator only
grasps a small fraction of those respondents that were socialized in the GDR. It should,
however, capture the effect aimed for.
In the data, no significant effects can be found for being socialized in the GDR.
There is a positive effect for employed respondents’ work-related social capital that is
just significant. The results can be seen in table 4.32.
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Measure Living in Socialized
the East in the GDR
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Social Capital in the Private Sphere 0.03 0.527 -0.02 0.886
Social Capital in the Work Sphere
Employed respondents’ indicator 0.15 0.097 -0.35 0.169
Non-retired respondents’ indicator 0.09 0.194 -0.20 0.254
Table 4.32: Effect of living or originating in eastern Germany
Apparently, almost one generation after the German reunification, the differences be-
tween eastern and western Germany are no longer as big, at least if it comes to social
capital possession. If there has been an effect of communist dictatorship on the social
capital people build, it has waned so far, and people have moved from east to west and
vice versa so much, that it is no longer measurable. That employed respondents in
eastern Germany have a higher level of work-related social capital may be due to the
inferior job market situation in these parts of the country: Maybe, in order to actually
become employed, a higher level of work-related social capital is necessary in the first
place.
Differences between City and Countryside
In section 2.5.4, the hypothesis developed was that networks with closure were more
likely to develop in smaller towns and that, thus, social capital should be higher in small
villages.
Two items were used to gather data on this question. Firstly, respondents were asked
how big the town they live in is. The results are given in table 4.33.
Answer Share of Respondents
Less than 2 000 inhabitants 9.59%
2 000 - 4 999 inhabitants 12.99%
5 000 - 19 999 inhabitants 21.38%
20 000 - 100 000 inhabitants 23.88%
More than 100 000 inhabitants 32.17%
Table 4.33: Distribution of the respondents by town size
Moreover, respondents were, as already mentioned above in connection with re-
spondents form eastern Germany, asked for the part of their licence plate that iden-
tifies their county. Thus, the classification into structural area types by the Federal
Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development could be
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used [Bundesinstitut fu¨r Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung (2014)]. The classification
sorts counties into four types: Cities that form a county of itself, urbanized counties,
counties with urbanized parts and rural counties. The respondents live in counties that
group into these four county types as depicted by table 4.34.
County Type Share of Respondents
Cities that form a county 11.16%
Urbanized county 17.69%
County with urbanized parts 37.39%
Rural county 33.77%
Table 4.34: Distribution of the respondents by town size
In the data, there is no linear effect of living in an urbanized or a rural county, where
a higher value means a more rural county. Also, there is no linear effect of town size,
where town size is increasing in the indicator. Additionally, it has been checked for
living in a large city with more than 500 000 inhabitants, which applies for 15.98% of
respondents. Here, there is also no effect. This is also true for living in a small town
with less than 5 000 inhabitants, which holds true for 43.96% of respondents. All these
results can be seen in table 4.35. Pena-Lo´pez and Sa´nchez-Santos (2017) do find a
positive effect of town size for instrumental and a negative effect for expressive action
resources, which they assess separately.
Measure Area Type Town Size Large City Small Town
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SCPS12 -0.01 0.560 -0.00 0.700 0.05 0.364 0.01 0.771
Social Capital in the Work Sphere
ERI, P -0.01 0.843 0.00 0.841 0.05 0.573 0.03 0.710
NRRI, P -0.02 0.323 -0.01 0.742 0.01 0.890 0.08 0.150
Table 4.35: Effect of town size and area type on the stock of social capital
Summing up, there is no effect of town size on a respondent’s social capital stock.
This may be due to the reasons already outlined in section 2.5.4: Many small towns
constitute mere suburbs and people living there de facto lead a life as though they
live in a big city, with their social contacts spread around a larger area. Moreover, the
size differences between small and big towns are not as pronounced in Germany as in
many other countries in the world: Less than a sixth of the sample lives in towns with
12SCPS: Social Capital in the Private Sphere, ERI: employed respondents’ indicator, NRRI: non-retired
respondents’ indicator
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more than 500 000 inhabitants, which is still a relatively small city by non-European
standards.
4.3.5 Intrinsic Reasons
The final set of variables is analyzed with respect to the effects of traits inherent in the
respondent on his social capital stock. As in section 2.5.5, it will firstly be looked at the
role of specific character traits before investigating into the role of life satisfaction.
Character Traits
In section 2.5.5, two hypotheses were formulated: Firstly, respondents who have a pref-
erence for being with others should have more social capital. Secondly, there should be
a character effect, where certain character traits, namely extraversion, agreeableness
and openness are supposed to be helpful in building social capital. The two aspects
will be discussed in turn.
To measure the preference for contact with others, two items have been included in
the questionnaire. For the private sphere, respondents were asked whether they like to
spend their leisure time together with others. For the work sphere, respondents were
asked whether they come into contact with many different people in their job. The idea
behind this last item is that the choice of the job also depends on the preference for
having contact with different people. Respondents who do not have such a preference
should more likely be found in a job where they do not have as much contact with
others. Due to an error in the questionnaire, this item was presented to all respondents
instead of only those respondents active in the work sphere. The summary statistic for
this item includes only the 695 respondents active in the work sphere. The summary
statistics for the answers to these two questions can be found in table 4.36.
Like to spent leisure
time with others
Agreement Come into contact with
different people in the
job
Agreement
Completely agree 5.21% very often 9.21 %
Somewhat agree 15.43% often 6.33%
Neither agree nor disagree 37.78% sometimes 16.26%
Somewhat disagree 31.66% rarely 27.05%
Completely disagree 9.92% very rarely 41.15%
Table 4.36: Preference for contact with others
What can be seen in the data is that there is a positive and highly significant effect
of the preference for contact with others on a respondent’s social capital stock. This
is true both for using the preference to spend leisure time with others in the private
sphere as a variable to determine private level social capital as well as for using the
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preference for a job where one gets in contact with many different people as a variable
for work related social capital.
Measure Coefficient p-value
Social Capital in the Private Sphere 0.09 <0.001
Social Capital in the Work Sphere
Employed respondents’ indicator 0.15 <0.001
Non-retired respondents’ indicator 0.11 <0.001
Table 4.37: Effects of respective preference preference for contact with others on the
different social capital measures
Regarding the character traits extraversion, agreeableness and openness, which
can be measured using the the Big Five personality inventory, items were taken from
the German version of the Ten Item Personality Inventory by Muck, Hell, and Gosling
(2007), which is based on the English version by Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann Jr.
(2003). The items to assess extraversion were, in Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann
Jr.’s (ibid.), “Extraverted, enthusiastic13” (p. 519) and “Reserved, quiet14” (ibid.). The
items to assess agreeableness were “Sympathetic, warm15” (ibid.) and “critical, quar-
relsome16” (ibid.). The items to assess openness were “Open to new experiences,
complex17” (ibid.) and “conventional, uncreative18” (ibid.). Respondents were asked
whether they see themselves as described by the respective adjectives.
All items were assessed using a seven-point Likert scale that ranged from “com-
pletely agree”, which was coded as one, to “completely disagree”, which was coded
as seven. The total score for both items was created reverse coding the first item for
each character trait and then adding them up and dividing them by two. Thus, a higher
value represents a higher score for this character trait. Summary statistics for the three
character traits under investigation can be found in table 4.38.
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Extraversion 4.08 1.30
Agreeableness 5.17 1.06
Openness 5.14 1.05
Table 4.38: Summary statistics for selected Big Five character traits
In the data, a positive and highly significant effect of extraversion can be found on
all social capital measures. The positive and significant effect of agreeableness can
13Muck, Hell, and Gosling (2007) translate this as “extravertiert, begeistert” (p. 170).
14Muck, Hell, and Gosling (ibid.) translate this as “zuru¨ckhaltend, still” (p. 170).
15Muck, Hell, and Gosling (ibid.) translate this as “versta¨ndnisvoll, warmherzig” (p. 170).
16Muck, Hell, and Gosling (ibid.) translate this as “kritisch, streitsu¨chtig” (p. 170).
17Muck, Hell, and Gosling (ibid.) translate this as “offen fu¨r neue Erfahrungen, vielschichtig” (p. 170).
18Muck, Hell, and Gosling (ibid.) translate this as “konventionell, unkreativ” (p. 170).
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only be found in the private sphere. This character trait does not seem to help much
in the work sphere, where a negative effect can be found that is significant when only
employed respondent’s are looked at and just no longer significant if all respondents
active in the work sphere are considered. There is no significant effect of openness on
any social capital measure. The results can be found in table 4.39.
Measure Extraversion Agreeableness Openness
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SCPS19 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.001 0.00 0.996
Social Capital in the Work Sphere
ERI 0.05 0.057 -0.06 0.063 -0.02 0.617
NRRI 0.04 0.025 -0.03 0.121 -0.01 0.758
Table 4.39: Effect of selected Big Five character traits on the respondent’s social capital
stock
Summing up, it is apparent that there is a strong relationship between a respondent’s
preference for contact with others and his social capital stock. Regarding the effects
of the different Big Five character traits, there is only a significantly positive effect of
extraversion on all measures for social capital. The effect of agreeableness is mixed,
with a positive effect in the private sphere, but a negative effect on work related social
capital. Maybe this is because being a compassionate person, which is described by
that character trait, may make a person a valuable friend, but being critical and less
open may be a more fruitful trait at the workplace.
Life Satisfaction
In section 2.5.5, the hypothesis was that there is a positive effect of life satisfaction on
a respondent’s social capital stock. It is just nicer to be in contact with happy people.
Response Option Private Life Satisfac-
tion
Job Satisfaction
Completely dissatisfied 0.90% 4.83%
Rather dissatisfied 8.09% 13.62%
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 14.49% 26.79
Rather satisfied 46.05% 35.43%
Completely satisfied 30.47% 19.33
Table 4.40: Private life and job satisfaction of the respondents
19SCPS: Social Capital in the Private Sphere, ERI: employed respondents’ indicator, NRRI: non-retired
respondents’ indicator
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The question there was more about the direction of the effect: Does being happy
make you a more attractive person to know, or is it the other way around?
To test this point, respondents were asked how satisfied they are with their life in
the private sphere and with their job. The latter item was erroneously presented to all
respondents. The answer is, of course, only purposeful for the 683 respondents who
were not in pension or unable to work. The answer pattern for these items can be found
in table 4.40. What can be seen is that most respondents were quite satisfied with their
private life. Respondents were, on average, less satisfied with their job.
Measure Coefficient p-value
Social Capital in the Private Sphere 0.10 <0.001
Social Capital in the Work Sphere
Employed respondents’ indicator 0.12 <0.001
Non-retired respondents’ indicator 0.12 <0.001
Table 4.41: Effects of private life satisfaction and job satisfaction on the respective so-
cial capital measures
Looking at the data, private life satisfaction is a highly significant and positive pre-
dictor for social capital in the private sphere and job satisfaction is a highly significant
positive predictor for all measures of work related social capital. The specific results
can be seen in table 4.41. Pena-Lo´pez and Sa´nchez-Santos (2017) also find a positive
effect of life satisfaction on a respondent’s social capital.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, the results of the empirical study have been presented. Firstly, some
descriptive data concerning the internet study has been presented. Then, the con-
struction of the different indicators for social capital has been discussed in detail. As
a consequence of the nature of the data and a low Cronbachs Alpha of the items to
assess social capital in the work sphere, a compositional and a psychometric measure
for both respondents who are employed and respondents who are not in pension have
been created. However, the results between them hardly differ, so that only the results
of the psychometric measure were included in the text while the results of the compo-
sitional measure can be found in the Appendix. For social capital in the private sphere,
only one psychometric indicator for all respondents has been constructed.
When investigating into the determinants, there are almost no differences between
the two different measures in the work sphere: The main difference appeared when
looking at the effects of individual mobility: Moving seems to have a greater effect on
employed respondents.
All in all, a high number of significant predictors for social capital have been found.
Most of them are in accordance with what would be expected from theory. This can be
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interpreted as a good sign for the validity of the measures developed and counteracts
internal consistency doubts on the work related social capital scales. Where the theory
has been ambiguous, the data often gives a clear answer which effect is stronger:
Social capital and other forms of capital are complements, not substitutes, and the
additional leisure time unemployed have does not outweigh the difficulties they have
in creating social capital because they lack the contacts from the workplace and the
economic resource gathered there.
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Three contributions to the social capital literature are presented in this thesis: Firstly, a
concept of social capital that is compatible with the individual perspective prominent in
neoclassical economics has been identified. Secondly, a new tool to measure individ-
ual social capital has been developed and applied. Thirdly, results on the distributional
effects of a great number of predictors on individual level social capital have been
obtained for a representative sample of the German resident population. Hence, an
answer has been worked out to the two research questions specified in the introduc-
tion, namely how individual level social capital can be assessed and which predictors
can be found for an individual’s social capital possession theoretically and empirically.
Identifying a concept of social capital that is compatible with an individual perspective
is not only important because the individual perspective is a cornerstone of neoclas-
sical economic theory. As Udehn (2001) points out, the individual perspective also
follows from the idea of “individual humanism.” (p. 340). With this specific focus,
the five most prominent social capital concepts by Bourdieu (1983), Burt (1992, 2000,
2005), Coleman (1988, 1990), Putnam (1993, 2000) and Fukuyama (1995, 1995) were
investigated. Moreover, applications of social capital by economists, namely those by
Becker (1974), Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2002) and Chou (2006) were looked
at. Reducing these authors’ understanding of the term social capital to a common
denominator, the result would be that “social networks have value” [Putnam (2000), p.
19]. Thus, a deeper analysis of the different concepts turned out to be necessary.
Given this thesis’ focus on the individual perspective, it was swiftly identified that the
concepts mainly differ in their level of analysis, i.e. the question whether social capital
is an asset for individuals or a property of larger entities as e.g. larger groups or even
entire societies. The approach by Burt is, without any doubt, the most individualistic
concept of social capital. Burt goes as far as recommending his readers which kinds
of relationships they should invest into to maximize their individual social capital. On
the other end of the spectrum, the concept of Fukuyama is the most holistic one. Here,
the benefits that accrue to an individual from his social connections are not under the
focus of investigation. Social capital is rather seen as an element of a society’s culture,
which is exogenous to individual behavior. The other three authors’ concepts are posi-
tioned between these two extremes. Especially Bourdieu thoroughly investigates into
individual level social capital creation and the consequences of its possession. Cole-
man also identifies this individual level aspect of social capital. However, on top of that,
he claims that norms at the macro level of the society can be seen as social capital.
Putnam puts even more focus on this latter aspect. The contributions by economists
that were investigated share that they restrain themselves to embedding some inter-
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pretation of social capital into existing economic models, irrespective of whether it is
thoroughly compatible with an individual perspective.
The contributions that focus on macro level aspects of social capital are problematic
from an individual perspective: The issue at stake is whether they can be derived from
the individual level using a convincing micro to macro transition. It has been shown
in this thesis that such a connection between individual level social capital and norms
as a form of social capital at the macro level, which is convincing from a perspective
of methodological individualism, has neither been formulated by Coleman nor by Put-
nam. Accordingly, Esser (2008) proposes to split social capital analytically into a micro
level component that he calls relational capital and a macro level component that he
calls system capital. The concept of relational capital was found to be plausible from
an individual perspective in the thesis. Thus, the following social capital definition by
Van Der Gaag and Snijders (2004), which focuses on individual level social capital,
was adopted: “The collection of resources owned by the members of an individual’s
personal social network, which may become available to the individual as a result of
the history of the relationships” (p. 155). In 2.4, it has been investigated whether such
a concept of social capital can also serve as a form of capital in economic theory. This
was confirmed, although it is different from economic capital in a number of ways. This
mainly concerned the question whether purposeful investment into it actually takes
place and the facts that it is not as easily alienable as economic capital (but this point
also exists for human capital), that its fungibility is limited and, since it is not protected
by the legal system, that its value depends on its being honored by others.
A second major focus of this thesis was to develop a new measure how individual
level social capital can be assessed. To do so, a thorough look has been taken at
indicator construction, specifically at psychometric and compositional measures, and
a list of resources that are identified as social capital resources in the literature has
been created. Building on these preconsiderations, a number of existing social capital
measures has been analyzed. These included the three most prominent measures,
namely the name, the position and the resource generator, but also a number of fur-
ther measures. All these measures share that they are imperfectly suited to assess
social capital as defined in this thesis. Specifically, the main weaknesses are: they
systematically over- or underestimate some specific form of ties, such as the position
generator does for weak ties, they put a very high cognitive burden on the respondent
such as the name generator and, up to a certain extent, the resource generator, or they
do not assess resources systematically such as the Internet Social Capital Scale, the
Personal Social Capital Scale, the World Bank Indicator and the Indicator included in
the German Socio-Economic Panel.
Taking the strengths of the different approaches, a new tool to measure individual
level social capital has been proposed in section 3.4. This tool has been designed
in order to create a measurement instrument that does not put a too high cognitive
burden on the respondent, does not take too much time to answer and yet systemat-
ically assesses all kinds of resources commonly identified as social capital resources
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of individuals in the literature. It consists of ten items, of which nine directly measure
access to some resource that stands for a class of resources relevant for a person’s
individual level social capital. Of these ten items, seven aim at social capital in the
private sphere and three are directed towards social capital in the work sphere. Out
of this stock, one indicator for social capital in the private sphere and two indicators
for social capital in the work sphere have been created. In an empirical application of
the tool in an online survey with a sample representative for the German adult resident
population, all indicators show their validity through a number of factors, especially by
exhibiting a high level of internal consistency and by delivering plausible results in line
with the theoretical considerations presented in this thesis.
Moreover, as a third major focus, an investigation into the distributional effects of a
diverse set of predictors on individual level social capital has taken place. In section 2.5,
a number of theoretical hypotheses on the effect of certain predictors was formulated
drawing on arguments from the literature and own considerations. In some cases,
clear-cut hypotheses could be stated. In other cases, the arguments presented only
allow for contradictory hypotheses. The empirical results of testing the hypotheses
developed in this thesis can hence be divided into two groups. Firstly, concerning the
predictors where a clear-cut research hypothesis has been formulated, these research
hypotheses have mostly been confirmed. Secondly, for those predictors where no
clear-cut research hypothesis has been formulated, the survey results indicate which
of the contradicting arguments dominates empirically.
The research hypotheses concerning the following predictors could be confirmed: In-
dividual level social capital declines with old age, and housewives and househusbands
have less social capital. People who spend more time with other people also have
more social capital, as predicted, and this is also true for group membership. When
looking at social network sites, the expected consistent positive effect can be found in
the private sphere. In the work sphere, this is only true if membership is connected
to an investment motive. A negative effect of mobility can only be found for employed
respondents’ work sphere related social capital. When looking at the big five charac-
ter traits, the hypothesized positive effect can only be shown for extraversion in both
spheres and for agreeableness in the private sphere. However, as expected, life satis-
faction and a preference for sociability are positive predictors for individual level social
capital possession.
A small number of hypotheses could not be confirmed. This is most notably the
hypothesis that there is a negative effect of residential mobility on social capital which
could not be confirmed in the private sphere, as is true for other studies [Pena-Lo´pez
and Sa´nchez-Santos (2017)]. Moreover, the hypothesis that living in a smaller town
leads to more social capital could not be confirmed. It should be noted there is no
effect of the big five character trait openness on individual level social capital and even
a negative effect of agreeableness in the work sphere. This latter result especially
highlights that differentiating between private sphere and work sphere is worthwhile.
When looking at the predictors where no clear-cut hypothesis could be derived theo-
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retically, the following results: Possessing other types of capital is clearly helpful in the
private sphere, supporting the hypothesis that possessing resources facilitates accu-
mulating social capital since it makes a person more attractive to be acquainted with.
This result still holds true for human capital in the work sphere, but no such effect can
be found in the work sphere for economic capital1. Behaviour that can be identified as
unconscious investment behaviour takes place and this also helps social capital cre-
ation. Conscious investment behaviour is only rarely admitted, and it is only helpful in
the work sphere, while it reduces social capital in the private sphere, probably because
it is considered socially unacceptable. There is a positive effect of being employed on
social capital, i.e. the effect of meeting people at the workplace outweighs the time cost
of working. Moreover, no migration effects could be found. Also, no consistently sig-
nificant effect showed up for living in or originating from eastern Germany. If there has
been an effect in the past, it has possibly faded 25 years after the German reunification.
Summing up, the concept of individual level social capital is a theoretically fruitful
and, from the perspective of methodological individualism, coherent concept to grasp
the resources an individual has access to via his social connections. It is thus a valu-
able addition to the well-established concepts of economic and human capital. The
indicator developed in this thesis leads to plausible results in its investigation in both
an individual’s private and his work sphere. Moreover, when looking at the predic-
tors of individual level social capital possession, evidence concerning the direction and
existence of a number of effects disputed in the literature could be gathered: This is
especially true for the question whether individual level social capital is a complement
or a substitute for other forms of capital (the former) and whether investment in social
capital takes place (it does, but its incomplete concealment is only accepted in the work
sphere).
The tool to measure individual level social capital developed in this thesis may, more-
over, be helpful for researches who want to use this concept as an explanatory variable
in other contexts. Consisting of only ten items, the tool is short enough to be included
in research questionnaires. Moreover, the calculation of the indicators follows a simple
to use procedure.
Building on this thesis, numerous research endeavours can be followed. Firstly, as
has been repeatedly discussed in this thesis, it would be interesting to find out for a
number of predictor variables whether they help in creating social capital, whether the
relationship is rather the other way around or whether they co-influence each other
simultaneously. However, such analysis can only take place with time-series data,
ideally with a natural experiment involved, which were not available for this thesis.
Secondly, the topic how social capital possession helps individuals to achieve certain
ends or how it changes their behavior in certain situations has not been discussed
in detail in this thesis. However, in economics, interesting questions abound: Are
individuals with a high level of individual level social capital more likely to be risk-taking
1A positive effect can be found when taking income as a proxy for wealth and only looking at employed
respondent’s work related social capital.
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in those fields where their social capital may serve as an informal insurance? Do
individuals with a high level of social capital buy different goods and services because
they could substitute them with resources they access via their social network? Is the
investment into social capital in the work sphere rational, i.e. can its rate of return
be estimated and, if so, how does it compare to the return on human and economic
capital?
Finally, further research also needs to be done to find a link, if there is any, between
individual level social capital possession and the macro level of norms and societal trust
postulated by Coleman (1988, 1990) and Putnam (1993, 2000) that is satisfactory from
a perspective of methodological individualism. Maybe the theoretical considerations
laid out and the indicator developed in this thesis can be used to theoretically construct
and empirically test such a link in a convincing manner.
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The regression tables for the baseline models from section 4.3 are presented here.
Social Capital in the Private Sphere
Number of Observations = 961
R-squared = 0.3572
F (23, 945) = 22.83
Predictor Coefficient p-value
Aged 50-70 -0.29 0.548
Housewife/-man -0.21 0.007
Student -0.13 0.139
Unemployed -0.17 0.061
Pensioneer -0.24 <0.001
Unable to Work -0.03 0.869
Selfemployed -0.12 0.117
Any Wealth 0.08 0.029
Highest Degree 0.07 <0.001
Conscious Investment -0.04 0.063
Unconscious Investment 0.02 0.092
Investment Motive on SNS 0.10 0.007
Balanced Reciprocity -0.12 0.014
Time Spent with Friends/Family 0.04 <0.001
Membership in Organizations 0.07 0.003
Membership in a Special Organization 0.01 0.864
Lives in Small Village 0.01 0.771
Lives in Eastern Germany 0.03 0.527
Moved in the last Five Years 0.00 0.975
Preference to spent Leisure Time with Others 0.09 <0.001
Extraversion 0.04 0.010
Agreeableness 0.06 0.001
Private Life Satisfaction 0.10 <0.001
Intercept -1.65 <0.001
Table 5.1: Base Model for Social Capital in the Private Sphere
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Employed Respondent’s Indicator, Psychometric
Number of Observations = 415
R-squared = 0.3637
F (17, 397) = 13.35
Predictor Coefficient p-value
Aged 50-70 -0.15 0.046
Any Wealth 0.02 0.778
Highest Degree 0.10 <0.001
Conscious Investment 0.12 0.002
Unconscious Investment 0.03 0.205
Investment Motive on Work-Related SNS 0.14 0.073
Balanced Reciprocity -0.05 0.512
Time Spent with Friends/Family 0.03 <0.001
Membership in Organizations -0.01 0.859
Membership in a Special Organization 0.22 0.012
Lives in Small Village 0.03 0.710
Lives in Eastern Germany 0.15 0.097
Moved in the last Five Years -0.12 0.079
Preference to get into Contact with Others at Work 0.15 <0.001
Extraversion 0.05 0.057
Agreeableness -0.06 0.063
Work Life Satisfaction 0.12 <0.001
Intercept -1.82 <0.001
Table 5.2: Base Model for Social Capital in the Work Sphere, Employed Respondent’s
Indicator, Psychometric
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Employed Respondent’s Indicator, Compositional
Number of Observations = 415
R-squared = 0.3322
F (17, 397) = 11.62
Predictor Coefficient p-value
Aged 50-70 -0.12 0.076
Any Wealth 0.02 0.776
Highest Degree 0.10 <0.001
Conscious Investment 0.10 0.004
Unconscious Investment 0.03 0.233
Investment Motive on Work-Related SNS 0.12 0.072
Balanced Reciprocity -0.10 0.178
Time Spent with Friends/Family 0.03 <0.001
Membership in Organizations -0.03 0.402
Membership in a Special Organization 0.18 0.019
Lives in Small Village 0.03 0.583
Lives in Eastern Germany 0.13 0.102
Moved in the last Five Years -0.13 0.036
Preference to get into Contact with Others at Work 0.14 <0.001
Extraversion 0.04 0.048
Agreeableness -0.05 0.052
Work Life Satisfaction 0.07 0.008
Intercept -1.82 <0.001
Table 5.3: Base Model for Social Capital in the Work Sphere, Employed Respondent’s
Indicator, Compositional
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Non-Retired Respondent’s Indicator, Psychometric
Number of Observations = 665
R-squared = 0.4452
F (21, 643) = 24.57
Predictor Coefficient p-value
Aged 50-70 -0.11 0.056
Housewife/-man -0.20 0.035
Student -0.43 <0.001
Unemployed -0.24 0.023
Selfemployed 0.16 0.042
Any Wealth 0.01 0.829
Highest Degree 0.08 <0.001
Conscious Investment 0.12 <0.001
Unconscious Investment 0.04 0.046
Investment Motive on Work-Related SNS 0.12 0.046
Balanced Reciprocity -0.07 0.230
Time Spent with Friends/Family 0.03 <0.001
Membership in Organizations 0.04 0.217
Membership in a Special Organization 0.24 <0.001
Lives in Small Village 0.08 0.150
Lives in Eastern Germany 0.09 0.194
Moved in the last Five Years -0.05 0.334
Preference to get into Contact with Others at Work 0.11 <0.001
Extraversion 0.04 0.025
Agreeableness -0.03 0.121
Work Life Satisfaction 0.12 <0.001
Intercept -1.74 <0.001
Table 5.4: Base Model for Social Capital in the Work Sphere, Non-Retired Respon-
dent’s Indicator, Psychometric
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Non-Retired Respondent’s Indicator, Compositional
Number of Observations = 665
R-squared = 0.4321
F (21, 643) = 23.30
Predictor Coefficient p-value
Aged 50-70 -0.10 0.057
Housewife/-man -0.19 0.029
Student -0.36 <0.001
Unemployed -0.25 0.010
Selfemployed 0.15 0.038
Any Wealth 0.01 0.744
Highest Degree 0.07 <0.001
Conscious Investment 0.11 <0.001
Unconscious Investment 0.03 0.053
Investment Motive on Work-Related SNS 0.11 0.039
Balanced Reciprocity -0.11 0.044
Time Spent with Friends/Family 0.03 <0.001
Membership in Organizations 0.03 0.312
Membership in a Special Organization 0.21 0.001
Lives in Small Village 0.07 0.148
Lives in Eastern Germany 0.07 0.251
Moved in the last Five Years -0.05 0.344
Preference to get into Contact with Others at Work 0.09 <0.001
Extraversion 0.04 0.014
Agreeableness -0.03 0.102
Work Life Satisfaction 0.10 <0.001
Intercept -1.53 <0.001
Table 5.5: Base Model for Social Capital in the Work Sphere, Non-Retired Respon-
dent’s Indicator, Compositional
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The print version of the questionnaire used in the empirical survey is included on the
next pages.
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Druckversion
Fragebogen
1   Einstieg
Sehr geehrte Umfrageteilnehmerin, sehr geehrter Umfrageteilnehmer,
wir alle haben regelmäßig Kontakt zu anderen Menschen. Einige Menschen treffen wir immer wieder, so dass wir sie mit der Zeit
kennen lernen und sie uns. So entwickeln sich Bekanntschaften und Freundschaften, aber auch berufliche Netzwerke.
Mit diesem Fragebogen möchte ich im Rahmen meiner Doktorarbeit an der Universität Hohenheim untersuchen, zu welchen Menschen
wir dauerhafte Verbindungen knüpfen, warum wir dies tun und worin wir uns dabei unterscheiden.
Die Beantwortung des Fragebogens dauert ca. 15 Minuten. Bitte nehmen Sie sich die Zeit, die Fragen gründlich zu lesen und
wahrheitsgemäß zu beantworten. Ihre Daten werden selbstverständlich nur anonymisiert gespeichert und vertraulich behandelt.
Ich freue mich über Anregungen und Kritik, dafür steht Ihnen am Ende der Umfrage ein Kommentarfeld zur Verfügung.
Für Ihre Teilnahme an dieser Umfrage möchte ich mich bereits jetzt sehr herzlich bedanken!
Mit freundlichen Grüßen
Jan Neidhardt
Lehrstuhl für VWL, insbes. Umweltökonomie sowie Ordnungs­, Struktur­ und Verbraucherpolitiik (Prof. Dr. Michael Ahlheim)
Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (520F)
Universität Hohenheim
70593 Stuttgart
2   AlterGeschlecht
Zunächst möchte ich Ihnen einige Fragen stellen, die mir bei der statistischen Auswertung dieser Befragung helfen.
Sie sind...
weiblich
männlich
Ihr Alter?
18 bis 23 Jahre
24 bis 29 Jahre
30 bis 39 Jahre
40 bis 49 Jahre
50 bis 59 Jahre
60 bis 69 Jahre
70 Jahre und älter
3   Schulabschluss
Was ist Ihr höchster Schulabschluss bzw. Ihr höchster im Ausland erzielter vergleichbarer Schulabschluss?
Hochschul­/ Fachhochschulabschluss
Abitur bzw. Erweiterte Oberschule mit Abschluss 12. Klasse (Hochschulreife)
Fachhochschulreife (Abschluss einer Fachoberschule etc.)
Realschulabschluss / Mittlere Reife / Polytechnische Oberschule mit Abschluss 10. Klasse
Volks­/ Hauptschulabschluss bzw. Polytechnische Oberschule mit Abschluss 8. oder 9. Klasse
Schule beendet ohne Abschluss
4   Einkommen
Wie hoch war das monatliche Nettoeinkommen Ihres Haushalts (Summe aller Einkünfte) im letzten Jahr? 
Das Nettoeinkommen setzt sich wie folgt zusammen:
Einkünfte aus Erwerbstätigkeit aller in Ihrem Haushalt lebenden Personen
+ Verdienste aus Nebenjobs 199
+ Verdienste aus Nebenjobs
+ Bezüge aus Renten oder Pensionen
+ sonstige öffentliche Zahlungen (z.B. Kindergeld)
+ weitere Einkünfte und Einnahmen (z.B. Kapitalerträge, Stipendien, Zuwendungen von Verwandten, etc.)
­ abzüglich gesetzlicher Steuern 
­ abzüglich Sozialversicherungsbeiträge (auch Grundbeträge zur privaten Krankenversicherung) o.Ä.
bis 1.300€
1.300€ bis unter 2.600€
2.600€ bis unter 3.600€
3.600€ bis unter 5.000€
5.000€ bis unter 10.000€
über 10.000€
5.1   Endseite Quota Full
6   Beruf
Sind Sie...
selbstständig tätig und beschäftigen nicht mehr als einen Arbeitnehmer?
selbstständig tätig mit zwei und mehr Arbeitnehmern?
Arbeitnehmer im öffentlichen Dienst oder Beamter?
Arbeitnehmer außerhalb des öffentlichen Diensts?
in Ausbildung / Studium?
arbeitslos gemeldet?
in Rente / Pension oder Vorruhestand?
in Mutterschutz / Erziehungsurlaub / Elternzeit?
einen Freiwilligendienst oder Wehrdienst absolvierend?
Hausfrau / Hausmann?
Sonstiges, und zwar: …   
7.1   Filter
Haben Sie eine leitende Funktion inne und Personalverantwortung für zwei und mehr Personen?
ja
nein
8.1   Filter
Hatten Sie während Ihrer Berufstätigkeit eine leitende Funktion inne und Personalverantwortung für zwei und mehr
Personen?
ja
nein
9.1   Filter
Hatten Sie vor Ihrem Mutterschutz/Erziehungsurlaub bzw. Ihrer Elternzeit eine leitende Funktion inne und
Personalverantwortung für zwei und mehr Personen?
ja
nein
10   Engste Beziehungen
Bitte beantworten Sie mir im Folgenden einige Fragen zu Ihrem Privatleben:
Wie viele Personen leben aktuell bei Ihnen im Haushalt?200
Wie viele Personen leben aktuell bei Ihnen im Haushalt?
Haben Sie derzeit eine feste Partnerschaft?
ja
nein
Wie stehen Sie zu folgenden Aussagen?
trifft voll und
ganz zu
trifft eher zu
weder
zutreffend
noch
unzutreffend
trifft eher
nicht zu
trifft
überhaupt
nicht zu
Diese
Verwandten
habe ich nicht
(mehr).
Zu meinen Geschwistern stehe ich in
einem engen Verhältnis.
Zu meinen Kindern stehe ich in einem
engen Verhältnis.
Zu meinen Eltern stehe ich in einem
engen Verhältnis.
11   Wohnort
Bitte beantworten Sie mir im Folgenden einige Fragen zu Ihrem Wohnort (Erstwohnsitz) und Ihrem Verhältnis zu diesem Ort:
Welches KFZ­Kennzeichen wird für Ihren Wohnort ausgegeben?
Unterscheidungskennzeichen, z.B. "B" für Berlin, "HH" für Hamburg.
Wenn für Ihren Wohnort mehrere Unterscheidungskennzeichen ausgegeben werden, geben Sie bitte nur eins davon an.
Wie viele Einwohner hat Ihr Wohnort?
unter 2.000 Einwohner
2.000 bis unter 5.000 Einwohner
5.000 bis unter 20.000 Einwohner
20.000 bis unter 100.000 Einwohner
mehr als 100.000 Einwohner
Haben Sie bereits an Ihrem aktuellen Wohnort gewohnt, als Sie die Grund­/ Volksschule besucht haben?
ja
nein
Sind Sie in den letzten fünf Jahren aus einem anderen Ort an Ihren aktuellen Wohnort umgezogen?
ja
nein
Wie weit lag ihr letzter Wohnort vom jetzigen Wohnort entfernt?
Ich habe noch nie an einem anderen Ort gewohnt.
1 bis 20 Kilometer
20 bis 100 Kilometer
mehr als 100 Kilometer
12   Migration
Bitte beantworten Sie mir im Folgenden einige Fragen zu Ihrer Familiengeschichte.
Haben bzw. hatten Sie oder mindestens ein Elternteil von Ihnen eine andere Staatsangehörigkeit als die deutsche?
Bitte kreuzen Sie alle zutreffenden Antwortmöglichkeiten an. 
ja, ich 
ja, meine Mutter 
ja, mein Vater 
nein 
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Sind Sie bzw. Vorfahren von Ihnen in Folge des 2. Weltkriegs als Vertriebene auf das jetzige Gebiet Deutschlands
gekommen?
ja
nein
Sind Sie bzw. Vorfahren von Ihnen als Spätaussiedler, d.h. als deutschstämmige Personen aus osteuropäischen Staaten,
nach Deutschland gekommen?
ja
nein
13.1   ich ausländer
Sie haben angegeben, dass Sie eine andere Staatsangehörigkeit als die deutsche besitzen bzw. in der Vergangenheit
besaßen. Um welche handelt es sich dabei?
Sonstiges, und zwar:   
14.1   ich ausländer
Sie haben angegeben, dass Ihre Mutter eine andere Staatsangehörigkeit als die deutsche besitzt bzw. in der
Vergangenheit besaß. Um welche handelt es sich dabei?
Sonstiges, und zwar:   
15.1   ich ausländer
Sie haben angegeben, dass Ihr Vater eine andere Staatsangehörigkeit als die deutsche besitzt bzw. in der
Vergangenheit besaß. Um welche handelt es sich dabei?
Sonstiges, und zwar:   
16   Sozialkapital 1
Ich bin daran interessiert, ob Sie jemanden kennen, der Sie bei den folgenden Dingen unterstützen würde. Denken Sie dabei an Ihre
Freunde und Bekannten, aber auch an Ihre Verwandten und ggf. Ihre Kinder und Ihren Partner.
Wie viele Personen kennen Sie, die Ihnen ohne finanzielle Gegenleistung bei kleineren Arbeiten in Ihrem Haushalt
helfen würden, z.B. wenn Sie Probleme mit der Technik haben (Fernseher, Computer, Telefon)?
0 Personen
Bulgarien
Griechenland
Italien
Kosovo
Kroatien
Polen
Rumänien
Russland
Serbien
Türkei
Sonstiges, und zwar:
Bulgarien
Griechenland
Italien
Kosovo
Kroatien
Polen
Rumänien
Russland
Serbien
Türkei
Sonstiges, und zwar:
Bulgarien
Griechenland
Italien
Kosovo
Kroatien
Polen
Rumänien
Russland
Serbien
Türkei
Sonstiges, und zwar:
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1 Person
2 Personen
3 bis 4 Personen
5 bis 7 Personen
8 bis 10 Personen
mehr als 10 Personen
Wie viele dieser Personen leben in Ihrem Haushalt?
0 Personen
1 Person
2 oder mehr Personen
Wie viele Personen außer Ihrem Bankberater kennen Sie, die sich gut mit Geldangelegenheiten auskennen und auf
deren Rat in diesen Dingen Sie sich verlassen können?
0 Personen
1 Person
2 Personen
3 bis 4 Personen
5 bis 7 Personen
8 bis 10 Personen
mehr als 10 Personen
Wie viele dieser Personen leben in Ihrem Haushalt?
0 Personen
1 Person
2 oder mehr Personen
Wie viele Personen kennen Sie, die Sie jederzeit anrufen können, wenn Sie jemanden zum Reden brauchen?
0 Personen
1 Person
2 Personen
3 bis 4 Personen
5 bis 7 Personen
8 bis 10 Personen
mehr als 10 Personen
Denken Sie kurz an eine Ihnen wichtige Person (z.B. Ihren Partner, Ihre Eltern, Ihre Kinder, einen engen Freund oder
eine enge Freundin).
Wie viele Personen kennen Sie, die bei dieser Person ein gutes Wort für Sie einlegen würden, z.B. nach einem heftigen
Streit?    
0 Personen
1 Person
2 Personen
3 bis 4 Personen
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5 bis 7 Personen
8 bis 10 Personen
mehr als 10 Personen
Wie viele Personen kennen Sie, bei denen Sie, immer wenn Sie eingeladen werden, Menschen kennenlernen, die Sie
sympathisch finden.    
0 Personen
1 Person
2 Personen
3 bis 4 Personen
5 bis 7 Personen
8 bis 10 Personen
mehr als 10 Personen
Wie viele Personen kennen Sie, bei denen Sie sich sonntags Lebensmittel leihen können?    
0 Personen
1 Person
2 Personen
3 bis 4 Personen
5 bis 7 Personen
8 bis 10 Personen
mehr als 10 Personen
17.1   Filter Arbeitsleben
Wie viele Personen kennen Sie, die bei Ihrem Chef ein gutes Wort für Sie einlegen würden, wenn es z.B. um Ihre Beförderung/Entfristung geht
oder darum, eine Abmahnung zu verhindern    
0 Personen
1 Person
2 Personen
3 bis 4 Personen
5 bis 7 Personen
8 bis 10 Personen
mehr als 10 Personen
Ich habe keinen Chef.
Wie viele Personen kennen Sie, die Ihnen einen Ihrer Qualifikation angemessenen Arbeitsplatz vermitteln würden?    
0 Personen
1 Person
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2 Personen
3 bis 4 Personen
5 bis 7 Personen
8 bis 10 Personen
mehr als 10 Personen
18   Sozialkapital 2
Wie hoch ist der maximale Geldbetrag, den Sie sich insgesamt von anderen Personen leihen könnten, wenn Sie
kurzfristig in eine finanzielle Notlage geraten würden? Gehen Sie davon aus, dass Sie auf Ihre eigenen Mittel keinen
Zugriff hätten.
0€
100€
500€
1.000€
5.000€
10.000€
20.000€
50.000€
mehr als 50.000€
Sind Sie mit den meisten Menschen, die Ihnen Geld leihen würden, verwandt?
ja
ungefähr mit der Hälfte
nein
19   Organisationen
Im Rahmen dieser Umfrage möchte ich Ihnen nun noch einige allgemeine Fragen stellen, die für die Auswertung der
Befragungsergebnisse von wissenschaftlicher Bedeutung sind.
Menschen engagieren sich in Deutschland in vielfältigen Formen und Organisationen, z.B. in Vereinen (u.a. Sportvereine, Musikvereine,
Schützenvereine, Heimatvereine, etc.), Bürgerinitiativen, Beiräten (z.B. Elternbeiräten, Gemeinderäten), einer Kirchen­ oder
Moscheegemeinde, der freiwilligen Feuerwehr, etc.
In wie vielen dieser Organisationen sind Sie aktives Mitglied?
0 Organisationen
1 Organisation
2 Organisationen
3 bis 4 Organisationen
5 oder mehr Organisationen
Wie viele Stunden sind Sie in einer durchschnittlichen Woche insgesamt bei diesen Organisationen aktiv?
0 Stunden
1 bis 2 Stunden
3 bis 5 Stunden
6 bis 10 Stunden
mehr als 10 Stunden
In wie vielen dieser Organisationen engagieren Sie sich über die bloße Teilnahme an Angeboten der Organisation (z.B.
dem Training eines Sportvereins) hinaus, z.B. als Übungs­ oder Gruppenleiter, in der Jungendarbeit, der
Öffentlichkeitsarbeit oder der allgemeinen Organisationarbeit, als Spendensammler oder Vorstandsmitglied?
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0 Organisationen
1 Organisation
2 Organisationen
3 bis 4 Organisationen
5 oder mehr Organisationen
Haben Sie schon einmal eine solche Organsation mit gegründet?
ja, schon einmal
ja, schon zweimal
ja, schon drei­ oder viermal
ja, schon fünfmal oder öfter
nein
Haben Sie schon einmal gemeinsam mit anderen ein Straßen­, Dorf­, Stadtteil­, Vereins­ oder Feuerwehrfest oder eine
ähnliche Veranstaltung organisiert?
ja, schon ein­ oder zweimal
ja, schon drei­ bis fünfmal
ja, schon sechs­ bis zehnmal
ja, schon zehnmal oder öfter
nein
Haben Sie schon einmal gemeinsam mit anderen ein Unternehmen gegründet?
ja, schon einmal
ja, schon zwei­ oder dreimal
ja, schon viermal oder öfter
nein
20   Vitamin B clubs
Sind Sie Mitglied in einer der folgenden Organisationen?
einer Studentenverbindung 
einem Rotary­ oder Lionsclub oder einem vergleichbaren Wohltätigkeitsclub 
einem Soldaten­ oder Veteranenverein 
einer Partei oder politischen Vereinigung 
einem Berufsverband (Gewerkschaften sind hier nicht gemeint) 
Sind Sie während Ihres Studiums von einem Begabtenförderungswerk (z.B. Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes,
Friedrich­Ebert­Stiftung, etc.) mit einem Stipendium ausgestattet worden?
ja
nein
Sind Sie Mitglied in einem sozialen Netzwerk für private Kontakte (z.B. Facebook, tumblr, instagram, etc.)?
ja
nein
Sind Sie Mitglied in einem sozialen Netzwerk für berufliche Kontakte (z.B. LinkedIn, Xing, etc.)?
ja
nein
Sind Sie Mitglied in einer Organisation, deren Mitgliedschaft man nur auf Einladung bzw. Empfehlung von Mitgliedern206
Sind Sie Mitglied in einer Organisation, deren Mitgliedschaft man nur auf Einladung bzw. Empfehlung von Mitgliedern
erlangen kann?
ja
nein
21.1   Filter Facebook
Sie haben angegeben, dass Sie Mitglied in einem sozialen Netzwerk für private Kontakte sind. Mit welchem Ziel haben
Sie sich bei einem solchen Netzwerk angemeldet?
Bitte kreuzen Sie alle zutreffenden Antworten an.
Ich wollte neue Freunde finden. 
Ich wollte alte Freunde, zu denen ich den Kontakt verloren hatte, wiederfinden. 
Ich wollte so den Kontakt zu meinen bestehenden Freunden erhalten. 
Ich wollte die Möglichkeit haben, am Leben anderer Menschen teilzunehmen. 
Sonstiges, und zwar:   
22.1   Filter Facebook
Sie haben angegeben, dass Sie Mitglied in einem sozialen Netzwerk für berufliche Kontakte sind. Mit welchem Ziel
haben Sie sich bei einem solchen Netzwerk angemeldet?
Bitte kreuzen Sie alle zutreffenden Antwortmöglichkeiten an.
Ich wollte einen neuen Job finden. 
Ich wollte mein Einkommen steigern. 
Ich wollte dadurch Aufträge für meine Firma akquirieren. 
Ich wollte dadurch Möglichkeiten zur beruflichen Kooperation finden. 
Ich wollte dadurch einen neuen Mitarbeiter finden. 
sonstiges, und zwar:   
23   Verwandtschaft
Einen möglichen sozialen Bezugspunkt stellt die eigene Verwandtschaft dar. Mit Verwandtschaft meine ich Menschen, mit denen Sie
verwandt oder verschwägert sind, nicht jedoch Ihren Partner/Ihre Partnerin und Ihre bei Ihnen daheim lebenden Kinder.
Wie stehen Sie zu folgender Aussage:
"Meine Verwandtschaft ist mir wichtig"?
trifft voll und ganz zu
trifft eher zu
weder zutreffend noch unzutreffend
trifft eher nicht zu
trifft überhaupt nicht zu
Außer den oben genannten habe ich keine weiteren Verwandten (mehr).
Wie viele Stunden verbringen Sie in einer durchschnittlichen Woche damit, Ihre Verwanden  persönlich zu treffen, mit
ihnen zu telefonieren oder ihnen zu schreiben?
0 Stunden
1 Stunde
2 Stunden
3 bis 4 Stunden
5 bis 7 Stunden
8 bis 10 Stunden
mehr als 10 Stunden
Was würden Sie sagen: Zu wie vielen Ihrer Verwandten haben Sie eine enge Beziehung?207
Was würden Sie sagen: Zu wie vielen Ihrer Verwandten haben Sie eine enge Beziehung?
0 Personen
1 Person
2 Personen
3 bis 4 Personen
5 bis 7 Personen
8 bis 10 Personen
mehr als 10 Personen
24   Freundschaft
Neben der Beziehung zu den eigenen Verwandten stellen Freundschaften mit anderen Menschen oft wichtige soziale Bezugspunkte dar.
Wie stehen Sie zu folgender Aussage: "In meiner Freizeit verbringe ich gerne Zeit mit meinen Freunden"?
trifft voll und ganz zu
trifft eher zu
weder zutreffend noch unzutreffend
trifft eher nicht zu
trifft überhaupt nicht zu
Wie viele Stunden verbringen Sie in einer durchschnittlichen Woche damit, Ihre Freunde persönlich zu treffen, mit
Ihnen zu telefonieren oder Ihnen zu schreiben?
0 Stunden
1 Stunde
2 Stunden
3 bis 4 Stunden
5 bis 7 Stunden
8 bis 10 Stunden
mehr als 10 Stunden
Was würden Sie sagen: Wie viele enge Freunde haben Sie?
0 Personen
1 Person
2 Personen
3 bis 4 Personen
5 bis 7 Personen
8 bis 10 Personen
mehr als 10 Personen
25   Investition
Wie stehen Sie zu folgenden Aussagen?
trifft voll und
ganz zu trifft eher zu
weder
zutreffend noch
unzutreffend
trifft eher nicht
zu
trifft überhaupt
nicht zu
Wenn mir einer meiner Freunde oder
Verwandten einen größeren Gefallen tut,
dann habe ich das Gefühl, dafür in seiner
Schuld zu stehen.
Freundschaft ist ein Geben und ein
Nehmen.
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Es kann auf Dauer nicht gut gehen, wenn
jemand immer nur um Gefallen bittet und
nie Gefallen erbringt.
Ich bin stets dafür offen, neue Menschen
kennenzulernen.
Sehr häufig häufig manchmal selten nie
Ich sehe mich manchmal bewusst nach
neuen Freunden um oder kontaktiere alte
Freunde, zu denen der Kontakt
eingeschlafen war.
Ich halte zu manchen Menschen vor allem
deshalb Kontakt, weil es manchmal
nützlich sein kann, sie zu kennen.
Ich habe schon versucht, mich mit einem
Menschen anzufreunden, weil ich dachte,
dass es einmal nützlich sein kann, ihn zu
kennen.
Zu manchen Menschen, die ich kenne,
nehme ich hin und wieder Kontakt auf,
damit die Beziehung zu Ihnen nicht
einschläft.
sehr häufig häufig manchmal selten sehr selten
Bei meiner Arbeit komme ich mit
unterschiedlichen Menschen in Kontakt.
trifft voll und
ganz zu trifft eher zu
weder
zutreffend noch
unzutreffend
trifft eher nicht
zu
trifft überhaupt
nicht zu
Meine Freizeit verbringe ich am liebsten
gemeinsam mit anderen.
Ich verfüge über ein ausgeprägtes
Netzwerk an beruflichen Kontakten.
Ich verfüge über ein ausgeprägtes
Netzwerk an privaten Kontakten.
26   Glücklich
Bitte beantworten Sie mir zuletzt noch einige Fragen dazu, wie Sie sich selbst und Ihre aktuelle Lebenssituation
einschätzen.
vollkommen
zufrieden eher zufrieden
weder zufrieden
noch
unzufrieden
eher
unzufrieden
vollkommen
unzufrieden
Wie zufrieden sind Sie mit Ihrem
Privatleben?
Wie zufrieden sind Sie mit Ihrer Arbeit?
Wie zufrieden sind Sie mit Ihrem Leben
insgesamt?
Ich sehe mich selbst als...
trifft voll
und ganz
zu
trifft
größtenteils
zu
trifft eher
zu
weder
zutreffend
noch
unzutreffend
trifft eher
nicht zu
trifft
größtenteils
nicht zu
trifft
überhaupt
nicht zu
extrovertiert, begeistert
kritisch,streitsüchtig
zuverlässig, selbstdiszipliniert
ängstlich, leicht aus der Fassung zu
bringen
offen für neue Erfahrungen, vielschichtig
zurückhaltend, still
verständnisvoll, warmherzig
unorganisiert, achtlos
gelassen, emotional stabil
konventionell, unkreativ
27   Vermoegen
Abschließend möchte ich Ihnen noch einige Fragen zu Ihren Vermögensverhältnissen stellen. Diese sind für die Auswertung der Daten
sehr wichtig, weshalb ich Sie bitten möchte, sie wahrheitsgemäß zu beantworten.209
sehr wichtig, weshalb ich Sie bitten möchte, sie wahrheitsgemäß zu beantworten.
Wie groß ist der Wert Ihres Immobilien­ (Wohnung oder Haus) und Grundstückbesitzes ungefähr?
Ich besitze keine Immobilien und keine Grundstücke
bis 80.000€
80.000€ bis unter 250.000€
250.000€ bis unter 600.000€
600.000€ bis unter 1.000.000€
über 1.000.000€
Ich besitze Immobilien oder Grundstücke, kann aber den Wert nicht einschätzen.
28   Finanzvermögen
Wie groß ist Ihr Finanzvermögen ungefähr?
inklusive
­ Geld auf Bankkonten
­ Aktienbesitz 
­ Unternehmensanteilen
­ Guthaben bei Bausparkassen
­ Guthaben bei Kapitallebens­ und privaten Rentenversicherungen
ohne Immobilien und Grundstücke?
unter 2.000€
2.000€ bis unter 20.000€
20.000€ bis unter 80.000€
80.000€ bis unter 250.000€
250.000€ bis unter 600.000€
600.000€ bis unter 1.000.000€
über 1.000.000€
Ich besitze Finanzvermögen, kann den Wert aber nicht einschätzen.
29   Schulden
Haben Sie Schulden (z.B. aus dem Erwerb einer Immobilie oder eines Autos) und, wenn ja, in welcher Höhe?
Ich habe keine Schulden
unter 2.000€
2.000€ bis unter 20.000€
20.000€ bis unter 80.000€
80.000€ bis unter 250.000€
250.000€ bis unter 600.000€
600.000€ bis unter 1.000.000€
über 1.000.000€
Ich habe Schulden, kann den Wert aber nicht abschätzen.
30   Feedback
Haben Sie noch Anregungen zur Umfrage?
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31   Endseite
Vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme!
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